

A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR)

December 2007

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This guide serves as an introduction to SSR and suggests some key sources for further reading. It is available as a downloadable document from www.ssmnetwork.net along with a database of key UK and international actors in SSR and a comprehensive SSR acronyms list, which form useful complementary reading to this guide.

This is the revised version of the guide and includes references to the recently published **OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: supporting security and justice** – currently the only international set of principles laid down to guide SSR programming. It also includes a number of new sections and literature references.

A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR)

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What is SSR?

Security Sector Reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good governance and, in particular, the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law. This relies on the ability of the state to mitigate its people's vulnerabilities through development, and to use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that affect society's well-being. This includes establishing appropriate civilian oversight of security actors. Hence, a broader range of state institutions is now being considered in the provision of security, with the military seen as one instrument among many. The 'security sector' includes traditional security actors such as the armed forces and police; oversight bodies such as the executive and legislature; civil society organisations; justice and law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary and prisons; as well as non-state security providers.

SSR as understood by the UN, the OECD and the UK government

Whilst SSR is a relatively new term, it has been adopted by major international bodies and countries as a holistic concept that includes various disciplines and covers many different sectors and in order to be successful; must be treated as such. However there is not yet one universally accepted definition.

The United Nations Security Council believes that SSR is “critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate State authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict”. As such, the Security Council “emphasizes that security sector reform must be context-driven and that the needs will vary from situation to situation. The Security Council encourages States to formulate their security sector reform programmes in a holistic way that encompasses strategic planning, institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, civilian oversight and good governance. The Security Council emphasizes the need for a balanced realisation of all aspects of security sector reform, including institutional capacity, affordability, and sustainability of its programmes. The Security Council recognizes the interlinkages between security sector reform and other important factors of stabilization and reconstruction, such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues”.

(UN Security Council, 20 February 2007)

The UK Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), defines SSR as: “a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognised democratic norms and principles.” (Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004)

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) defines SSR as: “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing.” (OECD, 2004)

How has SSR developed? How is it a part of the International Development Agenda?

The SSR policy agenda has developed over the past 15 years as the traditional concept of security has evolved. During the Cold War, SSR concerns were seen as secondary to which sides ruling groups took in the East-West conflict.

Development practitioners largely avoided security issues, which were inevitably bound up with political ideologies, and security policy focussed on the protection of states from military threats and, very often, providing illegitimate regimes with illegitimate support.

Since the end of the Cold War concerns have changed and security challenges have become more complex. It is now recognised that states have often failed to fulfil their security obligations, or have even actively compromised the security of their own people. Consequently, the security agenda has broadened to include the well-being of populations and human rights, SSR being part of the wider 'human security' framework. In this context, security and development have become increasingly linked – international security actors have realised that their short term operations will not bring sustainable benefit without coordinating their activities with longer-term development work. Similarly, development practitioners have realised that it is impractical to consider development without taking security issues into account.

Violence and security are a priority concern of those suffering from poverty and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, who are often subject to bad policing, weak justice and corrupt militaries. Security is also intrinsic to personal and state safety, access to government services and participation in political processes. SSR contributes to the development of appropriate structures to help prevent instability and violent conflict. It can contribute to creating the conditions necessary for economic and social development and the protection of human rights and is therefore a prerequisite to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

The UK Government has a collaborative approach to SSR that attempts to combine the knowledge, expertise and experience of the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence.

An increasing number of bilateral and multilateral institutions also recognise the potential of SSR. In June 2006 the EU adopted an SSR policy and began work on the practicalities of its implementation later that year. The OECD DAC Network

on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) produced the **OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice** which will provide a framework to guide SSR programmes and to close the gap between policy and practice. Similarly, the UN views SSR as an integral part of its preventative approach to conflict and has produced a number of papers on certain SSR activities and topics such as gender and SSR and restructuring security forces in a post-conflict setting.

Core principles and associated challenges of implementing SSR

In its handbook, the OECD-DAC provides an implementation framework based on practical experience and research. The 30 member states committed themselves in April 2007 to a number of good practices in SSR that include:

- 1) Building understanding, dialogue and political will. Involvement in SSR should aim to improve security and justice delivery, establish effective governance and accountability and develop local ownership of a reform process that reviews the capacity and needs of the security system.
- 2) Dialogue between security and non-security actors is essential for co-ordination and co-operation in joint fields of security and justice reform as well as governance.
- 3) Programme implementation must realise that short term projects will not benefit SSR as more often than not SSR is a long term process which requires dedication on the part of the donor government and long term commitments from the local actors.
- 4) Integrated government teams may produce more for the SSR process than if they work individually as unique government departments.

For the complete set of good practices, please refer to the OECD DAC handbook pages 10-12.

There are also a number of associated challenges involved in the implementation of SSR:

- It can be difficult to find local ownership for SSR, especially where it is most needed, for example where security forces are part of the problem or where SSR may have the potential to change current power relationships.

- SSR is expensive and human resource intensive – it requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors and expertise from a range of different governmental departments and non-governmental institutions.
- SSR includes a wide range of activities and can be deployed in support of a number of key objectives. This can often lead to inconsistencies and unevenness in implementation. The challenge is to provide a consistent and coherent overall framework with some form of prioritisation to avoid a mixed bag of ad hoc activities.
- SSR takes a long-time to bring about changes, which may deter donors from engaging in this type of work.

(OECD DAC Security System Reform and Governance)

The Global Conflict Prevention Pool's (GCPP) Security Sector Reform Strategy

The UK government's SSR strategy is funded by the GCPP. The strategy belongs to the GCPP funding departments which are the Department for International Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The GCPP aims to ensure that the UK government's policy towards potential and actual conflicts is based on analysis that is shared by these three departments. The diplomatic, development and military policies of these three departments are fed into this body in order to link them all into a unified and jointly agreed strategy for dealing with conflict. The GCPP has 12 geographical strategies that are country and regionally based.

In addition, the SSR strategy provides the GCPP and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) with a central base for resources, policy advice and information on SSR. The strategy recognises the need to influence thinking and develop understanding of SSR among conflict prevention pool partners – across Whitehall and internationally. To achieve this it focuses on four key outputs:

- Analysis and research for policy development;
- Effective institutional reform;
- Capacity building;
- Mainstreaming and international influencing.

The Strategy has provided the funding for two key SSR resources – the Security Sector Development Advisory Team **SSDAT** and **GFN-SSR**. These bodies aim to enable GCPP geographical strategies to access the support they require to plan

effective SSR programmes on the ground, notably in Jamaica, Uganda and Sierra Leone where the UK has taken the lead in promoting SSR. Funding from the Strategy has also (in part through GFN-SSR) provided practical support to the establishment of regional networks of civil society groups, academics, parliamentarians and government officials, building their capacity to understand and advocate SSR needs.

The Strategy also funds places on Defence Education programmes which are aimed at developing professional and democratic armed forces; underpinned by transparent governance regimes. As well as complementing other SSR initiatives and building regional confidence, these programmes facilitate wider engagement where entry points have been limited.

What are the areas of SSR engagement?

SSR engagement necessitates a multisectoral approach including defence, intelligence, policing, prisons, civil society, civilian oversight, financial management, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Further details on each of these sectors are provided in the corresponding sections below.

Where can I find further sources of information on aspects of SSR?

The following texts provide a useful introduction to different facets of the SSR policy agenda:

SSR: General

- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007, '[OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice](#)' Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris

How can SSR be introduced into different political environments and accepted as part of a national agenda? What is an SSR assessment methodology and how can it be implemented? How can an integrated approach to SSR be developed and what does it include? Which sectors are included in this holistic SSR approach? This handbook presents a detailed look at these questions and more, providing a framework for how SSR should be carried out and what the different challenges are in executing post-conflict SSR.

- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004, '**Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice**', Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines and Reference Document, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

How do you foster through governance reforms a secure environment that is conducive to poverty reduction and sustainable development? What are the key components of security? These are questions that are addressed in this publication by the OECD DAC. The research suggests that the traditional concept of security is being redefined. The document sets out the key concepts of security system reform (SSR) and suggests ways to support it in developing countries.

Defence

Armed forces need to respond to the strategic context by building militarily effective institutions, whilst also ensuring that they remain responsive to the legitimate demands of a democratic society. A major challenge for civilian and military leaders is to strike a balance between these (sometimes competing) requirements. It is also important to take account of the history and traditions of individual armed forces, which are normally critical factors in maintaining their identity, sense of shared purpose and morale. However, these should not stand in the way of achieving efficiency, effectiveness, affordability, duty, political neutrality, human rights, justice and the development of civilian control through democratic institutions.

- Chuter, D., 2000, '**Defence Transformation: A short guide to the issues**', ISS Monograph no. 49, Pretoria

How have nations adapted their defence policies to the post-Cold War world? What is required to manage armed forces effectively in a democracy? This Institute for Security Studies (ISS) paper provides a practical guide to defence transformation, beginning with fundamental questions about the role and place of the military in civil society. It argues that defence transformation is not a single process with a generic blueprint; rather it must be an organic process that grows out of each country's particular circumstances.

For further information on defence reform and a Ukraine case study please refer to the OECD DAC handbook pages 124-139.

Intelligence

Intelligence services play a vital role in protecting national security, but it is important that they should be subject to appropriate democratic civilian oversight. Such oversight is necessary to provide appropriate checks on their power, and also to ensure that the need for these services to operate clandestinely does not conflict with the principle of transparent democratic governance. They should derive their existence and powers from legislation, and the use of special powers should be grounded in law. The executive exercises direct control and determines the budget, setting general guidelines and priorities for the intelligence services. The judiciary should oversee the use of their special powers, and judges should prosecute any wrongdoing.

- Hannah, G., O'Brien, K. and Rathmell, A., 2005, '**Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform**', RAND Europe, Cambridge

What choices are required when designing and implementing legislative oversight of intelligence and security services? This RAND report provides an opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of intelligence and security legislation in various countries. Case studies from the UK, Canada, South Africa, Germany, the Czech Republic and Argentina provide a balance between developed and developing countries alongside evolutionary versus revolutionary intelligence reforms.

For further information on intelligence reform and case studies from the Middle East please refer to the OECD DAC handbook pages 140-150.

Policing

The main objectives of SSR from a policing perspective are to increase respect for human rights and to provide greater security for citizens, rather than focus exclusively on the security of the state. In countries making the transition from authoritarian government or violent conflict, a particular priority in the short-term can be to 'demilitarise' the police. This often means ensuring a clear functional differentiation between a heavily armed, unified military, physically separated from the population; and a community based police service which focuses on local needs policing rather than act entirely as an agent of the state. This is a precondition for establishing democracy and providing a favourable environment for economic development.

- Ziegler, M. and Nield, R. 2001, '**From Peace to Governance: Police Reform and the International Community**', Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

Is police reform a worthwhile cause for donors to take up, considering the serious political risks it entails? What are the positive outcomes of police reform? What are the impediments to police reform? This report summarises the findings of a conference, 'Police Reform and the International Community: From Peace Processes to Democratic Governance'. Despite the political risks, the positive aspects of police reform have encouraged donors to participate. Police reform can support demilitarisation and democratisation, boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve respect for human rights. However, case studies from Central and South America and South Africa highlight the difficulty of achieving reform where violent crime is on the rise.

For more information on police reform and case studies of Malawi, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo please refer to the OECD DAC handbook pages 163-181.

Prison Reform

The penal system is one of the main benchmarks by which post-conflict situations are assessed in terms of transparency, justice and accountability. It touches upon many themes including transitional justice, human rights in prisons, juvenile justice, prison reform, pre-trial detention and others. From undermining SSR because prisons were easily broken out of to creating tension and lack of credibility for the post-conflict state, the penal system is a visible example of the states' fairness and authority. Thus, penal reform is an integral part of the SSR process.

- Tkachuk, B., 2001, '**International Prison Policy Development Instrument**' International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy

What national and international guidelines exist on penal systems? Do they cover prison development, human rights of prisoners and good practices? How well do they conform to international human rights standards? This detailed and comprehensive prison policy instrument is a compilation of standards and policies from national and international sources and covers everything from the transfer of keys to dealing with transsexual inmates. Policies are based on the rule of law and national and international human rights standards – mostly UN standards such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

- Romdhane, D., 2004, Supporting Penal and Prison Reform in North Africa: Algeria and Morocco, in Ferguson, C. and Isima, J.O., 2004, '**Providing Security for People: Enhancing Security through Police, Justice and Intelligence Reform in Africa**', Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Shrivenham

What is the best way to support penal and prison reform? Can prison reform contribute to individual security? This paper analyses the experiences of Penal Reform International (PRI), in supporting penal reform in Morocco and Algeria. It suggests that supporting prison reform requires both modesty and ambition: ambition to see potential for change, and modesty to accept that it is not the role of international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to substitute for government.

For more information on penal reform please refer to the OECD DAC handbook page 199.

Justice Reform

The absence of a functioning and impartial justice system is a severe hindrance to SSR efforts and the development of a state. States need effective judicial systems that are able to resolve conflicts and to set down the law for violations. Marginalised peoples will remain vulnerable to oppression without the strength of the law to support them. In many countries such an absence can lead to non-state dispute resolution mechanisms that may not be impartial. Justice reform must be seen as part of a wide reform approach and if done in isolation may not necessarily achieve the desired results. Actors in the justice sector include and are not limited to the judiciary, prosecutors, NGOs, defence lawyers, ministry of justice and its officials.

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002, '**Access to Justice for all and Justice Sector Reform**', BDP Policy Note presented at UNDP Access to Justice Workshop, Oslo, March 2002

Why is justice sector reform important for democratic governance and development? How does the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organise its operations in the sector? This policy note, presented at a UNDP Access to Justice Workshop, outlines recent thinking in the field and categorises UNDP activities within it.

- Piron, L-H., 2005 '**Donor Assistance to Justice Sector Reform in Africa: Living Up to the New Agenda?**' Open Society Justice Initiative, New York

Is donor assistance to promote justice sector reform grounded in an adequate and appropriate understanding of African realities? Does it complement or conflict with the new poverty reduction agenda? This paper outlines the history and current status of justice sector aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Justice sector aid could be a

pro-poor, long term, developmental endeavour that contributes to the realisation of human rights, but only if key changes take place.

- Open Society Justice Initiative, 2005, '**Human Rights and Justice Sector Reform in Africa: Contemporary Issues and Responses**', Justice Initiatives, Open Society Justice Initiative

Can the justice system in Africa be looked at specifically from a legalistic point of view? Should other factors such as formal, informal, national and international mechanisms be considered too? This collection of articles from the Open Society Institute (OSI) demonstrates a holistic review of justice, including localising universal norms, globalising local principles of access to justice and promoting the link between justice, safety and security through the safeguarding of accountability mechanisms.

For more information on justice sector reform and case studies from El Salvador and South Africa please refer to the OECD DAC handbook pages 182-198.

Private Military Companies/Private Security Companies (PMC/ PSC)

The terms PMC and PSC have been used exclusively and interchangeably in different contexts. Technically the difference is between the services that each provide. A PMC will typically provide military combat services (offensive and/or defensive) as well as military training and intelligence. In contrast to this, PSCs will provide actual security for commercial interests and/or government interests, close protection of VIPs, risk assessment and risk analyses. However with the diversification of these companies and the massive contracts they now oversee, there is a huge overlap in the work they do and it is not uncommon to find major PMCs and PSCs offering the same services. Controversies surround the accountability of their operations and previous activities, with critics pointing to legal black holes which they see these companies operating in.

The speed at which these companies operate within a conflict and post-conflict situation can occur within the "golden two month period" and if coordinated with development programs can have a positive impact in securing and stabilising areas for development work to be carried out.

- Richards, A. & Smith, H., 2007, '**Addressing the Role of Private Security Companies within Security Sector Reform Programmes**', Saferworld, London.

What is the relationship between PSCs and SSR? What are the duties and roles that should govern the role of PSCs in SSR? What is the legislation that governs the activities of PSCs and their role in SSR? As well as placing restrictions on physical operations and the use of weapons, the paper also advocates the prohibition of political affiliations or ties between political parties and the private security industry. The paper draws heavily upon the Sarajevo Code of Conduct for PSCs which was a successful culmination of work done by the South East European Small Arms and Light Weapons Clearing House SEESAC, Saferworld and the Centre for Security Studies that set out guidelines for working with PSCs.

For more information on PMC/PSCs and SSR, please refer to the OECD DAC handbook, pages 211-224.

Civilian Oversight

Civilian oversight and accountability is needed to ensure that state-military relations are conducive to democratic politics and that human security is promoted as well as national security. This can be difficult to achieve where there are complex technical issues, vested interests and a culture of secrecy at stake. Approaches in this area often include building the capacity and expertise of a variety of state institutions, including governments, legislatures, judicial institutions, ombudsmen and complaints bodies. Non-state actors can also play an important role.

- Born, H., Fluri, P., and Lunn, S., (eds.) 2003, '**Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform**: A Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector', DCAF/NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Geneva

Who should be responsible for making security policy? Is the executive responsible for planning and executing security policy as opposed to parliament? This paper from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) argues that parliamentary oversight of the security sector and its reform is in the interests of strengthening democracy and security. Security sector reform creates systematic accountability and transparency on the premise of increased democratic control, placing it within the context of the good governance agenda.

Civil Society

The term 'civil society' is often used with imprecision, but is generally understood to encompass areas of activity that take place outside of the state's direct control. It includes a wide range of actors, including non-governmental organisations, grassroots, professional, religious and labour organisations and groups, as well as the media. The security sector has historically proven one of the most resistant to public input, and a major objective of SSR is to make the sector more accountable to citizens and communities, and more responsive to their needs. Civil society can play an important role in encouraging the state to fulfil its responsibilities transparently and accountably. This can be through a range of functions including advocacy, monitoring, policy support and service delivery.

- Ball, N., 2006, '**Civil Society, Good Governance and the Security Sector**', in *Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies*, eds. Caparini, M., Fluri, P. & Molnar, F., DCAF, Geneva, Ch.4.

Why is civil society involvement important in SSR? Can civil society influence government accountability and policy formation? What are the challenges for civil society in promoting democratic security sector governance? Ball argues that the existence of unprofessional and unaccountable security forces derives from the failure to develop democratic systems. Possibilities for civil society involvement vary according to context and are dependent upon the overall state of democratic governance in that particular context. There are both internal and external challenges to civil society involvement in the security sector. Internal challenges include a lack of expertise and confidence or unwillingness to engage. External problems include government suspicion and donor policies that give inadequate attention to strengthening democratic governance.

- Caparini, M & Fluri, P., 2006. '**Civil Society Actors in Defence and Security Affairs**' in *Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies*, eds. Caparini, M., Fluri, P & Molnar, F., DCAF, Geneva, Ch.1.

What is civil society? How can it contribute to democratic governance of the security sector? This introductory chapter to the book '*Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies*', explores these questions and provides an overview of subsequent chapters which explore the role of civil society (including the media) in post-communist Europe. It argues that civil society in post-communist Europe is still weak and has been hampered by both a lack of

civil society interest in and expertise of security issues. Donor policies have hindered civil society involvement by pre-occupying themselves with legal frameworks, institutional reforms and direct security assistance.

- Ball, N. and Brzoska, M., 2002, '**Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector**', Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Bonn

Why is security important in human development? How can the security sector be held accountable? This paper from the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) discusses the need to keep the security sector accountable and under democratic, civil control. It argues for civil oversight, transparency, respect between civil authorities and security forces, and commitment from country leadership.

For a case study on civil society involvement in SSR in Guatemala please refer to the OECD DAC handbook page 233.

Gender

The integration of gender issues in SSR is important to strengthen local ownership, effective delivery of security and justice services, and oversight and accountability of the security sector. Women's civil society organisations can serve as a crucial bridge between local communities and security policymakers, enabling local ownership through communicating security needs to policy makers and raising awareness of SSR in local communities. Men, women, boys and girls have different security and justice needs and priorities. Taking into account these differences, including gender-based violence, in SSR policy and programming is essential to effective and efficient delivery of security and justice services. Integrating gender issues also highlights the need to support the establishment of representative and non-discriminatory security sector institutions – increased participation of women can strengthen civilian trust and operational effectiveness. Gender-responsive internal initiatives, for instance codes of conduct, can help prevent, address and sanction human rights violations committed by security sector personnel. Two complementary strategies are often used to integrate gender: gender mainstreaming – which involves considering the impact of all SSR policies and programmes on women, men, girls and boys – and promoting the equal representation of men and women – which includes initiatives to increase the recruitment, retention and advancement of women.

- Valasek, Kristin, 2005, "Gender and Security Sector Reform: An Analytical Framework", UN-INSTRAW

What are the different aims of SSR programmes and do they address gender issues? Why is gender relevant to SSR and what value would it bring to SSR programmes? How can gender be incorporated into SSR processes? What are the possible barriers to mainstreaming gender? This introductory document to gender and SSR provides succinct background reading on the relevance of gender to SSR and proposes a preliminary framework to approaching the issue.

- UNDP, 2001, '**Gender Approaches in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations**'

How has the understanding of gender issues developed? How are gender issues addressed in international legal guidelines? How do gender approaches fit into conflict and post-conflict situations? Beginning by charting the various approaches to gender and women issues over the past thirty years, this manual provides practical tools for gender mainstreaming including a guide to gender analysis, gender checklists and how to integrate gender issues in the project cycle.

Further online information on gender and SSR issues, including a bibliography, lists of relevant organisations and international agreements, a Gender and SSR Network, etc. can be found online at www.un-instraw.org - the website for the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women. In addition, UN-INSTRAW in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is currently developing a Gender and SSR Toolkit for practitioners and policymakers which will be available online in February 2008.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into peacetime economic and social life is essential for restoring security. It can be an important part of SSR during transitions to peace, although it sometimes takes place before any SSR intervention begins. DDR programmes are complex and include political negotiations, humanitarian relief, the technical aspects of weapon disposal and socio-economic interventions to provide livelihoods, training and skills.

- Douglas, I. et al, 2004, '**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide**', GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC and SNDC

How can DDR be carried out successfully? What are the entry points? What case studies exist? What instruments can be used to support DDR programmes? Are DDR programmes country-specific? There are a variety of specific instruments and approaches that can support DDR programmes when adapted to the

implementation conditions of particular countries. This training book aims to support effective planning by providing a comprehensive overview of all aspects of DDR operations. It is a product of the partnership between the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC), the Norwegian Defence International Centre (FOKIV), the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

There are also further considerations within the DDR sphere that must be taken into account. The use of child soldiers in conflicts and how they are reintegrated must be dealt with taking into consideration the social, psychological and physical factors that bear upon the child.

- Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, November 2006, '**Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in West Africa**'.

What are the experiences of child soldiers and how are they affected by them? Can they be included into a DDR programme? What is the best approach that to deal with them? This document details the various examples of abuses and traumas that affect child soldiers in a number of West African countries. There are certain communication problems and capacity shortages in tackling the issue of DDR and child soldiers and drawing upon the various experiences of the organisations in order to make work in this field more efficient and beneficial to the young victims of conflict.

Financial Management

Reform of inefficient and unaccountable security sector expenditure is important for democratic control and for effective use of public finances. The security sector can often be an active breeding ground for financial corruption in developing countries. Reform includes encouraging governments to make sure that security expenditure forms part of the standard public resource allocation and management process; that it is transparent and affordable; and that resources are allocated according to priorities within the security sector and between sectors. 'Rightsizing' the security sector aims to ensure that expenditure is appropriate, and does not divert resources needlessly from other areas such as development. Tackling corruption in all sectors of government activity is important, including the security sector.

- Hendrickson, D. and Ball, N. 2002, '**Off-budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors**', Conflict Security and Development Group Occasional Papers, DFID and Kings College London

What are the levels of misspent military expenditure? What should donors take into consideration when carrying out financial management as part of a military reform project? Off-budget military expenditure is more widespread than is generally recognised. It is a significant problem for both developing countries and the donor community as it undermines macro-economic stability and efforts to promote poverty reduction, and is also an indicator that there are accountability problems with the military. This paper raises key issues of concern to donor governments working to promote better financial management.

The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform

GFN-SSR aims to promote better networking and information sharing within the developing field of security sector reform. It is a resource funded by the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, run jointly by the **Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)**, **Ministry of Defence (MoD)** and **Department for International Development (DfID)**.

GFN-SSR provides a number of services specifically for UK government departments as well as other SSR stakeholders, particularly those in the South, as well as supporting and facilitating regional and inter-regional SSR networking.

In addition, a number of resources are available online at www.ssrnetwork.net. These include a documents library with an expanding body of SSR literature covering key texts and latest thinking, both academic and practical. All documents have a GFN-added user-friendly summary. The website also includes topic guides that give a detailed insight into specific SSR themes, such as this beginners guide and other thematic guides, an organisations directory of more than 200 governmental and non-governmental organisations working in SSR; the monthly newsletter (also available in French, Spanish and Portuguese) which can also be subscribed to through the website. It highlights the most recent research, current issues and key events with the SSR field.

An SSR events calendar list of SSR training provided by GFN-SSR as well as others and a listing of current SSR job vacancies are also available.

GFN-SSR

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