



Margarete Jacob/Daniel Bendix/Ruth Stanley (eds)

# **ENGENDERING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

-

*A Workshop Report*

A report on the workshop *Engendering SSR* on 7 November 2008, Berlin  
Hosted by the Free University Berlin

Margarete Jacob/Daniel Bendix/Ruth Stanley (eds)  
Engendering Security Sector Reform: A Workshop Report, 2009

Please cite as: Margarete Jacob/Daniel Bendix/Ruth Stanley (eds) 2009: *Engendering SSR. A Workshop Report*, Berlin.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Ruth Stanley</i> : INTRODUCTION.....	1
<i>Daniel Bendix</i> : A REVIEW OF GENDER IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM. BRINGING POST-COLONIAL AND GENDER THEORY INTO THE DEBATE.	9
<i>Kristin Valasek</i> : GENDER AND SSR TOOLKIT – ORIGIN, CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD .....	32
<i>Margarete Jacob</i> : ENGENDERING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA COMPARED .....	48
<i>Henri Myrntinen</i> : VIOLENT ISLANDS – NOTES ON MASCULINITIES AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROCESSES IN HAITI, SOLOMON ISLANDS AND TIMOR LESTE.....	76
<i>Sandra Oelke</i> : COMBATTING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN REFUGEES CAMPS: EXPERIENCES IN TANZANIA, KENYA AND UGANDA .....	90
<i>Margarete Jacob</i> : “INTEGRATING GENDER AWARENESS AND EQUALITY”: THE OECD DAC HANDBOOK CHAPTER ON GENDER AND SSR .....	94
ABOUT THE AUTHORS.....	113

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFTC	Armed Forces Training Centre (Sierra Leone)
CivPol	Civilian Police
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia)
CPDC	Network for Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSSP	Commonwealth Security and Safety Project
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DISEC	District Security Committees
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
Falintil	Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste
F-FD/TL	Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste
FPU	Formed Police Units
FSU	Family Support Unit
GA	Gender Advisor (Sierra Leone)
GBV	Gender-based violence
GFN-SSR	Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform
GIAN	Geneva International Academic Network
GRA	Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI	Human Development Index
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFM	Isatabu Freedom Movement

## Engendering Security Sector Reform: A Workshop Report

IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
ISF	International Stabilisation Force
LNP	Liberian National Police
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MEF	Malaita Eagle Force
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODIHR (OSCE)	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGA	Office of the Gender Advisor (Liberia)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKF	Peacekeeping Forces
PMC	Private military contractors
PMSC	Private military and security companies
PNH	Police Nationale d'Haïti
PNTL	Policía Nacional de Timor Leste
PROSEC	Provincial Security Committees
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands
RSIP	Royal Solomon Islands Police
RSLAF	Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC	Special Constable
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security Sector Reform/Security System Reform
SLP	Sierra Leonean Police
SWAT	Special Weapons and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## Engendering Security Sector Reform: A Workshop Report

UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
VPU	Vulnerable Persons Unit
WACPU	Women and Child Protection Unit
WIPSEN-Africa	Women, Peace and Security Network Africa

RUTH STANLEY

## INTRODUCTION

This report documents a workshop held at the Free University of Berlin on 7 November 2008, on “Engendering Security Sector Reform”.

The new paradigm of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been defined to refer to efforts to transform the security sector in a way that is consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance (OECD 2005: 20), and the security sector is understood to encompass all the organisations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force in order to protect communities, individuals and the state. These include the military, police, border guards, intelligence services, government bodies that monitor such organisations, and those institutions charged with upholding the rule of law, including the judiciary and the penal system. It is also recognised that civil society organisations, international donors and the media can have an important role in SSR processes, and that non-state actors such as private security and military companies and non-state armed groups and justice mechanisms need to be included within SSR.

The idea for the workshop arose from a project on Security Sector Reform financed by the German Foundation for Peace Research (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung – DSF) that focused specifically on normative aspects of the SSR paradigm, especially its commitment to local ownership of the reform process, the accountability of security actors, and the contribution of SSR to broader efforts towards democratisation and participation.<sup>1</sup> Given these normative concerns, as well as SSR’s emphasis on people-centred and rights-based security, it would seem that issues of gender should be at the centre both of conceptualisations of SSR, and of practical policy planning and implementation. Yet, until recently, gender concerns have been marginal to SSR.

In the past few years, however, major institutions involved in SSR have increasingly given recognition to the centrality of gender analyses to the conceptualisation and the practice of SSR. In 2007, the German GTZ published a paper on Security Sector Reform and Gender that sought to identify entry points for a gendered approach to SSR in the context of development

---

<sup>1</sup> DSF Project 001/01-2007.

cooperation (Oelke 2007). The OECD Handbook on Security System Reform, also published in 2007, deals with the question of integrating a gender perspective into SSR (OECD 2007), and the OECD has since developed this further by incorporating a new chapter on gender and SSR into its Handbook (OECD 2009). Similarly, in 2008, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE-ODIHR) have produced a detailed Gender & SSR Toolkit that looks at the need for and the possibilities of incorporating a gender perspective across a broad range of security institutions.

The workshop “Engendering SSR” therefore seemed to provide a timely opportunity to discuss the progress made thus far with integrating gender into SSR, as well as to identify the issues that require further attention. It brought together a small group of academics and practitioners working on gender and SSR, and provided a space for debate on conceptual and practical issues. The papers presented at the workshop were reworked to take account of the points that arose in discussion, and are reproduced here in order to make this debate available to a wider public.

**Daniel Bendix** first discusses current academic and practical approaches to gender and SSR. Reviewing the available literature, he points out that the need to incorporate a gender perspective is justified both normatively as well as on grounds of expediency. Bendix identifies a number of points that need to be given further attention in future work on gender in SSR. First, the debate on the role of gender very quickly becomes reduced, in practice, to a focus on women: men and masculinities tend to become lost from view. He thus argues for a conceptualisation of gender as a *relational* category. Secondly, and related with the previous point, Bendix argues that current conceptualisations tend to essentialise both men and women, thus reproducing gender stereotypes and hindering effective reform. Thirdly, he stresses that SSR needs to recognise that current conceptualisations of gender mainstreaming reflect quite specific understandings of what constitutes gender bias. Thus he argues that rather than devising blueprints for integrating gender into SSR, development practice needs to look much more closely at local gender arrangements and at the possibilities for building local alliances. He also calls for a more self-reflexive approach to the underlying assumptions of development cooperation and its Eurocentric bias.

Bendix makes a strong case for a context-sensitive approach to the integration of a gender perspective into SSR, suggesting that standardized recipes may not be adequate to capture the specifics of gender relations in a given society. At the same time, there is an evident need for

general policy advice and guidelines that can help to orient the approach to integrating gender into SSR, not least because many practitioners in the field of SSR have little exposure to, or knowledge of, gender-sensitive approaches. Practically speaking, therefore, if SSR policies and practice are to include a gender analysis, those charged with designing and implementing SSR need to be made aware of how reform of the security sector impacts on gender relations and vice versa, and what specific measures they should consider when drawing up SSR agendas. Such practical advice is now available in the form of the Gender & SSR Toolkit drawn up by DCAF / UN-INSTRAW / OSCE-ODIHR, presented in the next chapter by **Kristin Valasek** (DCAF). Writing from an insider's viewpoint, Valasek explains the background to, and contents of, this document. Notable features of the toolkit are, first, that it attempts to conjugate gender across the entire range of security institutions, and secondly, that it offers practical advice to those working in the field as to how to incorporate a gender perspective into SSR planning. The toolkit fills an obvious need, yet, as Valasek shows, the process of elaborating it was not a simple one. Valasek traces the origins of this project, the steps that resulted in its successful completion, and the decisions that helped to shape its final outcome. As with any such endeavour, compromises had to be made along the way, and Valasek's account offers a frank insight into the process of discussion, debate and accommodation that gave rise to the toolkit. She also points to the continuing needs of practitioners for advice and guidance on incorporating gender perspectives into SSR and mentions further initiatives in this field, as well as sketching the response to the toolkit thus far.

Not least thanks to the efforts of the OECD and of DCAF/UN-INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR, policy advice and a range of tools are now available to practitioners seeking to integrate gender into SSR, and a number of entry points have been identified (GTZ 2007). What is still lacking, however, is a systematic attempt to evaluate the impact of such measures through empirical case studies. **Margarete Jacob**'s comparative study of how far gender has been incorporated into SSR in two neighbouring states in West Africa - Sierra Leone and Liberia - represents an important first step towards filling this gap. Drawing on a distinction between women-as-actors and women-as-beneficiaries, Jacob argues that, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, more has been done towards increasing the numbers of women in the security institutions (women-as-actors) than towards enhancing women's security (women-as-beneficiaries). Jacob suggests that this reflects the fact that it is easier to introduce quotas than to alter underlying norms, values and perceptions of gender roles. The disjuncture between promoting women-as-actors and adequately responding to the security concerns of women-as-beneficiaries raises some important questions for the planning of gender-sensitive SSR: Can this disjuncture be explained simply in terms of an

inevitable time lapse, so that improvements in women's security may become manifest at a later stage? Or does the emphasis on incorporating women-as-actors into the security institutions reflect a limited understanding of what it means to integrate gender into SSR? Beyond this finding, which applies to both the cases reviewed here, Jacob also discerns some significant differences between the two cases. First, SSR was, in Liberia, conducted in a less coordinated and more ad hoc-fashion than in Sierra Leone; paradoxically, this created a certain room for manoeuvre that enabled gender concerns to be more effectively integrated into the ongoing development of policy measures. Secondly, by the time SSR commenced in Liberia, the salience of gender issues had been given emphatic recognition by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1325 of 2000. This finds an echo in the prominence of gender concerns in Liberia's SSR process, in contrast to Sierra Leone. Related to this latter point: gender concerns were integrated into the UN's peacebuilding mission in Liberia, but neglected in Sierra Leone, where the driving force behind SSR, the UK's Department for International Development, gave rather little attention to a gender-sensitive approach. Finally, Jacob suggests that the introduction of quotas to guarantee the fuller participation of women in the security institutions is easier to achieve in situations where these institutions are being rebuilt from scratch, as in Liberia. Whether such quotas necessarily have much impact either on women's security or on the function of the security forces in upholding unequal gender relations remains, as Jacob argues, a moot point.

Both Daniel Bendix' and Margarete Jacob's analyses draw attention to the point that "gender" in SSR is frequently reduced to a concern with *women's* security issues. While it is to be welcomed that the specific concerns of women are given attention in planning and implementing SSR, this approach represents a limited understanding of the impact of gender relations, discourses and identities on the propensity to violence. The next contribution, by **Henri Myrntinen**, addresses these issues by focussing on the construction of violent masculinities in the Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, and Haiti. On the basis of fieldwork observations in these three states, Myrntinen discusses different constructions of masculinity and shows how socio-economic developments within post-conflict societies affect the options for actually living out specific masculine roles. In some circumstances, he suggests, it is only within the security forces – whether state or non-state (and in both cases capable of shading into criminal activities) – that a masculine role consonant with prior expectations can be lived and experienced. Myrntinen also devotes attention to an important but little-considered aspect of SSR: the impact of external peacekeeping forces in transmitting a specific image of masculinity. In this connexion, Myrntinen draws attention to the spread of 'hyper-masculinised' role models as well as to the blurring of the distinction between

the military and the police in the context of post-conflict peacekeeping, and questions the impact this may have on the construction of gender relations in a post-conflict society.

The following presentation offers some important insights into the practice of gender-sensitive SSR. **Sandra Oelke** describes projects supported by Germany's GTZ to introduce cooperative forms of policing in refugee camps in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as a means of combating sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Her report highlights a number of perennial problems, such as the tendency of the police to regard SGBV as a bagatelle, or indeed the direct involvement of the police themselves in such violence. The involvement of the local community in security arrangements, as well as specific training measures to sensitize the police, can help to overcome these problems. However, Oelke also points to the ambiguities inherent in community-based security arrangements, as these may not always be conducive to gender equality. Beyond this, her analysis points to the importance of a broad and context-sensitive awareness of the gender implications of security arrangements. Thus, she points to the fact that increasing the firewood ration available to women within refugee camps obviates women's need to venture beyond the camps to seek firewood, thus exposing them to SGBV. This observation highlights two things: first, that people's security often depends less on modifying the behaviour of the security forces, and more on creating a generally secure environment. Secondly, that unquestioned assumptions about women's roles as carers and providers can expose them to danger, so that a gender-sensitive approach to SSR needs to consider such aspects also, and not limit itself to gender trainings for the security forces.

Finally, **Margarete Jacob** provides an overview over the OECD's very recent work on integrating gender into SSR. Jacob discusses the background to this OECD initiative, its objectives, and its main proposals. While the OECD had already included pointers to gender mainstreaming in the 2007 version of its Security System Reform Handbook, Jacob points out that the new chapter, treating the same issues in far greater detail, is intended to reflect the importance the OECD assigns to a gender-sensitive approach to SSR. Taken together, the recent initiatives by DCAF et al. and by the OECD represent important developments in this area.

While it would be impossible to summarise adequately the rich debate on these and related issues that took place at the workshop, it is worth noting the points that were raised as requiring further research. Some of these points reiterated and emphasised aspects raised in the presentations, while others drew attention to the silence surrounding certain aspects of the gender-security-development nexus. As topics for future research on gender and SSR, the following were named:

- intelligence services and gender
- traditional justice mechanisms and gender
- men, masculinities and SSR
- case studies on gender and SSR with documented outcomes; rigorous comparative analysis and explicit criteria for measuring success and failure
- conditions for institutional and cultural change
- conceptual critiques of SSR / development policy with regard to gender
- the impact of intervention forces and their influence on images of masculinity and/or security
- at the operational level: how to convert the general recognition of the need to integrate a gender perspective on SSR into specific programmes and projects?

As this list makes clear, the debate on how best to conceptualise the importance of a gender analysis in the context of SSR, what aspects to focus on, and what limits exist to the integration of gender into SSR measures, is still only incipient; many questions remain unanswered. To this extent, the workshop in Berlin was intended to provide an impetus to this ongoing discussion between practitioners and academics as to how best to anchor gender analysis in the conceptualisation and practice of SSR. If much remains to be done, the usefulness of this event was stressed by all the participants, who also expressed their hope that a follow-up event might be convened in order to continue this important debate.

It remains to thank all those who contributed to the success of our workshop and this publication that derives from it: first and foremost, those who presented papers on diverse aspects of gender and SSR, and reworked them for this publication in order to take account of the debate that took place at the workshop, as well as the discussants from academic institutions, civil society, and development ministries whose participation contributed so much to the constructive debate that marked this event. Secondly, we thank the Research Center 700 on Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, funded by the German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft – DFG), that generously made available not only a congenial environment for our discussions, but also the friendly and thoroughly competent assistance of secretarial staff and IT experts. Thirdly, we owe thanks to the German Foundation for Peace Research (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung - DSF), whose support for the research project that prompted this workshop enabled us to review and reflect on the achievements and limits of gender-sensitive SSR, which in turn was important for the selection of topics and speakers at the event whose results are reflected in this publication. Last but not least, the Free University Berlin,

whose funds for the support of gender research made both the workshop and this publication possible. We hope and expect that the diffusion of this workshop report will provide an important impetus to the ongoing debate on integrating gender perspectives into SSR. The title of this report – *Engendering Security Sector Reform* – is intended to express the idea that the new paradigm of Security Sector Reform will only live up to its ambitious aspirations if it places gender squarely at the centre of its conceptual thinking and practice. In this sense, this publication is intended to move the debate forward by focusing attention on the centrality of gender to the normative concerns of security sector reform.

## Literature

**DCAF / UN-INSTRAW / OSCE-ODIHR 2008:** Gender & SSR Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF/UN-INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR.

**Oelke, Sandra 2007:** Security Sector Reform and Gender: Concept and Points of Entry for Development Cooperation. Eschborn: GTZ.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2005:** Security System Reform and Governance. Paris: OECD.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2007:** Handbook on Security System Reform. Paris: OECD.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2009:** Integrating Gender Awareness and Equality. Paris: OECD.

DANIEL BENDIX

**A REVIEW OF GENDER IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM.  
BRINGING POST-COLONIAL AND GENDER THEORY INTO THE  
DEBATE.<sup>1</sup>**

**1) Introduction**

Although Western development circles only coined the concept of security sector reform (SSR) some ten years ago in, it has already come to occupy a central place on the development, conflict transformation and peace-building agenda. More generally, the emergence of SSR needs to be situated in the context of current global power relations: within these, the global North is seen as further developed and the global South as in need of becoming more like the global North; while conflict and violence in countries in the global South – and especially in so-called failed states – are mainly attributed to internal state-building deficits (see Küpeli 2008). SSR has become one of the favourite tools of international and bilateral donors to work towards state-building in these countries.

Broadly speaking, the security sector is understood to encompass all the organisations that have the authority to use or order the use of force in order to protect communities, individuals and the state. These include the military, police, border guards, intelligence services, government bodies that monitor such organisations, and those institutions charged with upholding the rule of law, including the judiciary and penal systems. It is also recognised that civil society organisations, international donors and the media can have an important role in SSR processes, and that private security firms and non-state armed groups need to be addressed within SSR. As this brief description indicates, SSR differs from traditional forms of military and internal security assistance in at least three important ways (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 44). First, reform of the security sector is intended not simply to enhance the efficacy of the security forces, but to ensure that they conform to standards of legality, transparency, and accountability. Secondly, and

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper builds extensively on an article originally published in *Security + Peace* (Bendix/Stanley 2008a). I would like to thank Ruth Stanley, Kristin Valasek, Chandra-Milena Danielzik, Paula Herm and Kathrin Ohlmann, as well as the participants of the workshop “Engendering Security Sector Reform” for their helpful comments and criticism.

reflecting this normative impulse, SSR seeks to adopt a holistic approach, recognising that effective reform of security institutions needs to encompass the different components of the security sector in an integrated fashion. And, thirdly, SSR is understood to have a positive impact not only on the security of the state, but also of communities and individuals.

Given this attention to normative standards, an integrated approach to the entire security sector, and the security not only of states, but also of individuals, it is remarkable that the research on and practice of SSR have only fairly recently begun to incorporate a gender dimension (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 44). The increased attention now being paid to gender aspects of SSR is, amongst other developments, reflected in the collaboration between the UN's INSTRAW (International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). These organizations formed a joint Gender and Security Sector Working Group<sup>2</sup>, and, in February 2007, they initiated the project "Gender and Security Sector Reform: Creating Knowledge and Building Capacities" together with the OSCE's ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) to produce a set of SSR tools and to hold workshops and e-discussions to highlight gender dimensions of SSR.<sup>3</sup>

In this article I will first review the literature on SSR that touches on gender, looking at the rationales offered for incorporating a gender dimension into SSR programmes and the proposals advanced for achieving this goal. I shall then turn to some practical experiences with gender and SSR as they are discussed in the literature. Third, I will discuss some aspects of the gender and SSR debate in the light of gender and post-colonial theory. In the context of this article, it is not my intention to cover all the relevant bibliography, but rather to use the extant literature to highlight and discuss some main themes and findings. The focus is on SSR in the context of development cooperation.

## 2) Why bringing a gender perspective into SSR?

Why does SSR need to take gender into account? At the most basic level, it is recognised that men and women are subject to different types of insecurity, that the security sector affects men and women in different ways, and that the goal of SSR must be a security sector that ensures "the peace and well-being of women, men, boys and girls" (Valasek cited in INSTRAW 2004a: 1). There is also widespread recognition of the fact that many issues which directly affect women, girls, and marginalised men and boys have hitherto been largely neglected in SSR (OECD-DAC

---

<sup>2</sup> URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=1060&Itemid=262>, 20.07.2007.

<sup>3</sup> The Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit was launched in March 2008.

2007: 66; see also Farr 2004: 63-70). More specifically, SSR will not fulfil its self-defined objective of ensuring democratic participation and local ownership without a gender-sensitive practice. Peace processes are generally dominated by men, with women being largely excluded from playing an active part (Ball/Brzoska 2002: 24).

This normative argument for fully incorporating gender into SSR processes is bolstered by the fact that several international agreements mandate the inclusion of gender and women's issues into the security sector.<sup>4</sup> Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) has been understood as implicitly mandating the inclusion of a gender perspective in SSR processes (Ball/Brzoska 2002: 24). More recently, the connection between SSR and Gender was finally made explicit in Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008).

Besides these normative concerns, the incorporation of a gender perspective into SSR is also justified on the grounds of enhanced efficiency and effectiveness (Bendix/St Stanley 2008a: 45). The German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) argues from this perspective that a gender-sensitive SSR can help to reduce the social costs of gender-related violence while simultaneously enhancing productivity by making better use of women's potentials in the labour market (Oelke 2007: 17). At a more specific level, women are seen as able to perform certain security-related tasks better than men, such as screening female ex-combatants, assisting in the aftermath of sexual violence, and acting where the segregation of men and women is culturally required (Valasek 2007). But women are not only viewed as being able to undertake specific security-related tasks that men could not perform: evidence is also presented to indicate that they bring a gender-specific "value-added" to broader security tasks, such as peace-keeping and policing. The presence of women in peace-keeping operations has been found to enhance access to services by civilian women, to lower incidents of sexual misconduct and to encourage the confidence and trust of civilian populations (UN-INSTRAW 2004b). A study on policing has found that female officers are less likely to use excessive or deadly force or be involved in misconduct, are more effective at defusing and de-escalating potentially violent situations, and receive more favourable evaluations and fewer citizen complaints (Valasek 2007).

While women's access to the state security institutions is often impeded by gender roles that see women as in need of protection rather than as offering necessary contributions to security forces,

---

<sup>4</sup> For example, the "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women" (1979), the "Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1994), the "Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action" (1995), the "Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations" (2000), the Security Council Resolution 1325 "Women, Peace and Security" (2000), the UN General Assembly Resolution of the twenty-third special session "Further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action" (2000); the Commission on the Status of Women Agreed Conclusions on "Women's equal participation in conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building" (2004).

their role within civil society is more often highlighted as representing an important element of the security sector reform process (Bendix/Stanley 2008a). As civil society actors, women are credited with initiating dialogue and reconciliation processes essential to post-conflict peace-building (OECD-DAC 2005: 18). This often takes place at grassroots level, while women are frequently excluded from formal SSR processes, especially at the national or international level. Finally, SSR is seen as central in the development, human rights and post-conflict peace-building agenda, which offers an argument for a fully gendered perspective (Bendix/Stanley 2008a). This viewpoint is advanced by DCAF/UN-INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR. In presenting their common project to highlight gender dimensions of SSR, these institutions argue that “[a]s security sector reform [...] is increasingly recognised as a crucial part of development, peace-building and human rights work, it is essential that we develop the tools to successfully integrate gender into security sector reform processes” (DCAF et al 2007a). SSR is presented as a critical juncture in the reconstruction process, so that a gender-sensitive approach can contribute to the reduction of gender-based violence and discrimination, act as a catalyst to increasing the participation of women in politics in the post-war period and thus support long-term peace-building (see e.g. Farr 2002: 33; Oelke 2007: 10-12).

### **3) How to bring a gender perspective into SSR**

Having recognized the need to incorporate a gender-sensitive approach into SSR, the question remains how this can best be achieved. This seems to be the crucial question, since there is an evident gap between the lip-service paid to the importance of incorporating marginalized groups of society, including women and marginalized men, into SSR programmes and the actual fulfilment of this principle in practice (see Bryden et al 2005: 11-12).

For many scholars and practitioners, engendering SSR implies the full involvement, equal participation and representation of women in security sector institutions, security policy creation and implementation, and security sector oversight (OECD-DAC 2007: 66, 105). While this is undoubtedly a laudable goal, it is hardly a working prescription for the integration of a gender perspective, but rather a description of an ideal state of affairs that could be one of the final (long-term) outcomes of a gender-sensitive approach (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 45-6). Less ambitious recipes may be of more immediate benefit to practitioners crafting SSR programmes. In this regard, awareness-raising and gender sensitivity training among the security bodies has been highlighted as a useful approach. This includes awareness-raising with regard to gender-based violence, incorporating gender into all training curricula for the whole range of security actors and self-help programmes and public campaigns (Vlachová/Biason 2003: 24; Oelke 2006: 13, 16). Truly effective gender-sensitivity training requires cooperation between the security

sector institutions and non-state actors dealing with gender equality and gender violence in order to incorporate the expertise and insights of the latter; thus, a gender-sensitive approach to SSR would strengthen the link between state security institutions and civil society.

However, gender training can easily become merely a “superficial stamp” (DCAF et al 2007b) if it is not embedded into a comprehensive gender mainstreaming strategy. Gender mainstreaming can broadly be defined as a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes, and in the SSR context, it aims to change the institutional culture of the security sector by incorporating gender-related issues at all levels and at all stages of policy planning and execution. But generally, a lack of policy articulation and practical tools is reported that hampers the implementation of gender mainstreaming in SSR processes. It was in order to overcome such deficits that the recent collaborative effort between DCAF, UN-INSTRAW and OSCE-ODIHR was launched.

Some authors draw attention to the fact that a state-centred security concept does not readily lend itself to a gender-sensitive approach (see e.g. Vlachová/Biason 2003: 3-7). If, as noted in the introduction, individual security is implicitly included within SSR endeavours, gender practitioners tend to place special emphasis on this dimension, focussing on human security in the sense of the physical inviolability of each and every individual. They attribute a particular usefulness to the concept of human security in this restricted sense since it can help to point to “facts which are sometimes hidden behind liberalisation, democratisation and economic privatisation, such as a high rate of invisible gender-based violence in the domestic sphere, trafficking in women and children, a flourishing sex industry, etc.”(Vlachová/Biason 2003: 6) Human security, with its attention to often hidden acts of non-state (although often implicitly state-sanctioned) violence against specific groups of the population, is a concept that resonates with the subjective security needs of marginalized groups, including women (Bendix/Stanley 2008a).

#### **4) Gender in SSR practice: experiences in war-torn societies**

In view of the fact that SSR donors and practitioners have only fairly recently begun to incorporate a gender perspective, it is not surprising that there are few documented examples of the impact and outcome of engendering SSR programmes. Any assessment of the effect of such programmes is further rendered difficult by the fact that in some cases no external evaluation has been carried out; programmes reported on by those same donor agencies that designed and implemented them are, inevitably, “doomed to success” (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 46). Nevertheless, it seems useful to consider some examples of attempts to include a gender-sensitive

approach to SSR in order to illustrate strategies, highlight the positive effects gender-sensitive SSR can have, and point to some common problems with implementation. In the following I will concentrate on four cases of SSR after violent conflict: in Nicaragua, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

a) Nicaragua

In Nicaragua, gender-sensitive reform pre-dates SSR and is also currently not part of a comprehensive undertaking. Specific initiatives to work towards equal participation of women in the police and to improve the security of women have been taken. These have been supported by the GTZ for more than 10 years (GTZ 2005). Since 2003 the GTZ sector programme “Security Sector Reform” has been involved in supporting this gender-sensitive police reform (Oelke 2007: 18): the Nicaraguan case can thus be understood as one that has seen a re-labelling of ongoing initiatives as SSR. Currently, 26% of police officers in Nicaragua are women (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al 2007: 18). The recruitment of women has led to successes in tackling violence against women and has generated more confidence in the police service in general (ibid.). Women’s participation and gender mainstreaming have proven to constitute an effective double strategy. In the case of Nicaragua, the fact that a woman in police uniform is not something new to the society – in the 1980s an estimated 35 percent of police personnel was female – has made the transformation a lot easier (Bastick et al 2007: 150). One of the problems emphasized with regards to the case of Nicaragua is that the Women’s Police Stations, which have been set up in 1993, were not sufficiently linked to the judiciary (Jubb cited in Bastick et al 2007: 151). This hints at the importance that needs to be given to the engendering of SSR (as well as SSR more generally) in the context of a genuinely holistic approach to security sector reform. In Sierra Leone, comparable specific institutions, family support units, were introduced and it would be worthwhile to examine whether similar shortcomings have materialised.

b) South Africa

The case of South Africa, whose SSR process was largely endogenously-driven, albeit with significant support from foreign donors, is often cited as a positive example of gender-sensitive reform (Barnes/Albrecht 2008: 19). All in all, the objectives of gender representativity were placed very publicly on the agenda in the South African reforms (Valasek 2008: 6; Hutchful/Fayemi 2005: 80). Thus, for example, the involvement of women at all levels of society helped to change the focus of the South African defence reform from a technical debate to discussions on human security, militarisation, and the social and political impacts of SSR (Anderlini 2004). Women members of parliament ensured that the defence review was conducted

in a way that included consultations with the public and civil society actors, contributing to the success of the review by providing it with legitimacy among the people (ibid.). Gender training was institutionalised for all security personnel, and women were appointed to senior positions within the ministry of defence (ibid.). In the police as well, representativity of women was enhanced. South Africa now has 29 percent women in its police service, the second highest percentage worldwide (UNIFEM/UNDP 2007: 8). It is also leading on the African continent regarding the participation of women in the army, with women comprising 22 percent of its National Defence Force (Juma/Makina 2008).

### c) Sierra Leone

In the SSR process in Sierra Leone gender perspectives were incorporated as well. Provision was made for the appointment of women into senior positions within the armed forces, and – as mentioned above – a family support unit was set up within the police department<sup>5</sup>, which includes female police personnel, leading to higher reporting rates of sexual and physical violence against women (Gbla 2007: 13-36). Police were trained on how to deal with crimes of this nature (ibid.). Despite these elements a recent evaluation found that gender was not well represented in Sierra Leone's SSR (Ball et al 2007: 59). One major problem is that the efforts of gendering SSR in Sierra Leone represent a piecemeal approach rather than a coherent overall strategy. This is partly due to the fact that gender issues had not yet been mainstreamed for UN missions at the beginning of SSR in Sierra Leone: Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, which mandates mainstreaming gender responsiveness and women's rights in peace negotiations and implementation of peace-building had not been passed at the inception of UNAMSIL's SSR measures in Sierra Leone (Nduka-Agwu forthcoming). Thus women and gender issues had not received special attention. Even the measures undertaken have not yielded the results they aimed for: despite gender training and the employment of women, "female police officers are sometimes expected to do little more than cook lunch for the male police officers" (Refugees International cited in Anderlini/Conaway 2004: 35). Two years after the beginning of police reform, complaints about insensitivity to gender-based violence and the failure to investigate rape and domestic violence were frequent (ibid.: 34). But this latter finding is also open to a more optimistic interpretation: it may be that the reform process opened a space where such complaints could at least be articulated, thus enabling activists to highlight gender-specific security issues that had hitherto remained unarticulated (Bendix/Stanley 2008c: 26).

---

<sup>5</sup> Some 13% of police officers are women, but the aim is to have about 30% (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al 2007: 18).

d) Liberia

In Liberia, the police force cannot to date be considered effective with regards to curbing gender-based violence: high rates of sexualised aggression is still one of the most pressing problems (Malan 2008: 52). Notwithstanding the high level of threat to physical integrity, some developments in Liberia point in a positive direction with regard to gender-sensitive security: In the new judiciary framework rape is now considered a serious crime and punishable with the maximum sentence. All in all, sexualised violence against women is discussed more openly in Liberia now than was the case in the past. A recent initiative that has attracted a great deal of attention within the SSR and gender debate is the deployment of an Indian all-female police unit in Liberia as part of UNMIL, which is *inter alia* meant to train Liberian women in policing.<sup>6</sup> This unit is on the one hand demonstrating the various roles and capabilities of female officers within peace operations, on the other hand, their presence is encouraging Liberian women to register their complaints and it is seen as also enhancing police responsiveness to gender-specific security issues (UNIFEM/UNDP 2007: 2). Another tangible and SSR-related effect has been that the Liberian police received three times the usual number of female applicants in the month following the deployment of that unit (Denham 2008: 10). However, since many women leave after a short period of employment, it would be necessary to complement recruitment figures with qualitative assessments, “interviewing both drop-outs and those who remain employed to develop a better understanding of the reasons that both encourage and discourage women’s employment within the police (or other security sector institutions)” (Popovic 2008: 13). Studies have shown that the fact that UNMIL is incorporating gender issues into its work must also be seen in the light of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which had been passed prior to UNMIL’s mandate (Nduka-Agwu forthcoming). From its inception, UNMIL has had an Office to the Gender Advisor which assists in mainstreaming gender into all aspects of the UN mission (ibid.: 17-8). All in all, Liberian security sector and government structures are more and more open to women, also partly due to the conviction of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia’s president since 2006, that women have an important role to play in Liberia’s peace- and state building efforts (Bendix/St Stanley 2008c: 26-7).

**5) Feminist and postcolonial perspectives on the gender and SSR debate**

In the following section I discuss some issues in the field of engendering SSR from a gender theoretical and post-colonial perspective. SSR conceptualisations and policies have their origins

---

<sup>6</sup> Judy Smith-Höhn, GIGA, Hamburg, in interview with Daniel Bendix, 05 November 2007.

in Western development circles and these have specific understandings of SSR and gender. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the potentially de-thematising, hegemonising and eurocentric dimensions and effects of the way gender and SSR are conceptualised.

a) De-thematising masculinity: Where are the men?

First, available studies have a tendency to reduce “gender” to “women”. Almost entirely absent from research and policy papers on gender and SSR is a reflection on the role that specific conceptions of masculinity play in prolonging or exacerbating conflict and in perpetuating unequal power relations into the post-conflict phase.<sup>7</sup> This seems to be a serious problem with current conceptualisations of gender in relation to SSR. Even where more sophisticated definitions of gender are offered, that go beyond a mere focus on women to thematise power relations between the sexes as well as the mutually-reinforcing nature of male and female gender stereotypes, these insights invariably get lost in practical policy prescriptions that focus exclusively on women (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 47). Thus, the focus on gender is all too frequently reduced to a call to empower women. Empowering women is in itself desirable (although there is a need to guard against essentialising conceptions of women and women’s roles). However, a genuinely gender-sensitive SSR approach needs to widen its focus and to look more closely at male roles and the construction of masculinities. After all, the central institutions of the security sector such as the military, the police, the intelligence services, and the penal system, are almost exclusively male dominated. In those countries where SSR is a particularly pressing and urgent issue, these institutions – as well as non-state violent actors – have had a profoundly negative impact on the well-being and freedom of the population. This is recognised by the SSR literature, and yet the gendered nature of the security institutions is rarely thematised. This is a major gap in the conceptualisation of the relationship between gender and SSR. The question, then, is not merely how to guarantee women’s participation in the security sector, but also how far the security institutions reflect and reinforce specific understandings of masculinity that contribute to a culture of violence and tend to exacerbate human insecurity. Thus, from this perspective, integrating gender concerns into police reform would imply not only setting up special units to deal with violence against women and encouraging female applicants to join the police, but also looking to see how far, for example, a macho gun culture within the police encourages a militarised style of policing that puts the lives of inhabitants at risk. Or, more generally, one would have to ask what ideal of masculinity is transmitted within the security forces and how this impacts on gender relations within society as a whole (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 48) How far are

---

<sup>7</sup> One of the exceptions is Henri Myrntinen’s work on SSR in Timor Leste (2008).

men negatively impacted by dominant conceptions of masculinity in that they are required to conform to a specific understanding of what masculinity entails? A way forward suggested by studies on masculinity and peace-building could be to work towards, as Robert Connell puts it, “contesting the hegemony of masculinities which emphasise violence, confrontation and domination, replacing them with patterns of masculinity more open to negotiation, cooperation and equality.” (Connell 2007) This approach would offer some important benefits. It does not view all men everywhere as being, by definition, perpetrators of violence and as profiting equally from the hegemony of violent masculinity. To this extent, it is a “men-friendly approach that could help to forge alliances across the genders and could encounter less male resistance: it would be attractive to the great number of men that do not profit extensively from a violent hegemonic masculinity based on hierarchy. Through gender awareness training and changes in the security forces’ standards of appreciation, patterns of masculinities could be transformed towards less violence. This, however, does not necessarily mean that women’s status in the security sector and in society as a whole is improved. It could lead to less violent masculinities becoming hegemonic, which would first of all mean an alteration in the way hierarchy is established amongst men. But would women inevitably profit from this? Would this really imply a destabilisation of the hierarchy between male and female gender roles? It inevitably depends on the focus of the intended changes in masculinity patterns. If the ‘caring man’ is established as the role to which male personnel should aspire to, then this runs the risk of replacing one construction of masculinity with another that is equally dominant in terms of unequal gender relations, the ‘male protector’. However, if norms like equality and democracy were valued, encouraged and rewarded, it could effectively mean that women profited from such a change in institutional principles.

#### b) Essentialising femininities and masculinities

As the prior section argues, men tend to become invisible in policy prescriptions dealing with integrating gender into SSR. However, this does not mean that they are absent: implicitly they are present as perpetrators. This leads into my second critique of an approach that conflates gender with women: SSR studies – even though some important achievements have been made, especially regarding the incorporation of women as combatants and security sector personnel – still have the tendency to conceptualise men as perpetrators of violence and women mainly as victims of violence or as peacemakers. This is in line with an influential strand of research on gender in violent conflict, which usually portrays women not as actors but as victims as a result of patriarchal structures in society (Karam 2001). In reality, as war and violent conflict is also a site of potential change, women occupy a number of roles and create different fates for

themselves (ibid.). According to Charli Carpenter, a simplistic view of a gendered victim-perpetrator divide is on the one hand not empirically valid and has on the other served to make invisible the widespread phenomena of women as combatants and men as victims of violence (2005: 308, 310). Some of the latest publications on SSR and gender have made laudable attempts at reflecting these facts (e.g. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al 2007: 18-9, 21; International Centre for Prison Studies 2008).

In spite of ample evidence that men face gender-based insecurity, too, most literature does not regard them as in danger of gendered violence. In a recent policy paper published by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on gender and SSR it is stated that “[m]en often face serious psychosocial problems when the women and girls in their family have been raped” and also that “[r]ape victims, ashamed and afraid of stigmatisation and abuse, will generally put more trust in a policewoman than a policeman” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al 2007: 11, 17). It is clearly implied that the victims of gender-based violence will be female. While the points raised are undoubtedly important, the publication – like many others<sup>8</sup> – lacks any reference to the fact that males are also victims of sexualised violence: i.e. as children at home and in school, as young people and adults in the army, during war and in prisons, as well as in intimate relationships. In a Human Rights Watch report it is stated that a survey of inmates in seven US men’s prison facilities in four states showed that 21% of the inmates had experienced at least one episode of pressured or forced sexual contact and at least 7% had been raped in their facility (Human Rights Watch 2001). Sexualised violence against men seems to be a particular taboo in most spheres. It is thus neither taken into account nor addressed. For example, during the Bosnian war, sexualised violence against men was widespread (UN Commission of Experts’ Final Report 1994). However, whereas sexualised violence against women was a major topic, that against men did not draw much attention – neither in the Balkans nor in the international media (Zarkov 2001 cited in Stanley/Feth 2007). These examples reveal that the guiding assumptions of public institutions, journalists and researchers play a pivotal role regarding the question of who is seen as a potential victim and who is not. In cultures in which dominant masculinity is equated with power and heterosexuality (and this is the case for most societies), the depiction of men as victims of sexual or gender-based violence seems to be inconceivable without breaking a fundamental taboo (see Stanley/Feth 2007; Bastick 2008: 18).

Just as disregarding men as victims does injustice to the potential of a gender-sensitive SSR approach, an essentialist view of women as victims or as peacemakers also hampers gender-sensitive reform efforts. Even though the SSR literature focusing on gender – just like that on

---

<sup>8</sup> DCAF et al’s toolkit on penal reform and gender (International Centre for Prison Studies 2008) is one of the notable exceptions.

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and on small arms and light weapons (SALW) – does now take women as combatants into account, the notion of women as being actively involved in warfare still seems to encounter resistance. A telling example is the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) for the greater Great Lakes region launched in 2002. Despite the attempt to integrate a gender perspective, significant under-reporting of female ex-combatants remained a problem in this case as typically elsewhere in DDR activities. Among the reasons cited for this were the criteria defining combatant status, the reluctance of women and girls to report themselves as combatants and the lack of a strategy to encourage such reporting, as well as commanders' reluctance to report the presence of women and girls in their forces (Schroeder 2005). This case illustrates the need for a gender-sensitive approach while revealing the limits of such an approach in the face of prevailing gender stereotypes. The image of women as non-combatants is difficult to challenge if international security policy circles are resistant to the change in policy this would imply: Thus, in UN debates, “a great deal of resistance came from women representatives who were hesitant to jettison the claim that they were ‘unprotected’ and ‘civilian’.” (Kinsella in UN INSTRAW 2004a: 5). According to Sanam Anderlini, the World Bank and UNDP are also resistant to acknowledging the widespread participation of women in war as combatants. Anderlini cites both ingrained sexism and financial reasons for this resistance – disregarding women fighters as combatants means that they do not have to be included in demobilisation programmes (cited in UN INSTRAW 2004a: 5). As this literature review reveals, the added-value of incorporating women into the security sector is mainly seen in the performance of specific tasks in a way that is associated with feminine characteristics: more sensitive and communicative, and less violent. While this argument might persuade male professionals in the security sector to include women, it reduces women's characteristics to stereotypes and thus propagates essentialist views on femininity. This in turn means that women's gender roles and possibilities in society are not necessarily broadened.

While exposing the deficits of the current approach to engendering SSR, this section highlights the enormous potential of an approach to SSR which takes the complexity of gender seriously and employs it in depth across the entire security sector. Such an approach would imply taking into account all violence and security-related constellations in which gender and sexuality play a role. But in order to achieve this, it is also necessary for us, as academics, policy makers and professionals, to scrutinize our own guiding assumptions and prejudices.

### c) Hegemonising Western feminist thought and de-historicising gender relations

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the tendency of the SSR and gender debate to

underestimate the hegemonising power of thought and theories in contexts of unequal power relations. Most publications do make clear that gender relations in each context need to be analysed in their specificity, but the different feminist traditions and struggles and the particular ways of perceiving and making sense of femininity and masculinity are not reflected. The analysis of gender issues by donor institutions is thus often undertaken with a particular type of gender theory in mind: one that was generated in the West in the past century in specific contexts and specific struggles. International organisations like the UN and Western donors intervening in countries of the global South carry as baggage a particular Western idea of gender issues: its epistemological foundations are that societies are patriarchal in a way that strictly divides men and women as well as public and private, and organizes them hierarchically as well as connecting them to notions of activity/passivity (Maerten 2004; McEwan 2008: 58-59). Put simply, the objective of this type of feminism is individual freedom and liberal rights for women in all spheres of private and public life. Post-colonial feminists have criticised Western feminisms' tendency to universalize their experiences of patriarchal oppression by Western men (see McEwan 2008: 58). Post-colonial feminism has pointed out that racist and classist oppression during colonialism has led to further marginalisation of women in many post-colonial societies, thus challenging the assumption that gender oppression is the primary force of patriarchy. For example, in several African societies, the division and hierarchy between men and women, between the public and the private, only manifested itself during colonial times through the imposition of Christianity, European educational and legal systems and other foreign institutions. (see Amadiume 1989: 119-143, for the case of the Igbo under British rule). Furthermore, a specific Western form of militarised masculinity – equating masculinity with the armed defence of the nation, with violence and hierarchy – became manifest in many countries of the global South in colonial times and during the struggles for independence, also due to the use of Western military organisation and technology (Connell 2007; Clarke 2008: 55).

SSR literature and practice, which depicts societies and especially the security sector in so-called developing countries as sexist and patriarchal, tends to portray today's situation of women and the *status quo* of gender relations in the global South as 'traditional', ahistorical and rooted in local cultures. This has the dichotomising effect that women of non-Western societies are portrayed as voiceless victims (and the men as perpetrators) and Western women as empowered and modern (and Western men as progressive) (see Stanley/Feth 2007). Indigenous feminisms and the history of gender relations in these countries, in which Western countries as colonisers played a decisive role, are given little attention in the context of gendering SSR. Moreover, the narratives apparent in SSR literature negate the implication of the West in the formation of these gender roles. This has major effects on the question of agency: Western donors appear as the necessary saviours of

the oppressed women in the South. We are thus faced with a re-enactment of a colonial pattern, in which racial difference is produced through the victimisation of non-white women and the demonization of non-white men (see Spivak 2003: 55). Taking this into account, one understands why stake-holders in the global South experience foreign interventions in the sphere of gender politics often as imposed by the West and not grounded in indigenous culture or experience (Maerten 2004: 2). Many African feminist activists find themselves in the difficult situation of fighting for women's rights – which local (male) stakeholders and decision-makers, who fear a loss of power, often portray and delegitimize as an imposition of Western ideas – while at the same time resisting the transfer of Western prescriptions that do not take African feminist traditions into account.

SSR policy runs the danger of perpetuating a colonial framework of power relations, if it does not question and address its entanglement in patterns of domination stemming from the era of colonialism. Differences in feminist tradition and the history and complexity of gender relations should be recognised when analysing the gendered nature of the security sector or when devising SSR policy recommendations. We should also move away from analysing societies in terms of 'traditional' and 'modern', since this all too often serves as a placeholder for 'non-Western' and 'Western', with obvious value judgements attached to these labels. In the context of discussions of gender relations 'traditional' virtually always implies 'backwards' and fails to recognise the complexities of different gender roles in different societies. In many African indigenous institutions, matrilineal systems give women more leverage in politics than is the case in some Western countries. By analysing gender relations and their articulation with ethnicity, 'race', class, sexuality, age and other categories of differentiation, it becomes possible to acknowledge the multidimensionality of female and male identities and roles and prevents from homogenising the global South and concealing the West's implication in its societal transformations.

It is challenging to specify what postcolonial perspectives on gendering SSR would effectively imply for practical SSR endeavours, because the critique is inevitably embedded in a more general, deeply structural critique of development and international politics. In general terms, it is imperative for Western donors and international institutions to take seriously indigenous gender relations and feminist knowledge, and to form alliances with activists in the South instead of only including them as informants and implementers of reform. Taking a postcolonial critique seriously would, for example, imply that devising SSR policy papers and interventions becomes a great deal more complex. One could no longer rely on the international, often Western professional or consultant, the globetrotting, cosmopolitan expert in SSR and gender issues. Taking into account the pressure under which such a consultant works, he/she is seldom

allocated the time necessary to access the diversity of relevant local views and perceptions, and contact with civil society may be limited to Western-style NGOs. The reality in many countries in the global South is, however, that NGOs have adapted to the discourse and demands of donors in the North in order to receive funding.<sup>9</sup> In policy papers and reports, such groups may nonetheless be referred to as ‘authentic’ voices of ‘the women’, thus homogenising women in the society and brushing over differences amongst women with regards to class, sexuality, ethnicity, etc (e.g. Mohanty 1988). To ascertain the security-related needs and requirements in a specific society or community, indigenous researchers and activists are needed that interact with all segments society and with girls, boy, women and men to decipher the problems and needs with regards to gender-sensitive SSR. This would also mean a need to resort to indigenous social and political forums. Access to these is often difficult and perhaps even impossible for non-indigenous policy makers and researchers. These suggested changes in gender and SSR practice are of course difficult to accept and implement for official development assistance that is rather short-termed and in a rush to produce tangible results. It would most probably also be hard to achieve because of resistance from researchers and professionals from the global North whose status as experts would be challenged by the authentic recognition of local expertise. However, if development cooperation truly aspires to a change in structures of hegemony, these changes in practice seem essential.

## 6) Conclusion

Despite the fact that both the practice and the analysis of gender-sensitive SSR programmes are still at an early stage, it seems possible to draw a few conclusions from the existing publications and experiences regarding gender in SSR.

In both literature and practice concerned with gender-sensitive SSR, the institution that is mainly focused on is the police. This narrow focal point is due to it being most accessible to gender reforms<sup>10</sup> and because the police is more generally in the limelight of SSR and thus also more likely to receive the attention of people or institutions working towards gender-sensitive SSR. The police is probably also a point of entry for gender-sensitive SSR because civil society, to which ‘women’ are often equated, is seen as particularly affected by the police and thus seen as a relevant local owner when it comes to police reform (Scheye/Peake 2005: 311). This is not only problematic because gender is reduced to women, but also because it could mean that ownership of reforms by the whole population is not seen as important when it comes to other security

---

<sup>9</sup> This adaptation of NGOs in the global South to the policy orientations of external funders has been pointed out by Ottaway and Carothers (2000).

<sup>10</sup> Kristin Valasek, DCAF, Geneva, in interview with Daniel Bendix, 22 November 2007.

institutions. The inhabitants of a state are affected by all security institutions, just in different ways. Gender-sensitive SSR must therefore necessarily focus on all the institutions of the security sector (Bendix/Stanley 2008b: 100).

In practice, police reform has seen the most tangible results. The percentage of women personnel in Nicaragua's police and in South Africa's police and army is impressive. I nonetheless advocate caution against hasty appraisals of the reforms, because one has to see where the women are employed: Experiences have shown that many female police personnel do secretarial jobs or are recruited for work on gender-based violence. In the army, women soldiers are often restricted to prescribed gender roles as nurses, cooks, secretaries and officers in personnel units (Juma/Makina 2008). Regarding the role of women in peace-building processes, Sierra Leone and Liberia are telling cases: The involvement of women in the peace-building process followed a familiar pattern: initially there was a high degree of engagement, but "once the machinery of peace beg[an], the impetus of women and their competencies and contributions [were] completely overlooked..." (Farr cited in UN-INSTRAW 2004a: 7). This leads to the conclusion that women's rights and security needs can all too easily become sidelined in an approach to SSR, which does not look at issues of power and access to decision-making, but remains technocratic and managerial.

The recently devised practitioners' tools on gender and SSR by DCAF et al must be regarded as substantial improvement of the SSR and gender debate and practice. Nonetheless, there is still very little independent evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of gender-sensitive SSR approaches that could usefully be drawn on in devising future programmes. The tools for designing and implementing SSR measures should be complemented by systematic and independent comparative evaluations of experiences with gender-sensitive SSR that would allow lessons to be drawn from policies hitherto attempted. Ideally, such research should incorporate a "before" and "after" perspective and should attempt to assess the relative impact of gender-sensitive measures rather than judging them by an unattainable absolute standard of gender equality.

DCAF et al's Gender Toolkit proposes two complementary strategies to achieve gender-sensitivity in SSR: gender mainstreaming and equal participation of women and men (Valasek 2008: 4-5). These strategies are undoubtedly important. Including more women in police work has e.g. led to more gender-sensitivity in policing in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Anything disturbing the image of the army or the police as a masculine institution has fundamentally unsettling effects, with benefits for women and a great number of men (see Cohn 1998; Hutchful 2001: 13). But one should not forget that the overall aim of SSR should be to contribute to conflict transformation and to a reduction of violence, and not to equal participation of men and

women in committing violence. This is perhaps especially relevant for armed policing and the military. It must be kept in mind that men are not born as soldiers (or police officers), but that the institutions train them to fit the specific ways the military or the police are functioning (Whitworth 2005: 10). If the army and the police itself (or any other security institution for that matter) are not reformed towards a less violent, less hierarchical institution, bringing women in could easily end up as leading towards militarising female identities. The experiences with women taking up arms or committing human right violations in wars are of course no reason not to demand equal participation of men and women in the security sector. However, they should serve as a reminder that working towards more gender equality in the security sector can only lead to a culture of less violence, if the institutions themselves (and the men and women serving in them), their norms and values, are reformed towards this culture.

Obviously, it has to be recognised that SSR is eminently policy-oriented and the SSR literature focuses on policy advice to major institutions and donors, making it difficult to state the case for broader transformations (Bendix/Stanley 2008a). However, SSR analysis and policy making should not solely focus on women, because this would invariably mean that the relational aspect of gender gets lost: the relation between men and women, between men and men, between men and boys, etc. to now, SSR has not had major effects regarding the destabilisation of cultures of masculinity sustained in the security forces (see Clarke 2008 for Africa). SSR programmes, especially in post-war situations, are viewed as critical junctures with the potential capacity to have a lasting impact on societal development, it would seem important to widen the debate on gender in SSR: In recent decades, feminist-inspired peace research literature has generated a wealth of insight into the nexus between constructions of masculinity and the state security institutions, focussing mainly on the armed forces as a crucial locus of the construction of gender identities. The incipient debate on gender in SSR could usefully build on these findings to broaden the understanding of how a gender perspective on security could contribute to societal transformation and a culture of non-violence (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 48).

Additionally, I have argued that taking a post-colonial perspective towards SSR is necessary in order to understand the broader historical and global political framework in which SSR is taking place. SSR analysts and practitioners have to think about some of the key questions in post-colonial feminism: who speaks for whom, whose voices are heard, and what consequence does this have for agency and empowerment of people in the global South. Knowledge of the colonial and pre-colonial history of security provision would also allow resorting to traditions of female participation for today's reform efforts. A post-colonial perspective on SSR which uncovers and criticises imperial and eurocentric viewpoints and structures and at the same time refrains from

romanticising today's or pre-colonial gender relations in the global South would lead to new possibilities for dialogue and cooperation between people working towards gender-sensitive SSR worldwide.

## Literature

- Amadiume, I. 1989:** Male Daughters, Female Husbands. Gender and Sex in an African Society. London-New Jersey.
- Anderlini, S. N. 2004:** Transforming the Security Sector – Women in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy, Washington. DC: Women Waging Peace. URL: [http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/9\\_negotiating\\_the\\_transition\\_to\\_democracy\\_and\\_reforming\\_the\\_security\\_sector\\_the\\_vital\\_contributions\\_of\\_south\\_african\\_women.pdf](http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/9_negotiating_the_transition_to_democracy_and_reforming_the_security_sector_the_vital_contributions_of_south_african_women.pdf), 14.07.2007.
- Anderlini, S. N./Conaway, C. P. 2004:** Security Sector Reform, In: International Alert/Women Waging Peace (eds), Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action, 31-40. URL: [http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/TK10\\_security\\_sector\\_reform.pdf](http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/TK10_security_sector_reform.pdf), 19.07.2007.
- Ball, N./Brzoska, M. 2002:** Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector. BICC Paper 21. Bonn: BICC. URL: <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper21/paper21.pdf>, 14.07.2007.
- Ball, N. et al 2007:** Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa. Evaluation Working Paper 23. London: DFID. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/1/38635081.pdf>, 10.08.2007.
- Barnes, K./Albrecht, P. 2008:** Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF. OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. URL: <http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=CF987A94-406A-75FF-5F8A-B22AC23E35E8&lng=en>, 06.08.2008.
- Bastick, M. et al 2007:** Sexual violence in armed conflict. Global overview and implications for the security sector. Geneva: DCAF.
- Bastick, M. 2008:** Integrating gender in post-conflict security sector reform. DCAF Policy Paper 29. Geneva: DCAF. URL: <http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=AB82F547-4F04-D19B-11DE-C81BDE02861C&lng=en>, 16.10.2008.
- Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008a:** Engendering Security Sector Reform. Where to from here? In: Security + Peace 1, 44-48.
- Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008b:** Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform. A Review of the Literature. In: African Security Review 2, 93-104. URL: [http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link\\_id=3&mlink\\_id=6266&link\\_type=12&mlink\\_type=12&mlink\\_id=3](http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=3&mlink_id=6266&link_type=12&mlink_type=12&mlink_id=3), 17.10.2008.
- Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008c:** Security Sector Reform in Africa. The Promise and the Practice of a

New Donor Approach. Accord Occasional Paper Series 3/2.

- Bryden, A./N'Diaye, B./Olonisakin, F. 2005:** Security Sector Governance in West Africa – Turning Principles to Practice. DCAF Policy Paper 8. Geneva: DCAF. URL: <http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=6A97F9D9-37B6-A14D-49F9-DF66ED5131CD&lng=en>, 29.01.2008.
- Carpenter, R. C. 2005:** “Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups”. Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue. In: International Studies Quarterly 49, 295-334.
- Clarke, Y. 2008:** Security Sector Reform in Africa. A Lost Opportunity to Deconstruct Militarised Masculinities? In: Feminist Africa 10, 49-66. URL: <http://www.feministafrica.org/uploads/File/Issue%2010/feature%20article%203.pdf>, 29.11.2008.
- Cohn, C. 1998:** Gays in the Military. Texts and Subtexts. In: Zalewski, M./Parpart, J. (eds), The “Man” Question in International Relations. Boulder: Westview Press, 129-149.
- Connell, B. 2007:** Masculinities, Violence and Peacemaking. URL: <http://www.peaceneeds.info/issues/2443/connell.html>, 15.08.2007.
- DCAF/UN-INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007a:** Concept Note for Virtual Discussion: Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform Assessments, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/SinSR/VirtualDiscussionFlyer-2.pdf>, 14.08.2007.
- DCAF/UN-INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007b:** Good and Bad Practices in Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel: Summary of a Virtual Discussion. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/gender&ssrtrainingdiscussion-summary.pdf>, 20.07.2007.
- Denham, T. 2008:** Police Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/images/files/PoliceReform.pdf>, 06.08.2008.
- Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs et al. 2007:** Developing the Security Sector. Security for whom, by whom? Security sector Reform and Gender. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. URL: [www.minbuza.nl](http://www.minbuza.nl), 04.08.2007.
- Farr, V. 2004:** Voices from the Margins. A Response to “Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries”. In: McCartney C./Fischer M./Wils, O. (eds), Security Sector Reform. Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation and Dialogue Series 2. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 63-70. URL: [www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2\\_ssr\\_complete.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_ssr_complete.pdf), 30.01.2008.
- Gbla, O. 2007:** Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. In: Le Roux, L./Kidane, Y. (eds), Challenges to Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa. ISS Monograph Series 135. Pretoria: ISS, 13-36. URL: [http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file\\_manager/file\\_links/M135CHAP2.PDF?link](http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/M135CHAP2.PDF?link)

[id=3&mlink\\_id=4627&mlink\\_type=12&mlink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](#), 14.08.2007.

**GTZ 2005:** Gender and Citizen Security. Regional Training Module, Nicaragua.

**Human Rights Watch 2001:** No Escape. Male Rape in US Prisons. URL:  
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html>, 05.08.2008.

**Hutchful, E. 2001:** Security, Law and Order. In: Africa Development 16/1-2, 1-17. URL:  
[http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ad\\_articles/hutchful.pdf](http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ad_articles/hutchful.pdf), 20.07.2007.

**Hutchful, E./Fayemi, J. 'K. 2005:** Security System Reform in Africa. In: OECD DAC (ed.), Security System Reform and Governance. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris: OECD, 71-90.

**International Centre for Prison Studies 2008:** Penal reform and gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/library/gender-peace-and-security/ssr-toolkit-penal-reform-and-gender/download.html>, 06.08.2008.

**Juma, M./Makina, A. 2008:** Too Few Women in Armed Forces. The Monitor, 11.09.2008. URL:  
<http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/17131.html>, 29.11.2008.

**Karam, A. 2001:** Women in War and Peace-building. The Roads Traversed, the Challenges Ahead. In: International Feminist Journal of Politics 3/1, 2-25.

**Kuepeli, I. 2008:** Die Debatte um "gescheiterte Staaten" als Legitimierung westlicher Politik. In: analyse & kritik 529, 17.

**Maerten, M. 2004:** African Feminism. RoSA-factsheet 34. URL:  
<http://www.rosadoc.be/site/rosa/english/pdf/factsheetsenglish/34.pdf>, 06.08.2008.

**Malan, M. 2008:** Security Sector Reform in Liberia. Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. URL:  
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>, 9.05.2008.

**McEwan, C. 2009:** Postcolonialism and Development. Oxon: Routledge.

**Mehler, A./Smith-Höhn, J. 2007:** Security Actors in Liberia and Sierra Leone – Roles, Interactions and Perceptions. In: Debiel, T./Lambach, D. (eds), State failure Revisited II – Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of Governance. INEF Report 89, 50-66. URL: [inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report89.pdf](http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report89.pdf), 31.01.2008.

**Mohanty, C. T. 1988:** Under Western Eyes. Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. In: Feminist Review 30, 61-88.

**Myrntinen, H. 2009:** 'Poster Boys No More' – Gender and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste. Geneva: DCAF.

**Nduka-Agwu, A. forthcoming:** 'Doing Gender' after the War – Dealing with Gender Mainstreaming and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peace Support Operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In: Civil Wars.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2005:** Security System Reform and Governance, DAC

Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris: OECD. URL:  
[www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf), 30.01.2008.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2007:** OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Paris: OECD. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>, 30.01.2008.

**Oelke, S. 2007:** Security Sector Reform and Gender. Concept and Points of Entry for Development Cooperation. Eschborn: GTZ. URL: <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-ssr-gender-2007.pdf>, 14.08.2007.

**Ottoway, M./Carothers, T. 2000:** Toward Civil Society Realism. In: Id. (eds), Funding Virtue. Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

**Pettman, J. 1996:** Worlding Women. London-New York: Routledge.

**Popovic, N. 2008:** Security Sector Reform Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. URL: <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?ord279=title&q279=gender&lng=en&id=47416&nav1=4>, 06.08.2008.

**Scheye, E./Peake, G. 2005b:** To Arrest Insecurity – Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform Agenda. In: Conflict, Security & Development 5/3, 295-328.

**Schroeder, E. 2005:** Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Gender Desk study. URL: [http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/Study\\_GenderDesk\\_En.pdf](http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/Study_GenderDesk_En.pdf), 14.08.2007.

**Skjelsbaek, I. 2000:** Sexual Violence in the Conflicts in Ex-Yugoslavia. In: Slapšak, S. (ed.), War Discourse, Women's Discourse. Essays and Case-Studies from Yugoslavia and Russia. Ljubljana: Topos, 117-146.

**Spivak, G. C. 2003:** Can the Subaltern Speak? In: Die Philosophin 14/27, 42-58.

**Stanley, R./Feth, A. 2007:** Die Repräsentation von sexualisierter und Gender-Gewalt im Krieg. Geschlechterordnung und Militärgewalt. In: Krasmann, S./Martschukat, J. (eds), Rationalitäten der Gewalt. Staatliche Neuordnungen vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert. Bielefeld: transcript-Verlag, 137-160.

**UNIFEM/UNDP 2007:** Gender Sensitive Police Reform in Post Conflict Societies. Policy Briefing Paper. URL: [http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender\\_Sensitive\\_Police\\_Reform\\_Policy\\_Brief\\_2007.pdf](http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender_Sensitive_Police_Reform_Policy_Brief_2007.pdf), 06.08.2008.

**UN-INSTRAW 2004a:** Gender and Security Sector Reform, Summary of e-Discussion, 4 October - 7 November. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/SecuritySectorReform/summary%20final.pdf>, 14.07.2007.

**UN-INSTRAW 2004b:** Gender and Security Sector Reform Working Group Background Information. URL: [www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/SSR/Website\\_Background.pdf](http://www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/SSR/Website_Background.pdf), 20.07.2007.

**UN Commission of Experts:** Final Report, S/1994/674, 27.05.1994.

**UN Security Council 2000:** Resolution 1325. URL: [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf), 29.11.2008.

**UN Security Council 2008:** Resolution 1820. URL: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement>, 29.11.2008.

**Valasek, K. 2007:** Gender and Security Sector Reform. URL: [http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/1325/Gender\\_ssr\\_dcaf07.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/1325/Gender_ssr_dcaf07.pdf), 17.07.2007.

**Valasek, K. 2008:** Security Sector Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. URL: <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?ord279=title&q279=gender&lng=en&id=47331&nav1=4>, 06.08.2008.

**Vlachová, M./Biason, L. 2003:** Violence against Women as a Challenge for Security Sector Governance. In: Hänggi, H./Winkler, T. H. (eds), Challenges of Security Sector Governance, Münster: LIT, 1-35, URL: [www.dcaf.ch/women/violence\\_vlachova.pdf](http://www.dcaf.ch/women/violence_vlachova.pdf), 20.07.2007.

**Whitworth, S. 2005:** Militarized Masculinities and the Politics of Peacekeeping. The Canadian case. In: Booth, K. (ed.), Critical Security Studies in World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 89-106.

**Zarkov, D. 2001:** The Body of the Other Man. Sexual Violence and the Construction of Masculinity, Sexuality and Ethnicity in Croatian Media. In: Moser, C. O./Clark, F. C. (eds), Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence. London / New York: Zed Books, 69-82.

KRISTIN VALASEK

## **GENDER AND SSR TOOLKIT – ORIGIN, CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD**

### **1) Introduction**

The idea for developing a Toolkit on gender and security sector reform (SSR) emerged through collaboration between Megan Bastick at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and myself, working for the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW). This paper focuses on exploring some of the conceptual challenges with developing the Toolkit as well as providing background information on the process of development, insight into how the Toolkit is now being used, and recommended future steps for the field of gender and SSR. As such, this paper is a critical first-hand narrative and does not make pretences of academic detachment.

### **2) Definitions**

As both ‘gender’ and ‘security sector reform’ are contested concepts, for the sake of clarity the definitions used in this paper are the same as within the Toolkit. Gender is defined as “the socially constructed roles and relationships between men and women. Rather than being determined by biology, gender is learned. In other words, men and women are taught certain roles and appropriate behaviours according to their sex. One example is how in many European cultures, women are traditionally responsible for food preparation. Women are not biologically predestined to cook; rather it is part of the gender role that most women learn. Gender roles, such as these, are not static and can change over time and vary widely within and across cultures.” (Valasek 2008: 3).

As the United Nations Secretary-General’s 2008 Report on *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform* had not been issued at the time of writing the Toolkit, the definition of security sector reform was adapted from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC 2005):

Security sector reform means transforming the security sector/system, *‘which includes all the*

*actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework’.* (OECD 2005: 20).

SSR is a system-wide approach that emphasises the interconnected nature of security sector institutions and has two main objectives. First, to ensure democratic and civilian control of the security sector, for example by strengthening the management and oversight capacity of government ministries, parliament and civil society organisations. Second, to develop an effective, affordable and efficient security sector, for example by restructuring or building human and material capacity. (Hänggi 2003: 17-18).

The security sector is broadly defined as comprising all state institutions and other entities that play a role in ensuring the security of the state and its people. As such, it includes core security actors (armed forces, police, intelligence and security services, border guards, customs authorities, etc.); security management and oversight bodies (parliament, the executive, government ministries, customary and traditional authorities, civil society actors, etc. ); justice and rule of law institutions (justice ministry, judiciary, prisons, traditional justice systems, etc. ); non-statutory security forces (liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security and military companies, etc.) and non-statutory civil society groups (media, non-governmental organisations, research institutions, community groups, etc.).

### **3) What is the Gender and SSR Toolkit?**

The Gender and SSR Toolkit, a joint publication by DCAF, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) and UN-INSTRAW, was designed as a basic introduction to information and analysis on gender and SSR. The stated audience for the Toolkit is a broad range of SSR policymakers, practitioners and researchers in national governments, security sector institutions, international and regional organisations and civil society organisations. Published in 2008, the Toolkit is comprised of twelve different ‘Tools’ (circa twenty-four pages each) and accompanying four-page Practice Notes which are a summary of the Tools. The topics of the Tools are:

1. Security Sector Reform and Gender
2. Police Reform and Gender
3. Defence Reform and Gender
4. Justice Reform and Gender
5. Penal Reform and Gender

6. Border Management and Gender
7. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
8. National Security Policy-Making and Gender
9. Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
10. Private Military and Security Companies and Gender
11. SSR Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender
12. Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel

The Toolkit also contains a *User Guide* and an *Annex on International and Regional Laws and Instruments related to SSR and Gender*. Each of the Tools follows the same basic structure, exemplified by the following outline of the Police Reform and Gender Tool:

1. Introduction
2. What is police reform?
3. Why is gender important to police reform?
4. How can gender be integrated into police reform?
5. Integrating gender into police reform in specific contexts:
  - a. Post-conflict
  - b. Transitional
  - c. Developing
  - d. Developed
6. Key recommendations
7. Additional resources

Funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Toolkit is available for free online at <http://www.dcaf.ch/gssrtoolkit>

#### **4) Origin Story**

The process of developing the Toolkit took a bit longer than two years from the initial project proposal to printing and distribution. As is often the case, it took as much time to find a project donor as it did to complete the project itself.

##### a) Pre-Funding: building the concept and searching for donors

The initial draft of the project proposal that led to the creation of the Toolkit was written in 2006 in an un-airconditioned office in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. I was working with UN-INSTRAW on gender and SSR issues and quickly realised the dearth of research and

resources on the topic. This project proposal was written with the aim of kick-starting the generation of information and research on gender and SSR. The main objective of the proposal was to “Initiate a global discussion on the gender aspects of security sector reform that influences SSR actors to take women and girls into account as actors and fully address their security needs.” The specific objectives were:

- Generate and disseminate new research on different aspects of gender and security sector reform.
- Increase knowledge, awareness and discussion regarding the gender aspects of security sector reform.
- Create a network of researchers and practitioners working on issues of gender and security sector reform.
- Identify future areas of research and capacity-building.

In order to meet these objectives, the project proposal outlined three activities. The first was a call for short (ten to fifteen page) discussion papers to be distributed to pre-selected candidates. The papers were to address six core areas, namely: gender and national security sector reform processes, gender and security sector governance, gender and military reform, gender and police reform, gender and judicial and penal reform, and gender and the private security industry. In addition to these six papers, which were designed to identify gender entry points in these various SSR processes, two to four short case studies on the integration of gender into SSR processes in developed and developing countries would also be commissioned. The second activity was to hold a two to three day colloquium on gender and SSR in Europe or New York with presentations and working group discussions on each of the six key areas, as well as presentations by experts and the authors of the case studies. The final activity was to be a global virtual seminar series of six seminars of two weeks each where the author of the respective discussion paper was to present his/her draft and facilitate the discussion.

The final product was a publication including the discussion papers and case studies, summaries of the colloquium report and virtual seminars, and a list of additional resources. It was to be translated and distributed in English, Spanish and French. The beneficiaries of the project were listed as United Nations staff involved in SSR (DPKO and UNDP); NGO staff working on SSR issues and/or gender, peace and security issues; and researchers and academics.

Reviewing this initial proposal after three years, it is clear that it had a more academic tone with a focus on knowledge generation rather than providing concrete information for practitioners. It also conflates women and girls with gender, as can be seen in the main objective. Though the text of the proposal mentions “hegemonic models of violent masculinity”, “marginalized men and

boys” and “the right to security for women, men, girls and boys” it has a heavy focus on violence against women and women’s lack of representation within security sector institutions. Finally, the choice of six key topics demonstrates a lack of understanding with regards to how SSR processes were being categorised and framed within SSR literature. For instance, having one short discussion paper try to cover both justice and penal reform, though intrinsically linked, is unrealistic. The omission of a paper on border management also reflects this lack of understanding.

With this initial project proposal, the next step was to contact potential partners with SSR expertise such as Clingendael, DCAF, SIPRI and GFN-SSR. Megan Bastick and Anja Ebnöther of DCAF responded positively to the request to partner on this project and together we launched into the process of multiple re-drafts of the project proposal – DCAF proposed to change it into a toolkit format – and a year-long search for funding. The project proposal was submitted by DCAF and UN-INSTRAW to various countries and foundations, including drafting long funding proposals for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Canada and the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN) in Switzerland. For the GIAN proposal, UNIDIR was also a project partner. Ingrid Kraiser of OSCE/ODIHR also expressed interest in working together on the proposal – so when DCAF was able to secure project funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2007 it was for a joint DCAF, OSCE/ODHIR and UN-INSTRAW project.

While searching for funding, I developed an online section on gender and SSR for UN-INSTRAW with extensive resources including a conceptual framework, annotated bibliography, organisations working on the topic and summaries of relevant legislation. We also hosted an online discussion on gender and SSR that provided more insight into the need for specific resources on gender and SSR. From this initial e-discussion, I developed a gender and SSR network that functions as a listserv to exchange information and resources on the topic. UN-INSTRAW provides monthly updates on gender and SSR news and resources and members are free to circulate their own information (to join the network go to the UN-INSTRAW website). DCAF and UN-INSTRAW also initiated a Gender and SSR Working Group to provide feedback on the project proposal and implementation. The Working Group included some thirty experts on gender and SSR from around the world and is now dormant.

#### b) Post-Funding: the process of developing the Toolkit

After one year of searching for a donor, DCAF secured project funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By this time the project proposal had changed in many ways from the original. The main objective of the project was now to “Increase knowledge, capacities and

exchange regarding the gender aspects of security sector reform amongst security sector reform researchers, policy-makers and practitioners.” The specific objectives read:

- Generate and disseminate new, practical research on gender and SSR.
- Build the capacity of SSR practitioners, security policy-makers, and others to mainstream gender into SSR initiatives.
- Promote the mainstreaming of gender into SSR policy and programming (including within the United Nations, European Union, OECD-DAC, OSCE and others).
- Strengthen understanding of the linkages between the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and SSR.

The conflation of gender with women and girls was removed and a stronger focus on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, capacity-building and influencing SSR policy and programming can be seen. The background and rationale also emphasise the normative framework on women, peace and security. They also include an explanation of the different security needs of women, men, girls and boys including a section on men as victims of gender-based insecurities while continuing to highlight the need for increased female representation in security sector institutions. The project proposal also mentions the need to recognise and support the involvement of women’s organisations in security decision-making and oversight.

The beneficiaries were now listed in detail as an audience of primarily SSR practitioners including: national security sector reform practitioners, including security sector personnel involved in SSR; policy-makers within government agencies responsible for defence, police, border security etc.; staff of international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE, development agencies, security organisations and others that advise on or support SSR processes. Secondary audiences include: women’s civil society organisations, and the broader ‘women, peace and security’ community; academics working on SSR. The project activities had also changed. Instead of discussion papers and case studies, the project focuses on the development of a Gender and SSR Toolkit complete with twelve tools and practice notes (see above for the complete list). It also included two e-discussions, an expert workshop and a launch/workshop to promote the Toolkit.

After the project had been funded by Norway, I came to work with Megan Bastick at DCAF to coordinate the development of the Toolkit. Hilary Anderson and Nicola Popovic took the lead for the project on behalf of UN-INSTRAW. One of our (Megan and I) first tasks in coordinating the project was to finalise on the topics of the different tools. UN-INSTRAW was interested in, and took on responsibility for drafting, the two cross-cutting Tools on *SSR Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender* and *Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel*. They also hosted two

online discussions on the respective topics, summaries of which are available on their website. OSCE/ODIHR wanted to fund the development of two Tools, one with a focus on incorporating women's rights into the security sector, conflict prevention and early warning and one on best practices for increasing the recruitment, retention and professional advancement of women within the armed forces.

However, after reviewing how security sector reform was conceptualised and categorised within publications on SSR, Megan Bastick and I felt that it would be practical to structure the Toolkit around different security sector institutions/organisations as this would be a familiar structure for the intended audience of SSR policymakers and practitioners. As such, the Toolkit includes Tools on police reform and gender, defence reform and gender, etc. The Tool on Defence Reform and Gender does incorporate information on early warning, recruitment, retention and advancement of women. However, the choice was made not to include a tool on intelligence and security services and gender. This was due to the extreme lack of resources on the topic and our inability at the time to find an expert to draft such a Tool. Many have commented that the Toolkit lacks a Tool on DDR and gender, however we felt that there already existed many good resources on this topic and that to include it would have been unnecessary duplication. Another topic that was suggested was HIV/AIDS, gender and SSR. Although this is a crucial cross-cutting issue, we simply felt that we had our hands already full with the selected twelve topics but we did seriously consider its inclusion.

The search for authors and reviewers of the Tools proved challenging. Very few experts exist that have both the requisite gender and SSR experience. We circulated an external call for authors and reviewers as well as targeting specific experts. Ideally the author would have practical experience on both gender issues and the specific SSR topic as well as past publications on the issue. We were also trying to include male and female authors, as well as authors from various regions of the world. In the end, the Toolkit authors were largely from North America and Western Europe and had more of a policy and academic background. However, we did manage to include reviewers from different regions such as Africa, Latin America and Asia. A feedback form was designed and circulated to reviewers asking for feedback on specific question as well as in-text track changes to the document. However, the Toolkit has been critiqued for having a 'Western' bias, which is understandable considering that most of the authors are 'Western.' However, we did include examples and information from different regions and contexts within each Tool.

In order to structure and provide coherency and consistency to the Toolkit when working with multiple authors, we developed detailed templates for each Tool as well as Project Guidelines for Toolkit Authors. Each Tool Template of circa six pages included information on:

- Length – how many words/pages

- Definitions – for instance, the definition of defence reform to be used in the Tool
- Format – outline of the structure including the specific wording of each heading, how long each section should be and what each section should cover
- Content - detailed suggestions as to what content we expected to be included in the different sections of the Tools
- Suggested background reading

The Project Guidelines included a summary of the project including background, rationale, objectives and audience; the author's responsibilities and compensation; guidelines on Tool content and cross-cutting issues; conceptual clarifications and definitions; and a style guide for language and citation. The Guidelines specifically state that the Tools should be written for an audience with no prior gender expertise or understanding. They also state that the Tools should be practically oriented and include a balance of case studies and examples from different regions and from post-conflict, transitional, developing and developed contexts. It also includes a list of cross-cutting issues to be emphasised in all the Tools including: democratic governance; the role of civil society; men and masculinities; HIV/AIDS; reproductive health and rights; insecurities faced by indigenous, ethnic minority and migrant women and men, children, youth and older people, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered and intersexual people; and different cultural understanding of male and female roles. It also includes a detailed definition of SSR, definitions of the different country contexts (post-conflict, transitional, developing and developed) and gender terminology such as 'sex', 'gender', 'gender mainstreaming' and 'gender-based violence.' We chose to provide these definitions in order to have conceptual coherency within the Toolkit and to emphasise the focus on gender rather than women.

The Guidelines and contracts with authors also specified that three drafts would be submitted and that the author would participate in the Expert Workshop. Authors were given one to two months to provide a first draft of the Tools, which I then reviewed and sent back with comments. The second drafts of the Tools were due a month later in order to circulate to the participants of the Expert Workshop. Funded in large part by OSCE/ODIHR, the Expert Workshop brought together the Tool authors, the lead external reviewer for each Tool, as well as key international stakeholders such as UNDP, DFID, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Clingendael, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and OECD-DAC. The two-day workshop held in Geneva was structured so that there was a one-hour session on each Tool which included a presentation of the content by the author, feedback from official reviewer/s and a facilitated discussion designed to provide specific input into developing the final drafts.

The Expert Workshop brought together more than fifty gender and SSR experts and

stakeholders and generated interesting discussions and feedback on the draft Tools. In hindsight it would have been a good idea to produce a workshop report, but at that point Megan and I simply had our hands full with reviewing drafts and coordinating the work on the Toolkit. One of the main critiques that surfaced during the Workshop was that the Toolkit was aimed at too broad an audience. Various experts advised us to narrow down the audience and incorporate a more substantial process of field-testing or focal group discussions in order to tailor the Tools to a specific SSR practitioner audience. Though a very valid point, after an internal debate on the matter we decided to move forward in order to meet project deadlines and to provide an initial introductory resource on gender and SSR. Instead, the idea was to potentially follow up with more specifically tailored resources to audiences such as Ministry of Defence staff or OSCE police reform units.

Authors were tasked to incorporate the feedback from the Expert Workshop as well as from DCAF, UN-INSTRAW and OSCE/ODIHR staff. The third drafts were then submitted to DCAF for final editing, proof reading, layout and printing. DCAF and UN-INSTRAW then divided the work of drafting the Practice Notes, which are four-page summaries of each Tool. Though we had contracted the layout and printing to a printing company, we ended up spending inordinate amounts of time guiding the design, colours, and layout and doing the final proofing of the Toolkit.

In hindsight, this project should not have been squeezed into one year but should have been allowed a year and a half for completion, especially to allow for more time for final editing of the Tools. It could have also used more human resources for development, coordination and editing. As it was, I was working one-hundred percent on the Toolkit, Megan Bastick was working part-time on it and we had a fifty-percent research assistant that spent a portion of her time on the Toolkit, namely Mugiho Takeshita. Though we were doubtful as to the value of including an Expert Workshop, this event turned out to be crucial to encourage an exchange of ideas and increase ownership and buy-in from gender and SSR stakeholders. The detailed templates and Author Guidelines also proved to be essential in order to provide coherence – though it was challenging to negotiate between the project coordination team and the author's ideas regarding content of the Tools.

## **5) Conceptual challenges and choices**

During the process of developing the Toolkit, a variety of different conceptual challenges arose. The Toolkit was designed for an audience of non-academic, non-gender experts which means that we tried to stay away from gender jargon and theoretical/abstract arguments. It was challenging to maintain this focus, especially for authors that were used to writing for academic

or gender expert audiences.

a) Women vs. gender

Despite having made the decision to focus on gender rather than women, and clearly outlining the definition of gender in the Guidelines for Authors, in many cases the first drafts of the Tools conflated women with gender and solely focused on women. Through the various revision processes, Megan Bastick and I attempted to include both language and content that reflected a focus on gender rather than women. However, when it comes to gender issues in the security sector there will invariably be a larger focus on women since they are under-represented as personnel and decision-makers and make up a significantly larger percentage of victims of gender-based violence. There is a balance between understanding and addressing gender as a crucial issue for women and girls, as well as men and boys, and highlighting the often marginalised specific security needs and rights of women and girls. Reaching this balance is difficult and though we made a conscious effort in developing the Toolkit, there is definitely space for improvement.

b) Men and masculinities

When going through the first drafts of the Tools, on every single one I noted that the author needed to better incorporate issues of men and masculinities. In the Author Guidelines I wrote that “Tools should mainstream issues of men and masculinities. The Toolkit is on gender and not women, therefore include wherever possible gender-based insecurities experienced by men. Other entry points to examine masculinities include men as actors working to stop gender-based insecurities, and the issue of violent/militarised masculinities within the security sector.” Despite this emphasis it is telling that all of the authors, including myself, needed to be reminded as to the importance of addressing issues of men and masculinities.

One of the challenges is that in the attempt to avoid gender jargon and present convincing arguments to a non-academic, non-gender expert audience it is not feasible to use terms such as ‘militarised masculinities’. Much of the discourse on men and masculinities has remained within an abstract academic sphere far removed from the SSR audience that we were trying to reach with this Toolkit. Another challenge is the lack of data, information and examples regarding men, masculinities and security sector reform. However, we did try to make sure that the Toolkit used inclusive language – for instance gender-based violence – and included information on male victims of gender-based violence and the key role men can play in integrating gender into SSR. Though I do think this is very much a first step and I agree with the critique that a larger emphasis could have been placed on men and masculinities.

At the same time, even though not framed as such, the Toolkit does include information and recommendations on the practical measures that can be taken to address ‘militarised and violent masculinities’ within the security sector. Stated under the heading of “How to integrate gender” a variety of measures such as a code of conduct, policy on sexual harassment, gender training, joint training of men and women, vetting of security sector personnel for gender-based violence, human rights training, external oversight, community policing, female personnel associations, etc. are advocated. These are in fact some of the key practical measures that can be taken in order to change institutional culture and individual behaviour in order to promote alternative constructions of masculinity and create a non-discriminatory and non-sexist work environment.

#### c) Rights vs. operational effectiveness

When I first started writing about gender and SSR, including the first draft of the SSR and Gender Tool, my rationale for why gender is important to SSR focused on the issues of equal rights and gender-based violence. Relying upon international norms and standards, I argued that women had the right to equal representation within security sector institutions and SSR decision-making. Presenting shocking figures and examples I then described the gravity of gender-based violence and framed it as a key security priority.

However, when consulting with SSR experts and gaining more experience in the field of SSR, the feedback was that the best entry-point was to speak the language of the SSR audience. As such, introducing gender issues as increasing operational effectiveness and local ownership through ensuring effective delivery and oversight of security and justice services is a way of reaching an SSR audience. The danger with this approach is that issues of gender and women’s participation can become reduced to their perceived ‘value added.’ In order to avoid this, we framed gender issues as both increasing operational effectiveness as well as being a rights issue of compliance with international, regional and national instruments and laws. Gender-based violence is also important to include as part of the rationale but can be framed as an issue of service delivery.

#### d) Essentialism and universalism

Another conceptual debate we had with the Toolkit was regarding essentialist assumptions about women and whether universalistic assumptions across cultures could be made. By using the frame of operational effectiveness we risk essentialising all women as inherently better communicators and less likely to use excessive force, etc. Careful wording such as “women often possess a useful skill set” can avoid a certain level of essentialism, but more care could have been taken to explain that these skills are not inherent to women but a product of socialisation. In addition, though we wished to include in each Tool at least one example of how gender interacts

with other factors such as age, ethnicity, religion, ability, sexual orientation, etc. – and specified this as a cross-cutting issue in the Author Guidelines – many authors did not make the connection between gender and other social factors. Nor did we have time during the final edit to search for and add specific examples to this effect. This is definitely one of the shortcomings of the Toolkit. It is challenging to have a clear, practical and gender-focused Tool that also fully addresses the link between gender and other forms of marginalisation; however, we could have done more on this front. Related to this issue, I also think that we could have included a more nuanced understanding of women that overtly recognises and discusses the extensive heterogeneity within the broad category and recognises that women do not all have the same security needs.

Similarly, after some internal debate, the Toolkit contains certain normative universalistic assumptions. For instance, that it is a good thing that SSR processes are more gender-responsive or that SSR assessments include questions on gender issues or that we want to increase the number of women within security sector institutions. These assumptions can be critiqued as ‘Western’ impositions, yet they are echoed in international, regional and national legislation as well as by women’s organisations and female security sector personnel around the world. In an effort to offset universalism in the Toolkit we made sure to include wording on how each SSR context is unique and that the recommended initiatives must be adapted to the individual context and based on a thorough assessment and analysis.

#### e) Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) issues

I had to advocate for the inclusion of LGBT issues within the Toolkit as it remains a controversial issue within the world of SSR, as much as within DCAF. My reasoning for inclusion was that it was a human rights issue. And that violence against gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity is a form of gender-based violence as it is based on perceived non-conformity with gender roles. There is also research showing that anti-gay discrimination, harassment and violence is perpetrated by security sector personnel – especially within the armed forces. Therefore, it was specifically mentioned in the Author Guidelines as cross-cutting issues to be included in all the Tools.

However, a few of the authors were not comfortable with mentioning LGBT issues and therefore it is only included within some of the Tools. In addition, several reviewers commented on it and it was discussed during the Expert Workshop. One of the arguments against inclusion was that many post-conflict and developing countries have legal frameworks that discriminate against or outlaw same-sex relationships and therefore security sector institutions cannot be expected to uphold or protect the rights of LGBT people. Another argument was that gender is a

controversial enough issue without mixing in LGBT issues, which might alienate many readers, especially from certain cultural contexts. The argument I found most persuasive came from a UK reviewer who simply stated that gender issues and LGBT issues manifest themselves differently when it comes to security sector institutions and therefore require different types of initiatives, so they should not be lumped into the same category. Despite these arguments, we took the decision to keep the references and examples related to LGBT issues but not to include them against the will of the authors. Another argument that we used in favour of inclusion is that the Toolkit does not just address post-conflict and developing contexts, but developed countries where human rights legislation is often in place to protect the rights of LGBT people and thus security sector institutions are mandated to respect and protect these rights.

f) New topics – border management and private military and security companies

Two of the Tools were on topics that had little to no previous research or resources to draw from. On border management, there was very little to be found on gender issues aside from the violation of women's rights by border guards and issues of human trafficking and female migration. Similarly, research on gender issues and private military and security companies (PMSC) is virtually unheard of except for a few articles on human rights violations by PMSC staff. The authors for these Tools therefore had to go to greater lengths to develop arguments and compile relevant examples for their Tools. This highlights the extreme dearth of resources on these two topics and the need for additional research and case studies.

g) Security sector reform for ALL

We took the controversial decision to include developed countries in our definition of security sector reform. SSR is almost always taken as only relating to post-conflict, transitional and developing countries. However, we argued that reforms take place within the security sector of developed countries even though they are not labelled SSR. This is especially the case when it comes to gender issues as most developed countries are still in need of reform, and in some cases could actually learn from initiatives implemented in developing or post-conflict countries.

What became particularly problematic was how to group different countries. As SSR varies greatly from country to country and no common model exists, it is important to acknowledge the need for in-depth assessment and adaptation of SSR initiatives to each country context. At the same time, for analytical purposes it can be useful to group countries into broadly defined SSR context in order to give a bit more specific gender and SSR information. However, within SSR research, each publication seems to have its own method of categorising and labelling different SSR contexts. In addition, placing any specific label on a country is a highly controversial act and

therefore we wanted to find a method of categorisation that was broadly accepted. After consultation and internal discussions, we chose to follow the categories established in the UN Statistics Division which take into consideration gross national income and the Human Development Index, namely post-conflict, transitional, developing and developed. Various reviewers and authors criticised this division, stating that such broad generalisations were not useful and in many cases ended up being repetitive. We seriously considered cutting this section from all of the Tools but in the end decided that there was enough interesting information to warrant keeping them in the Toolkit.

## 6) Results

After the process of developing the Toolkit and wrestling with various conceptual challenges the final product, though far from perfection, has proved to be having a positive impact at DCAF, at the donor level and countries undergoing SSR. The 3.000 copies of the Toolkit have been published along with 5.000 copies of a CD-ROM. The Toolkit is also available to download free on the websites of DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN-INSTRAW. All three organisations have held multiple launches of the Toolkit ranging from New York, London, Warsaw, Brussels, and Geneva to Addis Ababa. We have also used the Toolkit to design and deliver workshops and trainings on gender and SSR around the world. In addition to the implementation done by the Toolkit partners, we have also had reports of the Toolkit being used by the UN, EU and NGOs as the basis for gender and SSR-related training in Timor Leste, Afghanistan and Kosovo.

At DCAF, we have used the Toolkit to advocate for the integration of gender issues into DCAF's own work as well as initiating a project in Liberia and Sierra Leone on gender and SSR with the Women, Peace and Security Network – Africa (WIPSEN-Africa) as one of our local partners. The Toolkit has been extensively distributed in hardcopy to relevant stakeholders including SSR training participants, parliamentarians, civil society organisations, female security sector personnel, donors and UN and other internationals working on SSR. In response to a multitude of requests, translation of the Toolkit is currently underway into French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Bahasa Indonesia. In addition, selected Tools have been translated into Dari and Albanian.

We also received more requests for SSR and gender related training than we could handle. As the Toolkit does not include specific training exercises, we recognised this as a crucial gap and DCAF started a project to develop a Gender and SSR Training Resource Package. The Training Package includes concrete training exercises and will be launched during the summer of 2009. Another gap identified in the Toolkit was the lack of more detailed information on specific cross-cutting

gender initiatives such as the creation of institutional gender policies or increased recruitment of female personnel. In order to address this gap, DCAF is initiating a series of complementary Gender and SSR Practice Notes. For more information on activities related to the Gender and SSR Toolkit please visit the DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN-INSTRAW websites.

## **7) Ways forward**

The Gender and SSR Toolkit, along with other key publications and initiatives, has initiated a discussion on gender and SSR that was previously missing from the realm of security sector reform. However, many areas within gender and SSR remain under-researched and in clear need of additional information and analysis. These include:

- Intelligence and security services and gender
- Private military and security companies and gender
- Traditional justice and security provision, SSR and gender
- Men, masculinities and SSR
- Gender and SSR case studies including an in-depth analysis of context, process and outcomes
- Institutional change theory, gender and security sector institutions

By linking academia together with the realm of policymaking and field practitioners, inroads can be made to broaden our understanding of the links between gender and SSR and the practical measures needed to create a gender-responsive security sector that effectively meets the needs of women, men, girls and boys.

## Literature

- Hänggi, H. 2003:** Making Sense of Security Sector Governance. In: Hänggi, H./Winkler, T. H. (eds), Challenges of Security Sector Governance. Geneva: DCAF.
- OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2005:** Security System Reform and Governance. Paris: OECD.
- Valasek, K. , 2008:** Security Sector Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

MARGARETE JACOB

## **ENGENDERING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA COMPARED**

### **1) Introduction**

Since the mid-1990s, much has been written about the concept of security sector reform (SSR). This holistic approach for reform of a security sector, particularly with regard to developing countries, was first conceptualised by the British Department for International Development (DfID) in the late 1990s. It may be defined as “transforming the way the sector is managed and monitored to ensure that the sector’s principal institutions, first and foremost, the judiciary/courts, corrections, police and military are accountable to democratic civil authorities and that sound principles of public management and governance are instituted” (UNDP 2002: 7). Since then, the concept has drawn much attention both from the academic as well as the political community because it offers a comprehensive and global approach to apprehending security problems not only in developing countries, but also in situations of state fragility and especially in post-conflict environments.

However, despite its holistic approach and the important scientific and political attention SSR has attracted during the past decade, the question of whether and how to integrate gender concerns into SSR’s transformative agenda in post-conflict contexts has arisen only fairly recently. It arose when the United Nations began to take gender concerns in post-conflict-reconstruction and peacebuilding into account more consciously. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31<sup>st</sup> October 2000, “stressing the importance of their [women’s] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” (UN 2000: 1) is considered a key document in this context. Most recently, the UNSCR 1820 of 19<sup>th</sup> June 2008 has explicitly mandated international peacekeeping missions to take into account gender concerns when conducting SSR. Subsequently, policy makers and scholars started to consider more explicitly the connection between successful SSR and gender issues. This recent awareness is best reflected in a series of publications by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control for Armed Forces (DCAF), the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) and the OSCE Office for Democratic

Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR). It provides a detailed toolkit for gender and SSR and all its dimensions, such as gender and police, private military firms, etc. Furthermore, OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has recently published a booklet on gender and SSR, entitled "Integrating Gender Awareness and Equality" to be added to its original SSR concept (OECD 2007).

Despite this growing conceptual interest, it is difficult to evaluate empirically how and to what extent gender concerns are currently being integrated in externally-driven SSR in post-conflict situations. Thus, the present paper aims to enrich this debate and provide evidence for further analysis. For this purpose, SSR processes in two recent post conflict situations will be analysed and evaluated. Firstly, the case of Liberia, where SSR first was initiated in 1997 and taken up again in 2003 after the fall of President Charles Taylor, will be analysed. The second case study is Sierra Leone, where SSR has been conducted, with some interruptions, since 1998. SSR in Sierra Leone, in contrast to Liberia, was extremely well funded by external actors. Furthermore, it had been extensively pre-conceptualized which, again, was not the case in Liberia.

The central question of this paper will thus be how and to what extent security sector reform in Sierra Leone and Liberia was "engendered" in quantitative and qualitative terms. Given the limited space available here, the article's emphasis lies on an analysis of police and military reform.<sup>1</sup> It thus leaves aside the processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants (DDR), justice reform and reform of intelligence services or the attached ministries as well as legislative oversight; civil society capacity etc.<sup>2</sup> Police and military are traditionally strongholds of masculinity and violence. Therefore, this paper will argue that police and military are crucial for the gender-progress of the whole security sector and can therefore reflect progress and failure of the sector's development. Changed norms and attitudes in these branches will have an impact on the entire sector in the long term. Furthermore, changed attitudes in these domains can reflect progress in other parts of the reform process as well as obstacles encountered.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> However, a deeper-going and more extensive analysis should certainly also take into consideration other domains of the reform.

<sup>2</sup> In both cases, DDR was considered to be an independent, though interdependent programme from SSR. This article takes up this conceptual division. More recent conceptualisations of the nexus between DDR and SSR subsume both of them, as well as transitional justice mechanisms, under the broader concept of security governance (Bryden/Hänggi 2005).

<sup>3</sup> Thus, changes in both institutions depend to a certain extent on monitoring e.g. by civil society groups, as well as on the capacity and the will of other government agencies to monitor effective change. The relationship between the different domains of the reform is in fact complex and multi-faceted. However, because of the given space constraints, this complex interrelation cannot be fully addressed here.

The paper's main finding is that, contrary to what might be expected given the enormous financial investments in Sierra Leone's SSR, gender concerns were more consciously and successfully integrated in Liberia. Nevertheless, in both cases, significant shortfalls remain and much remains to be done with regard to establishing a gender-sensitive security sector. It will also be demonstrated that in both cases, gender concerns were respected more successfully in police reform than in military reform.

Even though the SSR processes in Sierra Leone and Liberia are well documented, analysts often take the gender aspect into account only marginally (see Aboagye/Rupiya 2005; Baker 2006; Horn et al 2006; Meek 2003). The aim of this paper is, therefore, to concentrate on this specific aspect and to provide a systematic analysis and evaluation of the gender dimensions in the two different SSR processes. This should contribute to further strengthen scientific attention to gender in SSR and provide initial empirical evidence. With this in mind, the paper will first define gender with regard to the security sector and present current arguments as to provide reasoning why engendering SSR can be beneficial. Second, it will identify ways in which to measure the extent of bringing gender into SSR. Third, it will analyse the two different reform processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone and compare them systematically.

## **2) Defining Gender issues in an SSR context**

### a) Defining gender: challenging the traditional nature of the security sector

In order to analyse why gender matters to the security sector, a definition of gender is essential. According to DCAF and INSTRAW, the concept of gender may be considered "as the particular roles and relationships, personality traits, attitudes, behaviours and values that society ascribes to men and women. Gender therefore refers to the learned differences between men and women, while sex refers to the biological differences between males and females." (Popovic 2008: 3). It can be deduced from this definition that taking gender into consideration is not only about "women", but also about deconstructing learned behaviour and gender roles in general; gender roles that affect women, men, boys and girls. All too often, gender is identified with women, which is undoubtedly a simplification of the reality. Therefore, the above-mentioned broad definition of gender shall be the guiding theoretical perspective of scientific analysis. However, in most post-conflict contexts, gender concerns are in fact identified with women's concerns, as the cases studies will show. Although this limitation is open to criticism, it can often be seen as an advance in practice – even though reductionist in theory - if women's specific needs are even taken into consideration in SSR. That is why this analysis will focus on the latter, while recognising that genuinely engendering SSR would imply looking also at the specific social

construction of male identities.

When analysing the interaction between gender and the security sector, it is essential to take into account that women, men, boys and girls are exposed to specific threats, of which gender-based violence is one of the most important. The aims of a gender-sensitive SSR are thus to effectively prevent and respond to gender-based insecurities, and to create non-discriminatory institutions as well as institutional cultures which respect gender differences, particularities and needs. In theory, this can be achieved through two types of intervention, which are either gender-awareness or women-specific interventions. Measures falling under the first category are, for instance, to ensure gender mainstreaming in all activities and the installation of gender focal points. Meanwhile, tools for the latter category include the systematic recruitment and advancement of women into security forces, the involvement of gender experts in SSR, etc. The ultimate purpose of a gender-sensitive SSR is to create a gender-balanced sector, which is able to take into account the different threats to which women, men, boys and girls are exposed.

Two arguments may be put forward when analysing the necessity of bringing gender concerns into security sector reform: a normative argument and an efficiency argument (Valasek 2007: 2). The normative reasoning consists in stating that women and sexual minorities, generally speaking, do matter to a society and that this should also be reflected in the security sector. A gender-balanced security sector represents thus an inherent value, it is argued (Bendix/Stanley 2008b: 45). The second argument states that “besides the normative concerns, the incorporation of a gender perspective is justified on the grounds of enhanced security and efficiency.” (Bendix/Stanley 2008b: 45). This argument has two important dimensions. It implies, first, that women should take part as actors, i.e. should be part of the security forces. Second, it means that gender concerns should be taken into account particularly by security forces, given that “it is recognised that men and women are subject to different types of security, and that the security sector affects men and women in different ways” (Bendix/Stanley 2008b: 44). This is all the more important due to the fact that in most countries and especially in most post-conflict countries, security sector institutions have a vast overrepresentation of men (Popovic 2008: 4). Thus, they represent one of the most important domains of masculinity, which is truer still for military than for police forces.

In many post-conflict societies, which the present article seeks primarily to consider, drawing attention to gender concerns is particularly difficult. In this context, the transition period can be both a window of opportunity and an obstacle. It will be a window of opportunity, if the transition period allows for challenging gender roles, traditional understandings of social behaviour and thereby also changes in institutional cultures. However, it may be an obstacle in

the sense that post-conflict societies tend to be particularly conservative due to what they have lost. In such a context, there may be a strong push from inside a society to return to an imagined “pre-war” idyll that may be decidedly un-emancipatory or even reactionary for women and with regard to specific gender concerns.<sup>4</sup>

b) How to measure the extent of gender sensitivity

According to an INSTRAW’s framework on “Gender and SSR”, there is a distinction between two dimensions to be considered when assessing barriers to and policies for a gender-sensitive security sector reform: women as actors and women/girls as beneficiaries (INSTRAW 2007b).<sup>5</sup> These two dimensions may also serve as categories when defining criteria for measuring the extent and success of engendering SSR.

The “women as actors” category refers to the question of how far female staff is recruited and represented in the security sector’s institutions, for example, how many female police officers there are and which ranks within the institution’s hierarchy they occupy. Meanwhile, the “women as beneficiaries” or “women as potential beneficiaries” category refers to the question as to how far women outside of the institution benefit from improved gender sensitivity, such as whether access barriers to justice could be reduced or whether gender-based violence has decreased. Gender-awareness training also belongs to this category. Even though this is more a means to achieve less gender-based violence than a purpose in itself, such training may also indicate an increased level of gender-sensitivity within security sector institutions, from which women or sexual minorities can potentially benefit. In this paper, several indicators have been selected for both of these global categories that will identify either quantitatively or qualitatively how far the process of engendering of each reform domain has advanced (Table 1). To evaluate these indicators for Liberia and Sierra Leone, quantitative and qualitative data will thus later be combined to draw a comprehensive conclusion.

The indicators selected here rely on Popovic’ propositions from the DCAF/INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR “Gender and SSR” assessment toolkit (Popovic 2008: 8). However, not every criterion defined in that toolkit was taken up here due to feasibility and the selection of criteria that are potentially relevant to the two case studies. Given that accessible and reliable data in the two cases, Sierra Leone and Liberia, is rare, the criteria are kept simple in order to facilitate a

---

<sup>4</sup> An interesting historical example of the will to maintain a pre-war idyll is the situation during World War II in Nazi-Germany. Interestingly, despite the rhetorical commitment to ‘total war’, Nazi ideology kept large numbers of women devoted to “Küche & Kinder” (“kitchen and children”).

<sup>5</sup> When framing security sector reform and gender, INSTRAW only talks about women and girls and not about sexual minorities or other aspects of gender. This simplification certainly reflects the reality in many post-conflict countries: what are subsumed under “gender” are often women-specific interventions. These indicators are adopted here despite the simplification.

comparative evaluation. Therefore, the indicators are not exhaustive. However, it can be argued that a positive tendency with regard to the indicators will point towards a positive evolution towards a more gender-balanced and gender-sensitive security sector in the long term.

	<b>Women as actors</b>	<b>Women/girls/sexual minorities as potential beneficiaries</b>
<i>Police Reform</i>	Proportion of female staff Ranks of female staff within the hierarchy of police force Interaction with women’s organisations	Gender-based violence/Domestic violence Access to police services Gender-awareness training
<i>Military Reform</i>	Proportion of female staff Ranks of female staff within the hierarchy of armed forces Interaction with women’s organisation	Gender-based violence in armed conflicts

In the following section, the SSR process in Liberia will be analysed according to these indicators.

### 3) **Bringing a gender perspective into SSR: the case of Liberia**

After the civil war in Liberia from 1989 until 2003, SSR represented an essential component of the reconstruction and pacification programme, initiated by the international community. The security sector’s role in Liberia had, throughout the country’s history, been largely negative. Since Liberian independence, security forces had mostly served as political instruments of the respective government and oppressed major sectors of Liberian society. The police and the secret police were thus considered as “heavily politicised” (Ebo 2005: 20). Furthermore, during the long years of civil war, the army and police forces had themselves committed grave atrocities and cruelties. Public confidence in the security sector was therefore lamentably low by the end of the war.

When SSR initially started in 1997, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was to oversee the reform process. However, due to ongoing conflict in Liberia, the need to conduct an extensive DDR and SSR was re-stated in the Liberian *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* in 2003. Its articles VI, VII and VIII stressed the importance of a comprehensive reform. Thus, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), deployed in 2003, was assigned to assist the Liberian Government in the reform process. From a conceptual point of view, the

UN particularly stressed the importance of police reform within SSR. The *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA) of 2003, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), and the Constitution of Liberia of 1986 provide the context and legal basis for the implementation of SSR in Liberia.

Analysts who have judged the success of the reform as a whole have differing viewpoints. Mark Malan from the Institute for Strategic Studies in London points out that “Liberia’s post-war security architecture has been characterized by redundancy, inadequate control, and incoherence. (Malan 2008: 10). Analysts who are critical clearly dominate the discourse, even though some domains of SSR such as the police are considered to have been a success, at least from a quantitative point of view (Malan 2008: 57). All analysts agree with regard to three points. First, the lack of a comprehensive strategy was judged to represent a serious problem for the reform process (Ebo 2005: ii). The fact that there was no coordination, harmonisation or cooperation between the different domains of reform is all the more surprising given that a holistic approach is one of the most important components of the SSR concept. Second, the strong emphasis on police reform to the neglect of other security institutions was criticised: “By concentrating on reforming and restructuring the police and not the armed forces, UNMIL now stands accused of going for the soft belly and not the hard aspects demanded by the security situation.” (Aboagye/Rupiya 2005: 260). Third, the outsourcing of the military reform to the private military contractors *DynCorp International* and *Pacific Architects and Engineers* is heavily criticised: this outsourcing restrained significantly the possibilities of engagement for civil society organisations and civilian oversight in the reform process.<sup>6</sup> (Bendix/Stanley 2008a: 17).

When it comes to gender aspects, the provisions of the UN Resolution 1509 (2003) place a particular emphasis on the protection and the promotion of vulnerable groups. Besides refugees, returning refugees etc, this provided a protective framework for women and children. Resolution 1509 (2003) and the CPA, against the background of Resolution 1325, “therefore acknowledge the importance of promoting and protecting the rights of civilians, especially vulnerable groups – predominantly women and children – in the resolution of the Liberian conflict” (Aisha 2005: 152). Despite these legal provisions, the two criticisms concerning SSR mentioned above also apply to the gender lens: gender did play a role when it came to the conceptualisation of police reform. But aside from that, there was no reliable strategy for gender mainstreaming throughout the whole SSR even though UNMIL had created a focal point for gender affairs by establishing

---

<sup>6</sup> According to Bendix and Stanley (2008a), “DynCorp has refused to report to the Liberian parliament, citing its contractual obligations towards the US State Department.” Besides the lack of transparency, this refusal also reflects the lack of ownership by which military reform in Liberia was characterised.

the *Office of the Gender Advisor* (OGA) (Aisha 2005: 153), consisting of around ten staff members. It may be argued that the very existence of this focal point office can be judged as a further sign of greater gender awareness. However, its concrete impact was limited, as the following analysis will show. It provides a more detailed analysis of gender aspects in two reform domains: the police and the military, looking at the impact on women as actors and women as beneficiaries.

a) Police reform: the impact of an engendered UN CivPol

According to the Security Council's resolution 1509 of 19<sup>th</sup> September 2003, it was part of UNMIL's tasks to "assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia (...)" (UN 2003). The CivPol units of the international peacekeeping force, 1,240 men and women in total, were to oversee the reconstruction of the *Liberian National Police* (LNP), a process that commenced in spring 2004. The UN's explicit aim in the reconstruction process was to create an effective and accountable police force of 3, 500 policemen and women that respected human rights (UN 2008b: 5).

One of UNMIL CivPol's particularities was the so-called *Indian contingent*, a police unit consisting almost exclusively of women: "The fifth formed police unit, from India, comprising 105 women and 20 men, arrived in the Mission on 30 January. This unit is the first predominantly female police unit deployed in the history of the United Nations" (UN 2007b: 3). In addition to this specific female-dominated contingent within CivPol, there were 56 female police officers spread throughout the mission. The integration of female policewomen was important from a symbolic point of view, indicating greater gender awareness among international actors than in many preceding missions. Aside from this symbolic dimension, the Indian contingent worked closely with the OGA. Together, they were to ensure the training of the female units within the LNP that were to be built.

With regard to Liberian women as potential actors within the police forces, an ambitious goal was defined, according to which 15 percent of the new Liberian police were to be female. In order to ensure the recruitment of qualified women, educational support programmes were provided from January 2007 on, mainly funded by the Dutch government (UN 2007b: 5). By March 2008, 3,662 police officers had graduated from the newly founded *National Police Academy*, 361 of them being female (UN 2008b: 5). Thus, one out of 90 police officers was female. Furthermore, women within the LNP do not only fulfil classical "women's tasks" like cooking, cleaning etc, but were seriously involved in the core work of the police. Even though the total recruitment figures remain below the initial benchmark of 15 percent, the recruitment process could still be considered an achievement in comparison to the prior situation. This is all the more true since the concerns of female police staff are increasingly taken seriously. Thus, female police

officers' demand for separate quarters was met recently when separate male and female dormitories were built. (UN 2008b: 6). However, the role of female actors within the police is not universally judged to be a success, as Malan shows. In the *National Police Academy*, Class 32, an all-female class, proved to be problematic from the very beginning of its training in 2007. Apparently, "UNPOL instructors report that discipline and fitness have been particularly problematic with this class, with members (...) behaving at a lower standard than previous male or integrated male-female classes" (Malan 2008: 60). Despite this, however, the serious efforts to integrate women as actors can be viewed positively when compared to the previous situation.

At the same time, the aspect of "women as beneficiaries" was less prominently addressed in the reform process than "women as actors". Aboagye and Rupiya stated in 2005 that "what appears to be deficient, is gender balancing in the LNP" (2005: 263). However, some particular measures were taken to address gender concerns: The Liberian National Police (LNP) established, at the end of 2005, the so-called *Women and Child Protection Unit* (WACPU) with help from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as well as from UNICEF. This special unit was supposed to deal with issues of gender-based violence and domestic violence (UNIFEM/UNDP 2007: 6). Furthermore, gender awareness training took place, but from a comparatively late stage of the process on. In its two-yearly report, the *Office of the Gender Advisor* (OGA) affirmed in 2006 that the Police Academy had increased "gender mainstreaming in the police and its operations." (OGA 2006: 1). In this context, the *National Police Academy* also provided special training courses from 2007 onwards, where the "women and child protection" class was taken by 104 recruits (Malan 2008: 58). In addition, the police academy instructors took part in routine training on gender issues. Fatoumata Aisha claims that in fact, "training strategic actors such as the interim LNP and conducting gender orientation sessions with incoming CivPol officers have helped to raise awareness of the issue." (2005: 160).

Nevertheless, it can be argued that gender awareness training was deployed relatively late in the reform process, as of end 2005/beginning 2006, which made it more difficult to generate an impact even though it was conducted systematically from that point on. With regard to the "sexual and domestic violence" indicator, little progress was therefore made. The improved access to police services for women has not yet had the impact external actors had hoped for. Indeed, the UN itself admits that this limited impact is demonstrated by ongoing sexual and gender-based violence in Liberia and by the lack of public confidence in LNP's sensitivity regarding gender-specific incidents (UN 2008b: 4). This finding is all the more alarming since gender-based sexual violence was one of the cruellest characteristics of the 14-year civil war.

Thus, this analysis has shown that the aspect of “women as actors” was slightly more present and respected than “women as potential beneficiaries” of police reform in Liberia, mainly driven by UNMIL. Gender awareness training as a mainstream measure was only initiated at a relatively late stage and its impact is still limited. A different result may be observed for the recruitment of female staff, facilitated by the female component of CivPol. Even though the ambitious initial benchmark of 15 percent of female police officers was not achieved, progress was made with regard to a gender-balanced composition of the police forces. This is true to a much lesser extent for the armed forces of Liberia.

b) High benchmarks for military reform

Largely neglected by the UNMIL mandate, the *Armed Forces of Liberia* (AFL) and their reform has become the ‘stepchild’ of SSR in Liberia. After a semi-successful DDR-process carried out by UNMIL, benchmarks for building a new army were set out. The United States took over the role as a leading nation and also funded the reform. According to the initial benchmarks, the new Liberian army was to consist of only 2.000 men and women. Besides the limited budget available, the decision to keep the Liberian army small was also a response to its dubious role during the civil war and its traditional relations with the governing power. Its mandate is, therefore, exclusively to defend national sovereignty as well as to help in the case of natural disasters. Its direct interaction with the Liberian population is therefore very confined.

The first training course of the new AFL recruits began in late 2005, and the first section of the new army was due to become operational by early 2006. However, the aim of training 2.000 soldiers in two years was not achieved. Apart from this quantitative shortfall, the reform of the *Armed Forces of Liberia* (AFL) has also been discussed very controversially in other terms. The United States as the leading nation delegated the reform to the American-based private military contractors (PMC) *DynCorp International* and *Pacific Architects and Engineers* (PAE), with an initial budget of 35 million dollars. The first criticism in this context resides in the lack of transparency, accountability and civil-military relations, which was a result of assigning military reform to PMCs. It is, in fact, still close to impossible to gain an exact and detailed overview as to the precise status of the reform. The second criticism relates to the fact that the engagement of PMCs indicated that “external engagement in Liberian security sector reform is a short to medium-term venture” (Ebo 2005: 24). In fact, it seems almost incredible that the military – “which bears the greatest responsibility for the country’s misfortune” (Aboagye/Rupiya 2005: 264) – was given such a low priority on the peacebuilding agenda.

The involvement of PMCs was also a significant problem from a gender perspective. The

engagement of DynCorp systematically prevented the OGA's intervention in this domain. The OGA had no clear mandate for working on military reform, but was dependent on limited agreements with DynCorp. Gender awareness training has not yet taken place within the army. According to Malan, however, this is planned for a later stage of the formation process. Nevertheless, since there has been no armed conflict since restructuring the army and thus hardly any interaction with the Liberian police, it is impossible to measure what the reform's impact on incidents of sexual violence would potentially be.

With regard to the aspect of "women as actors", there were significant shortfalls, but also opportunities. The benchmark first announced at the beginning of the reform process was to recruit 20% female staff (Malan 2008: 30). However, there was clearly neither a plan nor a strategy to pursue this benchmark seriously or systematically. By winter 2007, only around five percent of the new recruits were female (Malan 2008: 33). Although this is far from the 20 percent benchmark, it is remarkable for two reasons. Firstly, even though conducted by PMCs, gender was not totally neglected. Secondly, this ratio does not compare very unfavourably with Western European armies.<sup>7</sup>

Taking into account the above criteria of how to engender military reform, the overall extent of gender sensitivity is nonetheless remarkably low. Not only was the percentage of female staff within the new army low and gender-mainstreaming initiatives rare, but interaction with the UN hardly took place, and gender concerns were not significantly advanced in any other way.

This analysis of SSR in Liberia demonstrates that different branches of SSR, i.e. police and military, dealt differently with gender issues. The police reform, driven mainly by UNMIL, was significantly more successful than the military reform. Not only was a quota introduced, but it was also systematically pursued, with the OGA being more deeply involved in this reform domain. Whereas OGA had a strong presence in the police reform, its interaction with the military reform, run by DynCorp International, proved to be more difficult, even though not impossible.

However, regarding the entire security sector reform in Liberia, there was no overall strategy of bringing gender into the security sector. OGA activities referred to particular aspects of gender concerns, but without a clearly defined overall vision. Nevertheless, the establishment of a gender focal point can be seen as a sign of rising gender awareness in the conceptualisation of peacekeeping missions. The gender unit and the *Indian contingent* within UNMIL undoubtedly contributed to that outcome.

---

<sup>7</sup> In 2007, the German government stated that 7.3 % of the German Armed Forces are female. (Bundestag 2007: 7).

Finally, it has also become clear that the aspect of “women as actors” was better integrated in police and military reform processes than the question of “women as beneficiaries”. Gender-awareness training took place later and less coherently than the systematic recruitment of women.

#### 4) Gender in SSR in Sierra Leone

Externally driven peacebuilding in Sierra Leone is considered one of the rare success stories of international interventionism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ginifer 2006: 792). The country, having suffered from a bloody civil war with a regional component from 1991 to 2002, has received considerable external financial and personal support until recently. From 1998 on, the United Kingdom was the most important external actor in the conduct of SSR. However, it was only after the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), consisting of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1999 and the British military operation “Palliser” in 2000 that reconstruction and SSR could be conducted systematically. SSR’s priorities, as was defined in various peace agreements over the years of conflict, were reform of the armed forces, reform of the police, reform of the judiciary and reform of the intelligence services (Lomé Peace Accord 1999, Part IV, “Post-Conflict Military and Security Issues”). After the withdrawal of UNAMSIL in 2007, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established and mandated with further peace consolidation.

As in Liberia, security institutions in Sierra Leone had played a highly questionable role during the years of conflict, mainly serving as an instrument of oppression for the respective governments. Aside from this, “recruitment over the previous three decades had been based on patronage and ethnic affiliation” (Ginifer 2006: 795). First attempts to reform the security sector in Sierra Leone can be traced back to 1996 (Gbla 2006: 18), when President Kabbah came to power. In this context, various peace agreements from 1996 onwards stressed the need to reform the security apparatus. However, because of ongoing conflicts between the government and the *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF), it was almost impossible to conduct a systematic SSR before 2000.

Peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone in general, and specifically SSR, are mostly considered a success story (Ginifer 2006: 793). To a large extent, this is due to the fact that the British government was heavily engaged in the process and provided substantial financial and personal resources to support the process. Only in very few other international post-conflict processes has SSR been carried out with a similar degree of commitment and prior conceptual planning. As a consequence, the effectiveness of the armed forces and the new police force could be significantly enhanced as part of the reform process (Gbla 2006: 31). SSR succeeded in addressing problems of nepotism and ethnic tendencies (Gbla 2006: 30), and the accountability

of the security sector seems to have significantly improved. Nevertheless, specific criticisms remain, such as those articulated by Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin and Gordon Peake, who were directly involved in SSR planning for Sierra Leone. According to these critics, three main problems with SSR in Sierra Leone can be identified: the disconnection between the conceptual and the practical level, the poor management of the reform's complex processes and, finally, the lack of sustainability (Horn et al 2006: 109-110). In this context, it has also been argued that national ownership in the reform processes was too weak to make the reforms sustainable (Gbla 2006: 34).

When it comes to gender aspects in Sierra Leone's SSR process, the first finding is that they are far more difficult to analyse than in Liberia. Despite the strong conceptual base on which SSR relied, there is considerably less literature and material taking this specific aspect into consideration. To a large extent, the following analysis is based on reports published by international non-governmental organisations and other primary sources, such as UN agencies.

The UNAMSIL and United Nations mandates in Sierra Leone took gender aspects into account only marginally, despite that fact that 30 percent of the mission's staff was female: "The Security Council Resolution 1270, which established UNAMSIL, made only cursory reference to gender issues as it predated Security Council Resolution 1325, compared to the mandates of on-going peacekeeping missions in Liberia" (UNAMSIL 2006: 17). This marginal role for gender concerns was also reflected at an institutional level. Here, the mission's gender unit, the so-called *Gender Advisor* (GA), was first located in its human rights section where its visibility was low and thus its potential impact insignificant (UNAMSIL 2006: 6). In 2005, one year before the withdrawal of UNAMSIL, the GA was re-located to the Special Representative of the Secretary General's office. This would have been a better position to mainstream gender issues. However, in the final UNAMSIL gender report conducted for DPKO, the period of one year was judged "too short to ensure full attainment of the potential benefits." (UNAMSIL 2006: 7). Furthermore, it can be argued that one single full-time GA for a mission of 18.000 peacekeepers was, by definition, an underrepresentation of gender concerns. This is all the more true since in UNAMSIL's successor mission UNIOSIL, the gender advisor again became part of the mission's human rights and rule of law component.

#### a) Police reform: inventing "Family Support Units"

From 1998 onwards, the United Kingdom was involved in Sierra Leone's police reform. After a short initial assessment, conducted by a team of international experts, the so-called "first phase" of police reform was initiated (1998-1999). This consisted mainly in defining a conceptual base

(Horn et al 2006: 112). During the second phase (1999-2002), the *Commonwealth Security and Safety Project* (CSSP) was established. In order to provide training, support and professional advice to the reconstructed *Sierra Leonean Police* (SLP), international experts were sent to Sierra Leone. In the period between 2002 and 2005, the SLP then finally reached a stage where it could carry out its responsibilities without permanent external support (Horn et al 2006: 118).

In its tasks, CSSP was supported by UNAMSIL's CivPol component, which permanently consisted of between 60 and 90 police observers (Meek 2003: 110). CivPol and CSSP decided to adopt a strategy called "local needs policing" which was to take local needs into account explicitly.<sup>8</sup> Aside from this common strategic base, in training and assisting the SLP, the relationship between CivPol and CSSP has not always been very clear, which led to coordination problems in the implementation process.

In the 2002 *National Recovery Strategy*, the Sierra Leonean government set a benchmark of recruiting 9,500 police officers. By late 2007, 9,200 had effectively been recruited. With regard to gender-balanced recruitment, a benchmark of 15 percent female officers was defined. Consequently, the SLP had recruited 1,550 female police officers by the end of 2007 (UN 2007a: 4). Of 46 SLP-Superintendents, four were female. Thus, the purely quantitative aspect of recruiting with regard to gender criteria was relatively successful. Within the SLP, many of the female officers work in the so-called "Family Support Units" (FSU) (UN 2004: 1). These FSUs, first created in 2001, are the most prominent innovation in the context of post-conflict policing in Sierra Leone. Their explicit aim was and is to provide police services to victims of gender-based and domestic violence. Most of the police officers working for the FSUs are female, but there are also some male officers. This initiative also reflected the community-based approach to policing which had been adopted.

By inventing FSUs, the dimension of "women as beneficiaries" was integrated conceptually into police activities from an early stage of the process on. By late 2006, there were 26 FSUs located throughout the country. But even though the FSU-strategy seemed at first to be promising, its empirical success is in fact rather ambiguous. International Alert states that, despite the FSUs, "the police (...) remain largely insensitive to gender issues, including gender-based violence"

---

<sup>8</sup> The debate on the concept of "community policing", with its orientation towards local values and perceptions, has identified the potential drawbacks of this approach. However, most analyses focus on community policing in the industrialised world, above all in the USA and the UK. There is no systematic, independent research on community policing in other contexts. Moreover, it is unclear whether community policing is a useful approach to combating gender-based violence. Evidence from the United States suggests that, where police officers are closely integrated into their local communities, this can lead to greater tolerance towards such violence, if the community itself tolerates such abuse (Websdale/Johnson 1997).

(International Alert 2007: 2)<sup>9</sup>. This may also be attributed to the fact that gender-mainstreaming activities other than the FSUs were rare: “gender training inputs had not been formally integrated into the CIVPOL training manuals to ensure continuity” (UNAMSIL 2006: 25). In April 2008, the UN also found that governmental responses to gender-based violence were still weak (UN 2008a: 8). As a response to this finding, UNIOSIL finalised its policy guidelines and training modules for gender mainstreaming, establishing a zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse for the SLP in July 2008. Consequently, it is too early to evaluate their empirical impact. However, it may be observed that, until recently, the aspect of women as consumers of security and gender-mainstreaming activities was almost exclusively covered by FSUs. This concentration on this very specific aspect of integrating gender concerns represents a conceptual shortfall, which neglects other important dimensions of the issue.

According to the above analysis, then, gender concerns were integrated into the police reform to a limited extent. UNAMSIL’s and UNIOSIL’s capacity for addressing gender matters was somewhat attenuated which was due primarily to shortfalls in the SSR concept, drawn up by the UK and national authorities. Although conceptual planning was detailed, rare attention was given to gender issues. In practical terms, too, very few resources were dedicated to gender matters, in contrast to Liberia. Whereas the gender unit within UNMIL constantly consisted of 7 to 10 people, there was only one single gender advisor for the entire UNAMSIL. Meanwhile, recruiting women into the police proved to be more successful than raising awareness for the needs of women and children as consumers of security, similar to what could be observed in Liberia. Because of the lack of successful gender-mainstreaming initiatives apart from the FSUs, the police as an institution today still is clearly “dominated and biased towards men” (International Alert 2007: 23). From this point of view, little progress has been made since the end of the war.

#### b) The reform of the armed forces

Direct UK involvement in Sierra Leone’s military reform began in 1999 when the British Ministry of Defence sent an *International Military Advisory and Training Team* (IMATT) to Sierra Leone. The initial objective in assisting the *Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone* (RSLAF) was to defeat RUF forces. However, British military forces played a further crucial role in reforming the army after the UK’s intervention in 2000. The explicit objective of the military reform process was, therefore, to improve the RSLAF’s effectiveness, to implement structural reform and to create new mechanisms of oversight and accountability. However, as opposed to the case

---

<sup>9</sup> In 2007, International Alert, together with Irish Aid, carried out a detailed study on gender-based violence in Sierra Leone, which analyses international as well as national efforts made in this domain (International Alert 2007).

in Liberia, the army was not rebuilt from scratch, but rather provided with reform, training and better equipment. In the *Armed Forces Training Centre* (AFTC) near Freetown, British military advisors provided short-term trainings to RSLAF and assisted the army in its internal restructuring.

As a consequence, the situation of RSLAF has significantly improved over the past six years. The forces have become “more professional, and better trained and equipped with skills and discipline required, carrying out basic military missions and tasks.” (Horn et al 2006: 119-120). It is presently around 15.000 strong. Nonetheless, doubts remain regarding the sustainability of the military structure since the Sierra Leonean government will not be able to maintain the significant financial commitments provided by the British government until recently.<sup>10</sup> Horn, Olonisakin and Peake also criticise the format of the democratic oversight of the sector. Even though mechanisms of democratic control have improved, for instance by installing a dual civil-military led Ministry of Defence, it is doubtful whether these will be viable after the complete withdrawal of external actors (Horn et al 2006: 120).

In 2002, a UN report states that the “general public is yet to be fully convinced of the long-term reliability of the armed forces.” (UN 2002: 5). This is particularly true when viewed from the perspective of women and children. As well as the police, members of the military had committed grave sexual violations during the conflicts (International Alert 2007: 10). As a consequence, the reputation of the army in the population was lamentable. Nevertheless, for practical reasons, the army was neither entirely demobilised nor disarmed. Priority was given to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of RUF rebels. Therefore, no fundamental rebuilding of the Sierra Leonean army took place, but only additional training. This also meant that there was no large-scale systematic recruitment of new soldiers, which would have made an integration of female recruits more easily possible. Currently, there are no reliable figures available to demonstrate how many women serve in the Sierra Leonean army, which suggests that their number and their influence in the army’s hierarchy is insignificant. Even UNAMSIL confirms that “the mission lost the opportunity to integrate gender concerns in the local military’s work and capacity building.” (UNAMSIL 2006: 28). Aside from this shortfall regarding the recruitment aspect, women are also heavily underrepresented in oversight committees such as the *Provincial and District Security Committees* (PROSEC/DISEC), which were to be a forum for discussion on national and local security needs and concerns (International Alert 2007: 23). Whether as actors within the national army or as actors in monitoring and oversight bodies,

---

<sup>10</sup> Already in the initial phase of the reform between 2000 and 2002, the UK provided 37 million US \$ for basic equipments such as uniforms and vehicles.

women in Sierra Leone, in contrast to Liberia, thus played a marginal role..

As far as the “women as beneficiaries” category is concerned, it is, again, very difficult to find any empirical evidence or reliable data. International Alert reports that UNIOSIL did conduct gender-awareness training with the army, as it did with the police. Despite this, however, the institution remains dominated by traditional roles and images of masculinity (International Alert 2007: 24). Another alarming factor highlighted by UNAMSIL is the number of sexual offences still committed by the armed forces, which remains high even in the absence of armed conflict: “although the troops were rotated regularly to avoid long absences from families, they were still associated with a high incidence of sexual exploitation and abuse of locals.” (UNAMSIL 2006: 28). Taking into account the few substantive changes on an institutional level as well as this finding, it seems that no profound transformative agenda was initiated.

Thus, when comparing reform of the armed forces in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it becomes clear that gender concerns were integrated to a significantly lesser extent in Sierra Leone in this domain of SSR than in Liberia. Even though external funding for SSR was extremely high compared with other post-conflict situations, UNAMSIL itself stated in 2006 that “DPKO seriously under-invested in supporting gender mainstreaming activities” in the mission (UNAMSIL 2006: 6). In particular, the aspect of “women as actors” in the military was largely neglected in Sierra Leone. This was due to the fact that the RSLAF was not rebuilt, but only reformed. Less structural change could take place, given that the break with past structures was less decisive and deep than in Liberia.

## **5) Engendering SSR - Sierra Leone and Liberia compared**

Sierra Leone and Liberia can be considered as very similar cases as far as their general post-war environment is concerned. Both have suffered from a long and cruel civil war and, in both, there was a need to rebuild and reform governmental structures in depth. In both cases, external actors played a significant role in the peacebuilding process. When it comes to SSR, external actors and national authorities had to deal with a security sector that had played a highly negative role during the period of conflict and in which public confidence was extremely low. Undoubtedly, this represented a major challenge for the conduct of SSR. There are also remarkable similarities when it comes to gender and the initial situation of women after the end of the conflict as well as the cultural environment for mainstreaming gender. In fact, the “patriarchal context with discriminatory gender relations and cultural practices posed a major challenge to gender mainstreaming.” (UNAMSIL 2006: 10). Furthermore, gender-based violence had literally constituted a weapon of war in both conflicts. According to Amnesty International, around 33%

of the female population - 250.000 girls and women- had been victims of sexual violence during the conflict in Sierra Leone (Amnesty International 2007: 4). It is assumed that the percentage was higher still in Liberia.<sup>11</sup> Thus, it was a precondition for sustainable reconciliation and peace to address gender issues in the aftermath of the conflict as part of the peacebuilding process.

However, despite these initial similarities, the above analysis has shown that gender aspects were integrated to a larger extent in the Liberian SSR process than in Sierra Leone. Not only did gender-mainstreaming activities take place more systematically within the police and the army of Liberia, but women were also more systematically recruited into the armed forces (as the figures above have shown). Furthermore, in Sierra Leone, incidents of sexual violence, committed by members of the army, remained remarkably high. Nonetheless, this should not overshadow the fact that significant difficulties and challenges also remain in Liberia and that gender equality has not yet been reached. It could be said that the different outcomes of the reform processes are mainly due to a set of five main factors.

Firstly, due to strong UK involvement, SSR in Sierra Leone was based on a coherent concept, whereas in Liberia it was more ad hoc and less clearly framed. At the same time, however, this extensive SSR framework in Sierra Leone did not sufficiently take gender concerns into account. In Liberia, the different elements of the reform were less systematically connected and there was no overall framework for the reform process (Malan 2008: V). SSR in Liberia, therefore, did not meet the requirements of the concept's holistic approach such as defined by UNDP and the OECD-DAC. Paradoxically, this had a significant advantage from a gender perspective: it left a bigger *marge de manoeuvre* for actors within the reform processes. The strategic vacuum was filled by such initiatives as the *Office of the Gender Advisor*. In this way, the Liberian reform process also became more transparent from a gender point of view than in Sierra Leone, which is – among other things - reflected in the difficulty of finding reliable data on the latter.

Secondly, the female component within UNMIL CivPol and the so-called gender unit played an important pioneer role. Not only was it directly involved in gender training, but the *Indian contingent* was also important from a symbolic point of view. The fact that gender was directly integrated into the peacebuilding mission, and the external actors' efforts to make gender visible, increased sensitivity to gender issues in general. Aside from that, UNMIL dedicated in general more capacities and resources to gender issues than UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL and DFID.

---

<sup>11</sup> A study of the World Health Organization from 2005 points out that according to a representative study conducted in two counties in Liberia, 77,4% of the female population experienced rape during the years of conflict. (WHO 2004: 18). Even though certainly not fully representative for the whole country, this finding nevertheless points to the extraordinarily high level of acts of sexual violence committed during the war.

Thirdly, the principal international drivers of the reform had differing understandings of gender and its importance, which had an important influence on the outcome. The UK's DFID – the main driver behind the Sierra Leonean police reform – did not treat the issue of gender-sensitivity as prominently as did UNMIL when conducting the Liberian police reform. The latter spent far more resources on gender questions. Not only did it conduct systematic awareness trainings from a certain point on, also the personnel capacities in Liberia were more significant than in Sierra Leone. This is best reflected in the fact that the UNMIL's OGA consisted of around ten people, whereas the UN unit dealing with gender in Liberia only consisted of one single person, the gender advisor.

Fourthly, the difference between rebuilding and reforming played a crucial role. Whereas in Sierra Leone, parts of the security sector were simply reformed, in Liberia the sector was literally reconstructed from scratch. The subsequent openness made it easier to integrate gender concerns and women as actors in Liberia than in Sierra Leone. This is mainly reflected in the reform process of the armed forces. Whereas the Liberian army was completely rebuilt, the Sierra Leonean army was “only” reformed and trained. As a consequence, recruitment requirements could be established without the need to build on existing structures in Liberia, which was not the case in Sierra Leone.

Lastly, the SSR process began three years later in Liberia (2003) than in Sierra Leone (1999/2000). This 3-year period was crucial in the international community's debate on gender issues. It allowed for UNMIL to take account of the UN resolution 1325 on *Women, peace and security*, adopted on 31<sup>st</sup> October 2000, which was not possible for UNMISAL, already deployed by that time. Consequently, the “gender turn” in international peacebuilding that began at the beginning of the century did not affect Sierra Leone to the same extent as Liberia.

Further general findings result from the comparative analysis. It is noticeable that in both cases analysed above, the “women-as-actors” perspective was more successfully integrated into SSR than the “women-as-beneficiaries” perspective. As shown above, the quantitative requirements of recruitment of female staff were not always fully met, but there was considerable progress was made in the right direction. However, the impact of gender training and gender mainstreaming initiatives often seemed less significant. This might seem paradoxical given that recruitment of female staff could appear to be a more decisive and visible step towards gender equality. However, in practice, this is not necessarily true. The empirical evidence presented in this analysis indicates that changing learned behaviour – gender roles – and institutional cultures, is a more complicated process than meeting the requirements of an externally-imposed quota. Respecting women-as-actors within the security forces did not mean that society and security forces

questioned or modified traditional roles.

Moreover, in Liberia as well as in Sierra Leone, gender concerns were best integrated in the police reform and to a much lesser extent in the military. This suggests that traditional gender roles were more strongly reflected in the military than in the police. In fact, whereas policing is associated with public law and order rather than with *high security*, the latter is undoubtedly the case for the military. "Violent masculinity" is represented more strongly in the military than in the police force.

## 6) Conclusion and lessons learned

The aim of the present analysis was to evaluate and to analyse to what extent gender concerns were integrated in the SSR processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It was found that gender concerns were integrated to a larger extent in Liberia's SSR than in Sierra Leone due to a number of factors that were highlighted above. First, the general reform framework was more flexible in Liberia, which had positive implications on gender matters. Second, the gender unit and the peacekeeping environment within the present UN-mission played a crucial role. Third, the differing attitude of the international drivers behind the reform determined the way gender issues were approached. Fourth, the difference between *rebuilding* and *reforming* had an impact on the outcome. Lastly, the timing of the reform and the greater flexibility in the conduct of SSR in Liberia influenced the outcome in a positive way. This is most prominently reflected in the reform of the armed forces army and the recruitment of female staff in this domain.

However, progress made in the Liberian SSR should not hide the fact that, in both cases, major difficulties and challenges remain with regard to gender concerns. One of the most important difficulties that must be addressed is the continued gender-based violence in the country and gender-based discrimination within the security sector itself, which remains a significant problem.

Some important conclusions with regard to gender and SSR can be drawn from the above analysis. Even though the detailed findings from this comparative case study cannot be applied across the board, they nevertheless draw attention to some points of more general significance for analyses of other cases of engendering an SSR.

First, an overall gender strategy, which takes into consideration both the "women as actors" as well as the "women as beneficiaries" categories, is indispensable for a transformative agenda towards greater gender equality in the long run. Even though some changes might occur by accident rather than by planning, as was partially the case in Liberia, the agenda for systematic change and transformation must be carefully planned.

Second, it has proven easier to integrate gender concerns in a context of total reconstruction than

in a literal reform context, where learned patterns and social structures are more likely to persist. In this context, it has been shown that “women as actors” are more likely to be taken into account successfully than “women as beneficiaries”. This suggests that externally imposed requirements and quota can be met also in rather conservative cultural environments that do not seem likely to take into consideration gender concerns at a first view. However, the analysis has also brought to light that meeting these quotas does not necessarily make security institutions change their learned behaviour. Despite quotas for female participation, people tend to stick to their traditional gender roles. Third, the fact that gender concerns were most successfully integrated in police forces also suggests that there are certain domains of specific masculinities that are stronger than others, e.g. the military. This finding needs to be specifically addressed in the two cases, Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as in future efforts to engender SSR. The focus on police reform when it comes to gender matters also reveals that efforts made by external actors rely on a restricted definition of gender. Thus, engendering SSR is not only a challenge for the country in which it takes place, but also for the international actors concerned. However, given the experiences in Liberia, integrating female components into international peacekeeping missions seems to be promising and a path that should be further pursued.

Finally, with regard to further debate on SSR and gender, it should also be taken into account more explicitly that the cultural environment is likely to have a notable impact on the process of engendering SSR. In concrete terms, this means that it will be more difficult to conduct a gender-sensitive SSR in a strongly traditional or conservative country than in other situations, as the example of Afghanistan shows. This is all the more true since the analysis of Sierra Leone and Liberia has revealed that it is, in general, difficult to affect women’s gender roles profoundly and to change learned behaviour in the context of SSR. Lastly, it is even more difficult to affect men’s gender roles, and yet the one is inextricably bound up with the other. Rather than focussing almost exclusively on women, therefore, conceptual planning for integrating gender concerns into SSR needs to place this *relational* aspect of gender squarely at the centre of analysis and policy proposals.

## Literature

- Aboagye, F. B./Rupiya, M. R. 2005:** Enhancing Post-Conflict Democratic Governance Through Effective Security Sector Reform in Liberia. In: Aboagye, F. and Bah, A. M. S. (eds), *A Tortuous Road to Peace. The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*. Pretoria: ISS, 249-276. URL: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Chap11.pdf>, 21.09.2008.
- Aisha, F. 2005:** Mainstreaming Gender in Peace Support Operations: The United Nations Mission in Liberia. In: Aboagye, F. and Bah, A. M. S. (eds), *A Tortuous Road to Peace. The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*. Pretoria: ISS, 147-163. URL: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Chap7.pdf> 21.09.2008
- Albrecht, P./Malan, M. 2006:** Post-conflict Peacebuilding and National Ownership: Meeting the Challenges of Sierra Leone. ZIF (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze)/KAIPTC (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre). URL: [www.zif-berlin.org/Downloads/Full\\_Report\\_Sierra\\_Leone\\_04\\_06.pdf](http://www.zif-berlin.org/Downloads/Full_Report_Sierra_Leone_04_06.pdf), 31.01.2008.
- Amnesty International 2007:** Sierra Leone: Getting Reparations Right for Survivors of Sexual Violence. AFR51/005/2007. London.
- Anderlini, S.N./Conaway, C.P. 2004:** Security Sector Reform. In: International Alert/Women Waging Peace (eds), *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace. A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action*, 31-40. URL: [http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/46\\_security\\_sector\\_reform.pdf](http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/46_security_sector_reform.pdf), 04.02.2008.
- Andersen, L. 2006:** Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership – the Case of Liberia. In: DIIS Brief. URL: [http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/lan\\_postconflict\\_security\\_sector\\_reform.pdf](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/lan_postconflict_security_sector_reform.pdf) , 29.01.2008.
- Baker, B./Scheye, E. 2007,** Supporting State and Non-State Provision of Security and Justice. Lunchtime seminar DFID, London. URL: <http://www.ssrnetwork.net>, 7.05.2008.
- Baker, B. 2007:** Post-war Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda. In: *Democracy and Security*, 3/2, 215-236.
- Baker, B. 2006:** The African Post-Conflict Policing Agenda in Sierra Leone. In: *Conflict, Security & Development* 6/1, 25-49.
- Ball, N./Fayemi, K. 2004** (eds): *Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook*. Centre for Democracy and Development. Lagos.
- Ball, N. et al. 2007:** *Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa. Evaluation Working Paper 23*. London: DFID. URL:<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/1/38635081.pdf>,

20.07.2007, 10.08.2007.

**Bastick, M. et al. R. 2007:** Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector. Geneva: DCAF.

**Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008a:** Security Sector Reform in Africa. The Promise and Practice of a New Donor Approach. ACCORD Occasional Paper Series 3/2. URL: [http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/op\\_2008\\_2.pdf](http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/op_2008_2.pdf), 20.02.2009.

**Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008b:** Engendering Security Sector Reform – Where to from here? In: Sicherheit + Frieden 1, 44-47.

**BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) 2005,** Inventory of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Efforts in Developing and Transitional Countries. URL: <http://www.bicc.de>, 3.08.2007.

**Bouta, T. 2005:** Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Clingendael Institute.

**Bryden, A./Hänggi, H. (eds) 2005:** Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Münster: LIT.

**Bryden, A./N'Diaye, B./Olonisakin, F. 2005:** Security Sector Governance in West Africa – Turning Principles to Practice. DCAF Policy Paper 8. URL: <http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=6A97F9D9-37B6-A14D-49F9-DF66ED5131CD&lng=en>, 29.01.2008.

**Chataigner, J.M. 2006,** La réforme du secteur de sécurité dans les Etats et sociétés fragiles. Préalable indispensable au développement, ou dernière des illusions néocoloniales? In: Afrique contemporaine 2/218, 101-117.

**Conteh, K. 2007:** Sierra Leone Case Study – Local Ownership of the Security Sector Review and Transformation Processes. In: Nathan, L. (ed.), No Ownership, No Commitment. A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. 86-93. URL: [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/No\\_Ownership\\_No\\_Commitment.pdf](http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/No_Ownership_No_Commitment.pdf), 14.08.2007.

**Denham, T. 2008:** Police Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds.), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

**DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007a:** Project Outline. Gender and Security Sector Reform - Creating Knowledge and Building Capacities. URL: <http://www.dcaf.ch/gender-security-sector-reform/gssr-project-outline.pdf>, 20.07.2007.

**DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007b:** Good and Bad Practices in Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel. Summary of a Virtual Discussion. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/gender&ssrtrainingdiscussion-summary.pdf>, 20.07.2007.

- DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007c:** Concept Note for Virtual Discussion. Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform Assessments, Monitoring and Evaluation, 4-29 June. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/SSR/VirtualDiscussionFlyer-2.pdf>, 14.08.2007.
- DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007d:** Press Release – Involving Male Facilitators Makes Gender Training for Military, Police and Peacekeepers More Effective, Say Experts in UN-Sponsored Discussion. URL: <http://www.dcaf.ch/gender-security-sector-reform/gender-training-prress-release.pdf>, 20.07.2007.
- DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007e:** Project Outline – Gender and Security Sector Reform – Creating Knowledge and Building Capacities. URL: <http://www.dcaf.ch/gender-security-sector-reform/gssr-project-outline.pdf>, 20.07.2007.
- Deutscher Bundestag 2007:** Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung : Bericht Bundesregierung nach § 4 Abs. 5 Satz 2 des Soldatinnen- und Soldatengleichstellungsgesetzes. Drucksache 16/7425, 30.11.2007.
- Ebo, A. 2005:** The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia. DCAF Occasional Paper no.9, DCAF: Geneva.
- Ebo, A. 2007a:** Liberia Case Study – Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies. In: Nathan, L. (ed.), No Ownership, No Commitment. A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 78-85. URL: [http://www.ssnetwork.net/documents/No\\_Ownership\\_No\\_Commitment.pdf](http://www.ssnetwork.net/documents/No_Ownership_No_Commitment.pdf), 14.08.2007.
- Ebo, A. 2007b:** Toward Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa. The Challenges of Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. In: Aboagye, F. (ed.), Complex Emergencies in the 21st Century. Challenges of New Africa's Strategic Peace and Security Policy Issues. Pretoria: ISS, 49-71. URL: [http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file\\_manager/file\\_links/M134CHAP4.PDF?link\\_id=29&slink\\_id=4614&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=23&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/M134CHAP4.PDF?link_id=29&slink_id=4614&link_type=12&slink_type=23&tmpl_id=3), 10.01.2008
- Farr, V. 2002:** Gendering Demilitarisation as a Peacebuilding Tool. BICC paper 20. URL: <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper20/paper20.pdf>, 30.01.2008.
- Fayemi, J. K. 2004:** Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States. The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In: Bryden, A./Hänggi, H. (eds), Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, 179-205.
- Fitz-Gerald, A. M. 2004:** Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, Shrivenham: GFN-SSR. URL: [http://www.gfn-ssr.org/edocs/gfn010\\_sierra\\_leone.pdf](http://www.gfn-ssr.org/edocs/gfn010_sierra_leone.pdf), 20.06.2007.
- Gbla, O. 2006:** Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone. In: International Peacekeeping 13/1, 78-93.
- Ginifer, J. 2004:** Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools – Sierra Leone, Evaluation Report EV 647. URL: [www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf), 20.01.2008.

- Ginifer, J. 2006:** The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone. In: *Democratization* 13/5, 791-810.
- Gompert, D. C./Stearns, B. 2006:** Comprehensive Security Sector Reform – Making Liberia safe. In: *Africa Policy Journal* 2, 1-27. URL: [www.ksg.harvard.edu/kssgorg/apj/issues/fall\\_2006\\_issue/pdfs/Gompert\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kssgorg/apj/issues/fall_2006_issue/pdfs/Gompert_FINAL.pdf), 29.01.2008.
- Hendricks, C./Hutton, L. 2008 :** Defence Reform and Gender. Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008.
- Horn, A. et al. 2006:** United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. In: *Civil Wars* 8/2, 109–123.
- Human Rights Watch, 2002:** We'll Kill You If You Cry – Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict. Vol. 15, No.1, Washington/London/Brussels.
- International Centre for Prison Studies 2008:** Penal Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) 2006:** Liberia – Staying Focused. Africa Briefing 36. Dakar/Brussels.
- International Crisis Group 2006:** Resurrecting the Justice System. Africa Report 107. Dakar/Brussels.
- International Crisis Group 2003:** The State of Security and Governance. Africa Report 67. Freetown/Brussels.
- Jaye, T. 2006:** An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia. KAIPTC Report 3. URL: <http://www.kaiptc.org>, 26.11.2007.
- Malan, Mark 2008:** Security Sector Reform in Liberia. Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings. Strategic Studies Institute. URL: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB855.pdf>, 18.07.2008.
- Mazurana, D/Carlson, K. 2004:** From Combat to Community: Women and Girls from Sierra Leone. Women Waging Policy Commission: Hunt Alternatives Fund. Washington.
- Meek, S. 2003:** Policing in Sierra Leone. In: Institute for Security Studies (ed.), *Building the Road to Recovery*. Monograph 80. Pretoria: ISS, 105-116.
- Mehler, A./Smith-Höhn, J. 2007:** Security Actors in Liberia and Sierra Leone – Roles, Interactions and Perceptions. In: Debiel, T./Lambach, D. (eds.), *State Failure Revisited II – Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of Governance*. INEF Report 89, 50-66. URL: [inef.uni-](http://inef.uni-)

due.de/page/documents/Report89.pdf, 31.01.2008.

**Musah, A.-F. 2000:** A Country Under Siege: State Decay and Corporate Military Intervention in Sierra Leone. In: Musah, A. F./ Fayemi, J.F. (eds), *Mercenaries – An African Security Dilemma*, London: Pluto Press, 76-116.

**Oelke, S. 2007:** Security Sector Reform and Gender. Concept and Points of Entry for Development Cooperation. Eschborn: GTZ.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2005:** Security System Reform and Governance. DAC-Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD.

**OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2007:** OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Paris: OECD.

**Omotola, J. S. 2006a:** Post-election Reconstruction in Liberia. The Challenges of Security Sector Reform. In: *Conflict Trends* 2, 42-46. URL: <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/ct106omotola.pdf>, 25.05.2007.

**Omotola, J.S. 2006b:** Beyond Transition: Challenges of Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction in Liberia. In: *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4/4.

**Paes, W.-C. 2005:** The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia. In: *International Peacekeeping* 12/2, 1-9.

**Popovic, N. 2008:** Security Sector Reform Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

**Quast, S. 2008:** Justice Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

**Tönisson Kleppe., T. 2008:** Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel – Good Practices and Lessons Learned. v. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

**UNDP 2002,** Justice and Security Sector Reform. BCPR's Programmatic Approach. Geneva. URL : [www.undp.org/bcpr/jssr/docs/jssrprogrammaticapproach.pdf](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/jssr/docs/jssrprogrammaticapproach.pdf), 20.01.2009.

**UNIFEM/UNDP 2007,** Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies. Policy briefing paper. URL: [http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender\\_Sensitive\\_Police\\_Reform\\_Policy\\_Brief\\_2007.pdf](http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender_Sensitive_Police_Reform_Policy_Brief_2007.pdf) 9.11.2008

**UN INSTRAW 2004a:** Gender and Security Sector Reform, Summary of e-Discussion, 4 October – 7 November. URL: <http://www.un->

[instraw.org/en/images/stories/SecuritySectorReform/summary%20final.pdf](http://instraw.org/en/images/stories/SecuritySectorReform/summary%20final.pdf), 14.07.2007.

**UN INSTRAW 2004b:** Gender and SSR Framework. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/index.php?option=content&task=blogcategory&id=152&Itemid=211>, 14.08.2007.

**UN INSTRAW 2004c:** Gender and Security Sector Reform Working Group background information. URL: [www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/SSR/Website\\_Background.pdf](http://www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/SSR/Website_Background.pdf), 20.07.2007.

**UNAMSIL/DPKO 2006:** Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming Work and Impact of United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): Final Report prepared for DPKO. By Eugenia Date-Bah. URL : [http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/DPKO/UNAMSIL\\_evaluation.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/DPKO/UNAMSIL_evaluation.pdf), 21.09.2008.

**UNMIL/Office of the Gender Advisor 2003:** Gender Mainstreaming. URL: [http://unmil.org/documents/Gender\\_Background\\_and\\_mainstreaming.pdf](http://unmil.org/documents/Gender_Background_and_mainstreaming.pdf)

**UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) and UN Department of Public Information, 2004:** Policing with Compassion in Sierra Leone. URL : [http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Sierra\\_Leone/DPISierraLeone.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Sierra_Leone/DPISierraLeone.pdf) (06.09.2008).

**UN Security Council 2000:** Resolution 1325. URL: [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf), 26.07.2007.

**UN Security Council 2003:** Resolution 1509. URL: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/525/70/PDF/N0352570.pdf?OpenElement> 31.07.2008.

**UN 2002:** Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. S/2002/1417.

**UN 2007a):** Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone. S/2007/704.

**UN 2007b):** Fourteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. S/2007/151.

**UN 2008a):** Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone. S/2008/281.

**UN 2008b):** Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. S/2008/183.

**Valasek, K. 2007:** Gender and Security Sector Reform. URL:

[http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/1325/Gender\\_ssr\\_dcaf07.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/1325/Gender_ssr_dcaf07.pdf), 17.07.2007.

**Vlachová, M./Biason, L. 2003:** Violence against Women as a Challenge for Security Sector Governance. In: Hänggi, H./Winkler, T. H. (eds), Challenges of Security Sector Governance. Münster: LIT, 1-35, URL: [www.dcaf.ch/women/violence\\_vlachova.pdf](http://www.dcaf.ch/women/violence_vlachova.pdf), 20.07.2007.

**Websdale, N./Johnson, B. 1997:** The Policing of Domestic Violence in Rural and Urban Areas: The Voices of Battered Women in Kentucky. In: Policing and Society 6/4: 297-317.

**West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 2008:** Women in Peacebuilding Program. URL: <http://www.wanep.org/programs/wipnet.html#Follow> 14.09.2008.

**WHO 2005:** Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment. Liberia. URL: [http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia\\_RESULTS\\_AND\\_DISCUSSION13.pdf](http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_RESULTS_AND_DISCUSSION13.pdf)

HENRI MYRTTINEN

## **VIOLENT ISLANDS – NOTES ON MASCULINITIES AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROCESSES IN HAITI, SOLOMON ISLANDS AND TIMOR LESTE**

### **1) Introduction**

Haiti, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste have all been the focus of externally supported security sector reform (SSR) processes over the past decade. In spite of the efforts put into the building and re-building of state institutions, including the respective security forces, all three countries continue hovering on the edge of instability and are partially reliant on outside intervention forces for internal security. The key issue I will look at here is how gender role expectations – especially masculine role expectations – influence SSR processes and what kinds of challenges are posed by these expectations. For the sake of this paper, I will use a very narrow definition of SSR, looking only at police and armed forces rather than at the whole spectrum of security sector institutions, such as the judicial or penal systems.

Before proceeding with this comparative study, though, I would like to make a few cautionary points on the dangers of making broad, cross-country comparisons such as I am doing here. In looking at case studies as different and complex as Haiti, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, there is always the risk of oversimplification and looking for similarities which may be more relevant to the argument being made than to the situation on the ground. Brief overviews made with broad strokes often lead to a lack of a nuanced understanding of local factors, to a failure to consider properly the very different historical trajectories revealed by the countries compared, as well as a lack of attention to the very different cultural settings, with the latter being of key importance for gender roles and expectations in the respective society.

With these caveats in mind, I will nevertheless hope to highlight some commonalities between the three cases of SSR in conflicted societies and raise points which I found relevant to the issue of addressing the question of masculinities in SSR processes. The idea for comparing the three case studies came to me when I was struck, essentially on an emotional level, by how similar the three places ‘felt’ upon my visits to the respective countries. At times, the potential, imagined

linkages between the three cases were also made explicit by others. For example, during the 2006 crisis in Timor Leste, Australian media were labelling Timor Leste as ‘Australia’s Haiti’ (with ‘Haiti’ being used as a kind of shorthand to denote a drastically ‘failed state’), while East Timorese civil society activists stressed their fear of their country becoming ‘another Solomon Islands,’ referring to a country they saw as being dominated politically and economically by the major intervening peacekeeping power, Australia.

This paper is based mostly on my own observations from the field and background literature on SSR and gender. In addition, I have attempted to incorporate some of the discussions around my paper at the Berlin workshop on November 7, 2008. In this paper, I will proceed by first briefly discussing the gender and SSR terminology used, followed by short overviews of the historical background to the three case studies before proceeding to compare the SSR processes in the three countries. This will be followed by a discussion of how masculinities play a role in these processes, a brief discussion on some of the roles played by external actors and lastly some conclusions.

## **2) Masculinities and SSR – helpful definitions**

For the purposes of this paper, I use the word ‘gender’ as signifying the socially and culturally constructed identities, attributes, expectations, opportunities, roles and relationships associated with being female and male in a particular cultural, economic, social and temporal situation. Gender roles are thus learned, changeable and context- and time-specific. Often, the learning processes take place sub-consciously and start at an early age, making gender roles often seem like ‘natural’ attributes of being female or male. Using a slightly modified version of Haywood and Mac an Ghail’s understanding of ‘masculinities’(2003, 154), I define the term ‘masculinities’ as the various ways of being and becoming a man in a given culture (and sub-culture) and during a given time period.

It is important to see masculinity not as a monolithic construct but as a dynamic process. Men act out different versions of masculinity depending on the situation in which they find themselves, and depending on what they feel is expected of them. Thus for example in the context of SSR, it is important to not only see men as acting out the masculine roles they feel are expected from them in their general cultural environment (e.g. Afro-Caribbean masculinities in Haiti) but also masculinities expected from them in their institutional sub-culture (e.g. being a member of the *Police Nationale d’Haïti – PNH*) and sub-sub-culture (e.g. being a PNH traffic policeman vs. being a member of the PNH SWAT team).

The issue of security sector (or, alternately, security system) reform is a relatively new one. According to the OECD DAC guidelines for SSR, the ultimate goal of SSR processes is to ‘increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law.’ In the OECD-DAC definition, security is explicitly framed within the broader framework of human security, with specific reference to the needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children and minority groups (OECD 2005: 11).

In the three case studies under consideration in this paper, the processes were not SSR processes in the strict sense of the word, but rather reform processes of individual security sector institutions. In addition, they have to a great degree been about (re-) building these institutions, rather than reforming existing ones. Furthermore, in all three cases, there has been an element of a disarming, demobilising and reintegration (DDR) process involving former combatants, which has been conflated with the SSR processes.

In spite of a number of policy documents, most notably UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, which stress the need to take gender into account when addressing security-related issues, especially in post-conflict situations, this has only been slowly translated into gender-mainstreamed programming in the field.

Gender mainstreaming, in this context, is seen to

*mean that the impact of all SSR policies and programmes on women, men, boys and girls should be considered at every stage of the programme cycle, including assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. For example, mainstreaming gender into an SSR assessment involves including questions to identify the different insecurities faced by men, women, girls and boys. (Valasek, 2008, 4)*

When gender is mentioned in security contexts, or, for that matter, in development co-operation or political science literature, it is often simplistically equated, as Cynthia Enloe (1990) put it, with ‘womenandchildren.’ Men are thus rendered ‘invisible’ in the gender debate. Paradoxically, this invisibility arises precisely from the fact that they are implicitly cast as ‘the norm’ that is unspoken and needs no further explanation or justification. This tends to be especially the case in the discussion of gender in the security sector. While men make up the vast majority of security force members globally, the discussion of gender issues in the security sector does not problematise the gender roles and expectations of these men but tends to concentrate instead on, for example, the integration of more women into the security forces or on how to make security forces more responsive to gender-based violence (GBV) against women.

As the Gender and SSR Toolkit published by DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN-INSTRAW argues, incorporating gender perspectives into SSR processes enhances:

- local ownership,
- effective service delivery by the security sector, and
- oversight and accountability of the security sector. (Valasek 2008: 6-10)

In the discussions at the Berlin workshop, many of the interventions raised the problem of gender being equated with women. Several additional reasons for integrating the issue of masculinities into the debates surrounding SSR were mentioned. These included:

- The fact that gender as a social construct is relational and thus masculinities and femininities are co-dependent,
- That men are both victims and perpetrators of violence,
- Demographically, men make up half of the population,
- Men should and cannot be expected to bear the full burden of providing security in a society,
- SSR processes are about conflict transformation and reduction and in terms of violent conflicts, masculinities rather than femininities tend to be problematic,
- That both the security needs of men and of women, girls and boys need to be taken into account, and that
- Defining masculinities in any given society often also means defining societal power relations.

### **3) Historical overviews**

Before proceeding with an examination of the security sector institutions in the three case studies, I will give an extremely abbreviated overview of the relevant historical backgrounds in order to give an insight into the historical trajectories of the three countries and how these have impacted upon masculinities as well as on the types of security sector institutions which have evolved in the respective countries. I will however not go into great detail as the history of these three countries has been well documented elsewhere.

#### a) Haiti

Haiti gained its independence in 1804 as the result of a slave rebellion, becoming the second post-colonial nation-state to emerge on the American continent. Politically, the following two centuries in Haiti have tended to be both turbulent and violent. After the end of the U.S. occupation of Haiti in 1934, the Haitian army became increasingly politicised, taking power in

repeated coups d'état and often viewed as an instrument of the ruling political and social oligarchy, especially under the dictatorships of Duvalier *père et fils*. The end of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 was followed by a string of provisional governments until the 1990 election of the populist president Aristide. The populist and pro-poor policies of the Aristide government found little support amongst the country's traditional elite, who instead supported a military coup by General Cédras in 1991.

Internal unrest and international pressure led to a reinstatement of Aristide in 1994 with a strong foreign military presence in the country. Upon his return to power, Aristide disbanded the armed forces and strengthened the police force (Police Nationale d'Haiti, PNH) instead. A number of former members of the armed forces were integrated into the police force. The political situation remained volatile and in early 2004 a rebellion led by a former police officer, Guy Philippe, forced President Aristide to step down and go into exile. A further foreign intervention followed, with a UN mission (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti – MINUSTAH) arriving in June 2004. One of the tasks given to the mission has been to support the restructuring and reform process of the PNH, members of which are allegedly involved in the international drugs trade (Kumar 2005: 274).

#### b) Solomon Islands

After a relatively brief history of colonial occupation by Germany, Britain and Australia, and following military occupation and heavy fighting between Allied and Japanese forces during the Second World War, the Solomon Islands became independent in 1978. The presence of the state has traditionally been rather marginal in the lives of most Solomon Islanders. The island of Guadalcanal with the capital city of Honiara is the economic and administrative centre of the island nation.

Since the Second World War, however, when Malaitans were first brought to Guadalcanal as labourers by the Allied forces from the neighbouring island of Malaita, the area around Honiara has seen a growing influx of non-Guadalcanalese. Resentment of the local Guadalcanalese population against perceived economic and social dominance by the Malaitan immigrants led to the formation of the Guadalcanalese Revolutionary Army (GRA), also known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM). In response to these activities, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) was formed. In what became locally known as 'the tensions,' the GRA took control of most of the countryside around the capital Honiara, triggering an exodus of Malaitans from Guadalcanal. Increasing violence peaked in June 2000, when members of the MEF together with officers of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) effectively mounted a coup. An Australian-brokered peace agreement came into effect in October 2000 but tensions continued for the next few years,

triggering an outside intervention by the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003.

As a part of the peace process, one hundred 'militants' each from the GRA/IFM and MEF were to be integrated into the RSIP as special constables (SCs) in addition to the approximately 200 SCs already in the force. Through improper recruitment processes, the number of SCs however quickly went from an original 400 to approximately 2.000 by 2001 and the SCs themselves had become an instability factor. The Solomon Islands government sought to first reduce the number of SCs before disbanding the Special Constabulary altogether in 2003 through an externally-supported DDR/SSR-process. Unrest has, however, continued in the country, with extensive rioting in 2006 leading to an increased foreign police presence under Australian and New Zealand leadership.

#### c) Timor Leste

Before gaining independence in 2002, Timor Leste endured 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule, three years of Japanese military occupation during the Second World War and 24 years of brutal military occupation by Indonesia. From 1999-2002 the country was under the administration of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The independence struggle against Indonesia from 1975-1999 was in part carried out by the Falintil guerrilla. Following the withdrawal of Indonesian occupation forces in 1999, the Falintil fighters were demobilised as part of a DDR process under the auspices of UNTAET. Some of the former combatants were integrated into the newly-established police (Policía Nacional de Timor Leste, PNLT) and armed forces (Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste, F-FDTL). Relations between the two security forces were tense from the outset, with turf wars escalating occasionally into armed skirmishes. Tensions both between the two forces and within them came to a head in 2006. The fighting left at least 37 dead and caused around 100.000 people to flee their homes. The crisis of 2006 also led to a second outside intervention by the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and an increased presence of UNPOL. Also, a renewed SSR process was initiated, concentrating mainly on the PNLT. There has been continued instability in the country, including the shooting and wounding of President Ramos-Horta in 2008. Links between the security forces and various gangs have been problematic, with loyalties of security sector staff compromised and gangs gaining access to small arms from the security forces' armouries. The underlying problems in the security forces have not been addressed and tensions remain both within the police and army and between them (Myrtilinen: 2008).

#### 4) Socio-economic comparison

In spite of these three rather different historical trajectories, there are some similarities between three case studies. All three are in a rather similar socio-economic (see Table 1) and geo-political position, i.e. being impoverished societies affected by outside interventions, in which regional hegemonic powers play a key role.

In all three cases, the security sector has played a problematic role. It has not been viewed as an impartial force but rather as an instrument of power for a particular political, social, regional or ethnic grouping.

Table 1. Comparison of Socio-Economic Indicators (Source: UNDP, 2008)

	Population	Population under 15 (%)	HDI Rank (out of 177)	GDP (PPP USD, 2005)
Haiti	9.300.000	38.0	146	1.663
Solomon Islands	500.000	40.5	129	2.031
Timor Leste	800.000	45.0	150	1.033

In all three societies, there has also been a major problem with disaffected ‘youth,’ with the term being equated, mostly, with socio-economically marginalised, urban young men. As is visible in Table 1, all three societies have a very young age structure and limited economic possibilities. In all three countries there has been some degree of gang<sup>1</sup> violence, most notably in Haiti, to a lesser degree in Timor Leste and least in the Solomon Islands. In addition to being an obvious security challenge to the security forces, members of these gangs have also infiltrated the respective security forces. While this kind of violence tends to become located, at least in the public mind, in shantytowns and informal settlements, it is also important to see the hidden aspects of this violence, i.e. the social space (or even active support) given to it by other sections of society, be it the economic and social elite, members of the security forces, local communities, or political parties.

#### 5) Security sector reform comparison

Of the three case studies in question, only Timor Leste has both a police and armed force. In the case of Haiti and the Solomon Islands, the police force is the only armed national force. In all

---

<sup>1</sup> The term gang is used here to denote a range of various armed, irregular non-state actors which do not have a primarily political motivation, but rather other motivations, such as criminal activities.

three countries there is a considerable foreign military and police presence, either in the form of a UN peacekeeping force (PKF), a regional military intervention or, as is the case in Timor Leste, both. The national police forces are all undergoing SSR processes and in the case of the Solomon Islands the national police commissioner is currently a foreign national.

Table 2: Comparison of security forces of Haiti, Solomon Islands and Timor Leste

	Haiti (PNH)	Solomon Islands (RSIP)	Timor Leste (F-FDTL)	Timor Leste (PNIL)
Total force size	9.000	1.050	1.500	2.800
Percentage of female staff	5 %	9 %	6 %	20 %

As outlined already briefly in the historical overviews, the security forces have tended to be more a part of the problem than of the solution in the three cases under consideration here. The security forces have been seen as being partial and partisan in either a socio-economic, political or ethno-regional sense. Public trust in the institutions has been undermined by allegations of corruption, nepotism/cronyism and brutality. I would argue that all of these internal problems of the security forces are in part traceable to male role expectations.

In part, these are due to cultural environments in which male identity is, at least in part, constructed to a great degree through membership in networks of patronage. This, I would argue, is especially the case in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste. As Sinclair Dinnen has argued, societies in Melanesia are often defined not through a lack of structures which demand the loyalty of an individual but rather through a plethora of competing networks of loyalty amongst which state structures are merely one of many, and often not the strongest network (Dinnen, 2000).

In addition to the wider cultural environment in which the individual police officers and soldiers enact their masculinities, there is also a second important cultural environment which needs to be taken into account, that of the institutional culture within the security force itself. Especially in the more militarised sections of the security forces (e.g. paramilitary police, special forces and the like), this institutional sub-culture can often take on a hyper-masculine form. Hyper-masculinity refers to a type of masculinity that is based on an overt display of physical strength, of the readiness to use violence and of heterosexual prowess, or, as Mosher (1991, 199) defines it, ‘a

personality construct reflecting extreme involvement in and acceptance of the traditional male gender role,' a system of ideas

*'forming a worldview that chauvinistically exalts male dominance by assuming masculinity, virility, and physicality to be the ideal essence of real men, who are adversarial warriors competing for scarce resources (including women as chattel) in a dangerous world.'* (Mosher and Tomkins 1988: 61)

The hyper-masculine sub-culture which is mostly visible in the appearance and attitude of especially the riot police and other 'special' police units has often decreased rather than increased the local community's trust in security forces, especially since the local community, which has already been accustomed to seeing the police or armed forces as a partisan actor. Sexual abuse and exploitation of civilians by security force members (both national and international) has been an issue at least in Haiti and Timor Leste.

In all three case studies, the effectiveness of the security forces has also been undermined by the existence of 'old boys' networks which control access to funds and promotion within the forces and can be involved in illegal activities such as corruption, trafficking or smuggling. These on the one hand tend to block advancement opportunities for non-members within the force (e.g. female staff) but also have had a worrying tendency to engage in 'extra-curricular' activities such as smuggling, trafficking and maintaining ties to criminal groups. Police officers in Haiti and Timor Leste have been caught 'moonlighting' for gangs as hired killers. In all three countries weapons from security force armouries have found their way to non-state armed groups and criminal gangs.

It is in the interest of these informal networks that outsiders are kept out. One striking case of how this can play out was the case of several female border police officers in Timor Leste, who were relegated to work in the vulnerable persons unit (VPU) in spite of receiving specialist training for border police work. The ostensible reason given by the commanding officer was that the women were 'not up to the job' but it was more probable that the presence of the new female officers interfered with the involvement of the border police in smuggling and possibly trafficking (Siapno: 2008).

## **6) Challenges of addressing issues of masculinity in SSR processes**

As outlined extensively in the DCAF/UN-ISTRAW/OSCE/ODIHR Gender and SSR Toolkit, integrating gender perspectives into SSR processes is a complex task in the best of cases. In post-conflict societies such as the three cases discussed here, there are additional complexities surrounding the integration of potential 'spoilers' in the conflict resolution process into the security forces. Is integrating potential spoilers a good way of securing their acceptance of the

post-conflict settlement or is it a case of rewarding violent behaviour? Also, former combatants will need to unlearn many of the ways in which they acted during the conflict in order to constitute impartial and accountable security forces.

I would argue that especially in the cases of the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, membership in clientelist networks of patronage is constitutive of masculine identity in society. Furthermore, men in all three case studies can find themselves caught between two unattainable tropes, that of 'traditional' masculinity and the 'visions of modernity', which prevail especially in the urban centres such as Dili, Honiara or Port-au-Prince. The routes to the more traditional affirmations of masculinity that are linked to life in fishing or farming communities are no longer open to the young men in the urban centres (nor would they necessarily even have any interest in pursuing these avenues of masculinities) but neither are the hoped-for spoils of urban modernity with its own masculine ideals (male breadwinner with an office job, wife, kids, car, mobile phone, large house with a prominent home entertainment system) readily available. Often the security sector is the only route to getting even close to fulfilling these imported expectations of 'modern' masculinity.

While the mere addition of more female staff into the security forces is by no means a magic wand that would in and of itself guarantee a more accountable, transparent, equitable and democratic security sector (nor can the same be expected a priori by including more members of any given un- or under-represented group in society), the inclusion does, at the very least, make the security forces demographically more representative and thus increases local acceptance. Recruiting more under-represented sectors of society presents a number of practical challenges in terms of not only enabling their entrance into but also retention in the security forces. These include ensuring that security force members who are not in the 'old boys' networks' are able to advance in their careers, and reducing sexual and other forms of harassment as well as GBV inside and outside of the security forces.

It is to my mind also important to try and avoid 'gender ghettos' (and ensuing 'esprit de corps'-problems) taking hold, e.g. if the respective 'special' forces or riot police become almost exclusively male (and thus both prioritised and sought after) and VPU are almost exclusively female, low on the priority list and considered a kiss of death to a career in the security forces. This is not to say that it is not important to have female officers dealing with GBV victims but that their male colleagues also need to understand the importance of this work and be able to carry it out professionally and with the necessary empathy for the victim, who may of course also be male.

## 7) Notes on foreign interventions

Based on the discussions following the presentation of my paper at the workshop, I decided to add a few more words here on foreign interventions. In all of the three cases, the international community has played a visible and central role in the SSR processes. The structuring and reforming of the national security sector institutions has often been based more on the views and needs of the donors rather than the local communities.

This factor and other complexities in the process, such as defining security locally with the help of local civil society organisations (without, however, relying exclusively on the vision of such organisations) and not using imposed concepts, would ideally necessitate inclusive and thorough SSR processes, proceeding carefully to avoid alienation in society as a whole but also within the security sector itself. These considerations however often clash with the ‘need for speed’ or the ‘tyranny of urgency’ in post-conflict interventions.

In all three cases the outside interventions, regardless of how it is portrayed in the western media or the UN's own publications; have not been met with unanimous local support. This lack of acceptance includes resistance within the local security forces. The visible and at times heavy-handed role of regional ‘western’ powers (Australia and New Zealand in the case of Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands; Canada and the USA in the case of Haiti) have laid the interventions open to charges of neo-colonialism. These allegations can of course be self-serving at times, reactions of an entrenched local elite to perceived threats to their existing privileges. However, the resentment often goes far deeper into society.

Another issue linked to the externally-driven SSR processes in all three cases is that both in the case of the local security forces and those of the interveners the lines between policing and the military, between external and internal state security become blurred, as the interveners use military forces for policing and quasi-military units, e.g. Formed Police Units (FPU), for tasks normally in the realm of the military. The militarisation of peacekeeping and policing, drawing upon imported militarised notions of hyper-masculinity, has also been reflected in different ways in the style and appearance of the local and international security forces. I will digress slightly by going into some of my field notes from a visit to Timor Leste in late 2007, reflecting my own personal reactions to the various armed units in the country:

*Travelling across [Timor Leste] I've been getting a chance to see a lot of men in uniforms and brandishing weapons. On occasion, you might see the occasional woman in uniform, but their numbers are far smaller, so I'll concentrate on the men here.*

*You've got the local police (PNTL) with its various sub-units, the local armed forces (F-FDTL), the*

*UN police (UNPOL) and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) just to give you the main categories. Many of their number, though by far not all, do seem to enjoy showing off their military gear, especially the ones who are in the more "special" units, such as the UNPOL's formed police units (FPU) or the PNTL's rapid reaction force (UIR). The average street cops tend to be the least intrusive of the lot.*

*Each one of these units tends to have its own way of showing off its militarised masculinity. While the average PNTL cop walks around in a simple uniform with a handgun, the UIR riot squad members seem to take a special delight in wearing as much body armour as possible even when there are only little kids and old ladies around. Compared to the street cops, they also have a lot more gadgets attached to their webbing - pepper spray, torches, a baton, handcuffs, etc. A further step up from this in terms of displaying muscular machismo and military gadgetry is the special "bodyguard" unit of the PNTL. Their uniform consists of black t-shirts, black combat trousers, a black bandana, shades and headsets. They carry numerous gadgets which I could not figure out the purpose of on their webbing gear, have a handgun plus a brand new Steyr assault rifle and often a jungle knife on their belt.*

*In comparison, the F-FDTL members look like the poor rural cousins of these decked out cops. No extra gadgets, just baggy uniforms and assault rifles from the 1970s. Some of them don't even have designer shades, a faux pas unheard of in the cooler units.*

*The international forces tend to also have their own sub-cultures of displaying their military masculinity. The Aussies tend to go for the "matey"-look (baggy uniforms, floppy hats, slouch, designer shades) mixed in with military gadgetry (headsets, techy assault rifles with all sorts of stuff on them). The Portuguese GNR, on the other hand, tend to prefer the buff Mediterranean macho look: biceps bulging from beneath tight t-shirts, designer shades (of course), swagger. The Malaysian FPU is more into the "Malaysian Idol"-pop star type of look: fingerless gloves, bandanas, black t-shirts, the occasional necklace and yes, designer shades. Sporting a more old-school approach are some of the older South Asian officers: moustaches, ram-rod straight backs, even the occasional British colonial-style baton.*

Trivial as it may seem at first, appearance is also a key factor in determining the way security force members perceive themselves, perceive their role vis-à-vis society and how society perceives them. The 'look' emulated especially by the more 'special' police and army units in Haiti, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste tends to be one which is imported from the outside, as are the training manuals, the tactics, the uniforms, gear and weapons. These models of 'aggressive' or 'robust' policing do not build on local needs or local perceptions of security or conflict resolution, but rather reflect a trend towards a militarisation of policing, based often on hyper-masculinised role models.

## 8) Conclusions

Integrating gender perspectives into SSR processes means more than merely increasing the intake of female officers. If it is done comprehensively, it will mean a re-examination of both male and female role expectations and behaviour within the security forces and the impacts that these have on the work of the security sector. Security sector institutions are for the most part male-dominated and therefore any gender work with them must also look at masculinities in addition to femininities. Given the fact that gender is a socio-cultural construct, these examinations need to be carried out in the specific context of the society one is dealing with.

The three case studies briefly presented here provide some additional challenges. All three societies have been divided, faced internal violence, have weak overall state capacity and in all three the security sector has been seen as a partisan actor. All three cases are experiencing major external interventions, including externally driven SSR processes. In all three SSR processes, however, gender has been included as a topic amongst others in the training but has not been properly integrated, nor has a locally-based, gender-sensitive conceptualisation of security taken place.

For the respective security forces to be able to play a constructive and positive role in Haiti, Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, it is in my view necessary for this role to be based on the actual security needs and concerns of local women and men, girls and boys. Responding to these needs will require a rethinking of gender roles and expectations within the security sector. While external actors can play a supporting role in these processes, the majority of the re-conceptualisation work should come from within these societies.

## Literature

- Enloe, C., 1990:** *Bananas, Beaches & Bases – Making Feminist Sense of International Relations.* University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Dinnen, S., 2000:** *Violence and Governance in Melanesia - an Introduction.* In: Dinnen, S./Ley, A. (eds), *Reflections on Violence in Melanesia.* Canberra: Hawkins Press.
- Haywood, C. and Mac an Ghail, M., 2003:** *Men and Masculinities.* Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Kumar, C. 2005:** *The Role of the Military in Democratisation and Peacebuilding: The Experiences of Guatemala and Haiti.* In: Schnabel, A./Erhart, H. (eds), *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.* UNU Press: Tokyo.
- Mosher, D. 1991:** *Macho Men, Machismo, and Sexuality.* In: Bancroft, J. (ed.) *Annual Review of Sex Research* 2, 199-247.
- Mosher, D. and Tomkins, S. 1988:** *Scripting the Macho Man: Hypermasculine Socialization and Enculturation.* In: *Journal of Sex Research* 25, 60–84.
- Myrntinen, H. 2009:** *‘Poster Boys No More’ – Gender and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste.* DCAF: Geneva
- OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2007:** *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform.* OECD: Paris.
- Siapno, J., 2008:** *Re-defining Security: Articulating the Female in the PNTL and F-FDTL, Timor Leste.* A Report Commissioned by the National Commission on Research and Development for the State of the Nation Report. Dili.
- UNDP 2008:** *Human Development Report.* UNDP: New York.
- Valasek, K. 2008:** *Security Sector Reform and Gender.* In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds.), *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit.* DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW: Geneva.

SANDRA OELKE<sup>1</sup>

## **COMBATTING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN REFUGEE CAMPS: EXPERIENCES IN TANZANIA, KENYA AND UGANDA**

Refugee camps are meant to provide their residents with a safe and secure environment. They are a refuge from war, civil strife, personal attacks and other human rights violations and abuses, as well as from a climate of fear and from persecution. At a minimum, these places of refuge are expected to provide personal physical security, respect for fundamental human rights and access to the basics of livelihood such as food, water, shelter and other essential needs. The challenges involved in the administration of camps and the maintaining of law and order are in part due to the fact that they are very particular settings. They are often characterized by conditions and an environment which render their populations, and particularly women and girls, especially vulnerable to crime, human rights violations, (sexual) abuse and exploitation. While maintaining security in refugee camps has usually been left to the police forces of the host country, UNHCR, as the UN agency with the mandate to protect refugees, is increasingly seeking complementary ways to uphold law, order and security in and around the camps.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and discrimination hinder the establishment of peace and human security, especially in refugee camps. As a prerequisite for sustainable development and poverty reduction, human security comprises economic, ecological, social, and internal and external security factors. It means that both men and women can live without threats to their personal integrity and can exercise their individual right to freedom. In refugee camps, gender-based violence and discrimination undermine human security. Particularly women and girls are vulnerable to domestic violence including battering, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse of children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation or other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation. Besides domestic violence, there is physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation, forced prostitution and trafficking in women. Refugee women are above all victims of rape and abductions while searching for firewood outside the camps. Aside from this, gender-based

---

<sup>1</sup> The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent official GTZ views or policy.

violence and discrimination give rise to a general environment of violence, which in turn has a negative impact on the state of security as a whole.

The security actors in many refugee camps are not only entirely unable to proceed against gender-based violence and discrimination: in many instances they are part of the problem. Members of the police themselves often participate in gender-based assaults, instead of preventing them. Because of corruption and bribery, crimes such as trafficking in women, forced prostitution and forced labour or rape by criminal bands are tolerated instead of actively opposed. In many cases, female victims of sexual violence are not taken seriously, are treated with contempt and/or are exposed to further sexual violence, torture and/or discrimination. Often the women's credibility is questioned.

Regarding the provision of security in refugee camps, special emphasis needs to be placed on SGBV because women are especially vulnerable. In this context, "community-based security" has become a valuable tool within refugee camps to complement efforts by the state and its law enforcement agencies to address the security situation in refugee camps. Community policing is based on the active cooperation between refugees and the local police force. In most cases, there is hardly any cooperation on the part of the refugees due to either apathy of the victims, or skepticism against the police's professional skills. One central element of community policing therefore is education and awareness-raising of all involved actors regarding their individual rights and duties in order to establish a mutual trust and an integrative network which makes it possible to address specific kinds of insecurities, especially SGBV, and to jointly take preventive measures in order to stabilize the security situation. Since the police are (or should be) the institution charged with upholding security, criminal behaviour and the illegal use of violence should not exist within the police itself. This applies especially to SGBV, which is often not perceived as a serious offence. Therefore, it is necessary to train police staff regarding their rights and duties in order to achieve a high level of sensitization, awareness and professional qualification regarding prevention, sanction and repression of violence and crime. In addition to the training of police, it is imperative to train all involved actors (refugee guards, UNHCR staff, and refugees, especially women) in order to reduce causes of insecurity that derive from anti-social or deviant behavior and to guarantee a successful cooperation between all actors. Such training aims at achieving the understanding among all actors that community policing is a tool that can guarantee a more stable security situation through the mobilization of all capabilities and through close cooperation of all security actors.

UNHCR supports the implementation of community policing systems in camps in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The so called “Sungusungu” system in Kigoma/Tanzania, organized by refugees themselves in all UNHCR assisted camps, is a traditional Tanzanian community-based security system. It seems that most cases, ranging from domestic issues to petty theft, are handled successfully at the “Sungusungu” level, using a mix of mediation and traditional legal practices. Only serious cases are reported to the police, investigated and referred to the Tanzanian courts. The police cannot work without this community-based security system as more than 90% of the reported cases are referred to them by the “Sungusungu”. Since the introduction of the security package, the general incident rate has gone down and the frequency of reported cases of arson, theft, SGBV and other offences does not differ significantly from the average frequency in other Tanzanian communities. In Kakuma/Kenya a community policing system started right from the inception of the camps in 1992. Refugee guards are detecting, observing and reporting what is happening in their areas of responsibility and call the police who work with them to respond to crimes and question or arrest the suspect/s. They are supported by a number of volunteers. However, interviews with victims showed that especially women do not feel sufficiently protected by the existing system, not even in safe spaces and protection areas established particularly for that purpose. Many cases involving women are not reported and not taken seriously due to cultural practices (i.e. early marriages). Many domestic issues are solved at the community level, in particular through the traditional “bench courts” and the intervention of elders and refugee leaders. This is a useful protection mechanism, but in some cases discriminates against women and young girls due to its traditional gender role concepts. In Dadaab/Kenya, SGBV cases have been reduced over the years through a variety of interventions, including a disarmament program which decreased the number of weapons in the camps, bringing “mobile courts” to Dadaab which eased the prosecution of SGBV cases, the introduction of a firewood project whereby firewood was brought into the camps so that women did not have to leave the relatively secure camps, and increased sensitization and awareness raising of the community by UNHCR and partners.

In order to ensure an overall improvement of the security situation – including protection from SGBV – in refugee camps via the establishment of a community policing system, certain measures need to be implemented. It is important to increase the number of female police officers and the number of female refugee guards. They need to be provided with specialized training on SGBV (guidelines for prevention and response: definition, causes, types and prevention of SGBV, prevention of sexual exploitation of refugees, guiding principles, reporting system, etc.). This helps to support confidence building between refugee women and security

personnel. In addition, there should be “focal persons” within the police and refugee guards who serve as confidential persons and help female victims during the process of reporting their cases to the police. Sensitization and awareness raising workshops for refugee women contribute to empowerment and help them to regard all forms of SGBV as unacceptable and to stand up for their rights. The reinforcement of a “feed-back” system with a follow-up of reported cases and the information of victims about the status of their cases is also a necessary measure. In addition, the increase of the firewood rations per family would reduce firewood collection outside the camps and therefore decrease the number of SGBV cases occurring during the women’s collection of firewood. These measures should be part of an integrative community policing system, which actively addresses SGBV.

MARGARETE JACOB<sup>1</sup>

**“INTEGRATING GENDER AWARENESS AND EQUALITY”:  
THE OECD DAC HANDBOOK<sup>2</sup> CHAPTER ON GENDER AND SSR**

**1) Introduction**

The linkage between gender and conflict issues is currently experiencing an increasing recognition and attention within the international debate on development and sustainable peacebuilding. The recent United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 from 2000 and 1820 from 2008 best reflect this changing attitude of the international community towards gender issues. The latter explicitly mandates the international community to integrate gender concerns when conducting peace support operations, such as DDR-programmes as well as security system reform by stating that effective mechanisms should be developed for “providing protection from violence, including in particular sexual violence, to women and girls in and around UN managed refugee and internally displaced persons camps, as well as in all (...) security sector reform efforts assisted by the United Nations” (UN 2008). Gender-based violence and a general gender perspective on the peacebuilding process should thus be applied more explicitly than it has been done until now. Acknowledging this development, the OECD DAC’s subsidiary body the *Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* (CPDC) decided in early 2008 to take this development conceptually into account in areas where security and gender matters meet. It is in this context that the OECD-DAC will release a chapter on gender and security sector reform in the coming months, to be added to its 2007 Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD 2007). As a report on “work in progress”, this new chapter on gender and SSR was presented at the workshop “Engendering Security Sector Reform” at the Free University of Berlin on the 7<sup>th</sup> of November 2008. This contribution summarises the presentation given there. It briefly sketches the background to the chapter’s development, showing the continuity with OECD’s previous

---

<sup>1</sup> The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent official OECD views or policy.

<sup>2</sup> The OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR, first published in 2007, is considered to be the most important reference document for security system reform provided by the DAC. It provides a detailed exposition of how SSR needs to be carried out in order to enhance an accountable and democratic security system (OECD 2007).

work in this area, and explains its main objectives, before providing a short overview of the chapter's content.

## 2) Integrating gender into the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform

The forthcoming publication on gender and SSR basically builds upon previous work carried out by the CDPC on security system reform, and should be seen in the context of its work on the security-development nexus. The latter describes the overlap between development and security concerns in the prevention of conflict and the long-term elimination of poverty. This work stream assumes that in order to enable states to create peaceful and sustainable living conditions socio-economic, governance and security dimensions must be tackled together in an integrated approach. Founded in the late 1990s, the CPDC itself is a fruit of the recognition of this interdependence and reflects the need for an integrated approach.

With regard to SSR, the most important reference points in CPDC's work are the OECD-DAC Guidelines on *Security System Reform and Governance* (OECD 2005) and the OECD DAC *Handbook on Security System Reform* (OECD 2007). The chapter also draws from important pioneer work in the area of gender, undertaken by OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality (Gendernet) over the past years. With its DAC-Guidelines on *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Co-operation* (OECD 1999), the Gendernet defined the basis of how to understand gender matters within a development context. The definition of gender issued in these DAC-Guidelines was therefore taken up in the forthcoming chapter on gender and SSR and represents a basis for its approach to security and development. According to this guidance, "biological differences between women and men do not change. But the social roles that they are required to play vary from one society to another and at different periods in history. The term *gender* refers to the economic, social, political and cultural attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female" (OECD 1999: 12).

When work on the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007) was carried out, efforts were made to mainstream *gender* in order to make it a gender-sensitive handbook. It is for that reason that the handbook already deals, for example, with the question of how to integrate a gender-perspective in an SSR assessment (OECD 2007: 40) or how to create gender equality within the security system's institutions (OECD 2007: 66). However, given the importance of the topic, member states of the responsible subsidiary DAC-body CPDC decided that more work had to be done in order to do justice to the issue. Furthermore, there was a consensus that "mainstreaming gender" had made it almost impossible to highlight specific gender issues, such as system-specific entry points or the simple question of why a gender perspective could be beneficial for SSR etc. Therefore, exploring the linkage between gender and SSR and providing

conceptual guidance on it was defined as one of the CPDC working priorities for 2008.

The new chapter on gender and SSR, to be incorporated into the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, is intended to fulfil three main objectives. First, the aim of the additional chapter was to try to bridge the existing gaps of the OECD DAC SSR Handbook with regard to gender issues. Secondly, the OECD DAC wanted to strengthen its role as a leading institution in the area of security system reform by translating the state-of-the-art in academic debate into concrete policy advice. In this context, it was important not to identify gender with women only within the chapter, but to address gender as a relational category and thereby also to address the very specific needs and capacities of women, men, boys and girls, and to offer solutions of how to deal with these questions. Thus, thirdly, the objective was to develop conceptual guidance for donors, which they could translate into concrete programming at the field level.

### 3) Content: Gender sensitivity and the security system

The chapter, “Integrating gender awareness and equality”, consists of five main sections, dealing with the most important issues that arise with regard to gender and SSR.

#### a) The significance of gender for SSR

Women, men, boys and girls are exposed to different threats and have different security experiences and capacities. Responding to differing threats and security perceptions of different societal groups in the context of SSR is hence crucial in order to reform a security system so that all groups can benefit from the reform process. The concept of freedom from fear can be considered as a conceptual basis for taking into account individual – and thereby gender-specific – security needs. Physical security – *freedom from fear* – as first defined in the Human Development Report from 1994 (UNDP 1994) defines security at an individual level. According to that concept, *freedom from fear* is the “safety from (...) repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP 1994). This demonstrates that the SSR-concept ties up very closely with the *freedom from fear* approach and can be considered as a means to achieving this normative objective

However, the first obstacle to that is often the under-representation of women within the security system institutions in many countries. The security sector is in fact often considered as a reserve of stereotypical male attributes, such as strength, violence and power and does not appear to provide much space for female involvement. However, the degree of female underrepresentation differs within the various domains of the system. Whereas in many cases, it is less striking with regard to the police, the situation is significantly different concerning the military. In the reformed Sierra Leonean Police (SLP), around 12% of staff are female whereas the reformed

Sierra Leone army almost has no female soldiers. The second obstacle is the large exclusion of women from participating in security system decision-making. This makes it difficult to integrate a gender-sensitive perspective in many of those decisions, as for example raising awareness for issues of domestic and sexual violence.

In the next step, the first section of the chapter addresses the question of why a gender perspective is essential when conducting a security system reform. Apart from being an inherently normative value, a gender-sensitive SSR can be justified on the grounds of enhanced efficiency. For example, female police officers are indispensable for frisking women, which male officers may not be able to do, especially in certain cultures. By integrating a gender perspective, local ownership can be endorsed, for example when collaborating with civil society organisations which can bridge the gap between local communities and policy makers. In Liberia, women's groups were for example heavily involved in the DDR-process. With the support from various women's organisations, the United Nations mission in place and the Ministry of Gender and Development succeeded in demobilising and reintegrating 22.370 women and 2.440 girls – eleven times more than the numbers that had been foreseen initially (OECD 2009: 17). Gender-sensitive SSR can furthermore strengthen oversight and accountability mechanisms. The enhanced accountability of the security system can help to prevent and penalise criminal acts, as for example gender-based violence. Finally, more representative security system institutions can contribute to a more gender-sensitive delivery of justice and security services.

#### b) Gender-responsive SSR assessments

The second main section of the chapter deals extensively with the question of how to conduct gender-responsive SSR assessments.<sup>3</sup> It is argued that gender-responsive SSR assessments can be carried out, for example, through disaggregating all data gathered by sex and age as well as by other characteristics such as religion, geographic location as well as ethnicity, if adequate data is available. Integrating gender analysis into SSR assessment from the beginning ensures that relevant quantitative and qualitative data will be gathered later on. Another approach could be to analyse existing security and justice policies with regard to their gender-responsiveness: is there, for example, a policy of zero tolerance set out regarding gender discrimination for the institutions of the security sector? What are the incentives for gender-responsiveness in the different domains of the security system? There are more possibilities for integrating such perspective, such as conducting interviews with actors within the security sector on institutional cultures as well as

---

<sup>3</sup> The 2007 SSR Handbook deals with gender-sensitive assessments. This points out the centrality of assessments with regard to gender (OECD 2007: 49). However, the assessment tools were further elaborated in the context of the gender chapter presented here.

with experts that are familiar with gender matters. In addition to including gender concerns into a broader SSR assessment framework, specifically targeted audits and assessments can be carried out. These could concentrate, for example, on challenges in mainstreaming gender within an institution or identify the obstacles to female recruitment.

The section then highlights which kinds of questions need to be addressed in order to conduct gender-responsive assessments. Various areas have to be taken into consideration when analysing a given situation from a gender perspective: for example, the context for SSR, the functioning of oversight and accountability, management of the system etc. For all of these areas, different questions need to be raised - for example, what are the particular security and justice needs, perceptions and priorities of women, men, boys and girls within rural and urban communities? How do these perceptions differ? Are procedures in place to accept complaints from the public related to gender-based violence and discrimination? How is the public made aware of them? Are complaints being adequately dealt with?

#### c) Potential entry points for gender issues in SSR

How to conduct gender-responsive SSR? The third and largest section then deals with potential entry points for development actors and peacekeeping forces. In general, when supporting SSR processes in development cooperation, donors and international actors should self-evidently apply the basic principles of equal participation, and should address the differing security needs and capacities of different societal groups. In most recent peacekeeping operations, such as UNMIL in Liberia, this has been done, but still to a limited extent. In post-conflict Liberia, women were in fact recruited into the National Liberian Police (NLP) and special units were even created that deal with issues of domestic violence and sexual violence. However, men are still heavily over-represented in most of the security institutions and sexual violence remains a massive problem in the country. This reflects the fact that gender issues in the context of development and peacekeeping are still not systematically addressed to a sufficient extent.

#### *General entry points*

Certain entry points for gender-sensitive SSR can be applied to all institutions of a security system, ranging from police reform to intelligence services. Among these are for example personnel policy reforms, which endorse equal recruitment and the retention and advancement for women. In order to achieve a gender balance, setting out quotas or concrete figures have proven to be an important instrument. For example, in the course of police reform in Nicaragua supported by the GTZ, the percentage of female staff in managerial positions was increased from 17% to 27%, on the basis of explicit recruitment aims set out in advance (GTZ 2007: 20). In the

context of retention, it is furthermore important to build support for women's participation within the security system's institutions. Such support needs to be generated amongst the public, but also within the institutions themselves. Making men allies, in this context, is a crucial ingredient for successful SSR.

Another entry point could be the support for development of legal or policy frameworks with regard to gender and the security system. Gender-responsive laws and policies demonstrate a commitment to gender equality, which again is crucial to building political will and further support. Gender training is another potential starting point for gender-sensitive SSR. Such trainings, raising awareness and increasing staff capacities for dealing with gender issues, should be mandatory for both male and female security personnel at all ranks. Governmental as well as non-governmental institutions can play an essential role in ensuring gender mainstreaming as well as the participation of both women and men. But in order to be able to do so, capacity building and expert advice to these institutions is often indispensable.

#### *System specific entry points*

Sector specific entry points can vary widely among different domains and institutions of the security system. For each domain of the reform, the chapter provides concrete entry points, which can be taken up by donors and agencies involved in peacebuilding. Some examples of them will be picked up here.

For *defence reform*, it is proposed to start with a participative defence review process, which could enhance the development of a security vision reflecting the real security needs of all: women, men, boys and girls. Such a participative review could furthermore contribute to building national ownership and civilian trust. An example of good practice is Fiji, where women's civil society organisations were involved in the national security and defence review. The organisations provided input and even policy recommendations at the end of the process (DCAF/INSTRAW/ODIHR 2008: 2).

When it comes to the reform of *intelligence services*, the chapter states that it is particularly important in this domain to create a healthy and effective environment. Even though this is true for all of the security system institutions, it seems to be especially relevant for the intelligence and security services given the confidential nature of the work which can intimidate staff to address problems encountered such as sexual harassment. This was done, for example, in South Africa, where a gender action plan for the intelligence services systematically encouraged female and male staff to address the issue of sexual harassment (OECD 2009: 12) and set up a "gender forum" for dialogue and exchange.

With regard to *police reform*, the chapter proposes to install specific women's police stations as well

as specialised units that specifically deal with gender issues, such as gender-based violence. Women are often reluctant to file complaints with the police for various reasons. Often, the main reasons are strong social and cultural norms that would not allow victims to talk about the sexual or domestic violence they have experienced. As a response to that, women's police stations or specialised units have been set up in various developing and post-conflict countries, such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Timor-Leste.

In order to reform the *justice sector* in a gender-responsive manner, existing laws and regulations can be revised and changed, integrating a more gender-sensitive lens. The gap between international human rights standards and national legislations remains very significant in many countries. Even in those cases where national and international standards are harmonised, the implementation of normative standards and rights still remains a critical issue. Another important entry point for justice reform is the question of who has access to justice services. Often, it is more difficult for women to claim their legal rights because they only have a limited access to courts (and to other institutions of the judicial branch) for social and cultural reasons. This is, for example, the case in Afghanistan, where women have difficulties in getting through to legal services, especially in the rural areas of the country. UNIFEM is, therefore, working actively on these issues in Afghanistan, and is currently establishing a "Legal Aid Referral Centre". However, changing the underlying cultural attitudes undoubtedly represents a long-term challenge.

As far as *prison reform* is concerned, meeting the needs of pregnant women and mothers of young children in prison is very important. Poor conditions and the lack of proper facilities can place both the mother and her unborn child at risk. Special provisions should be made for medical treatment for these women.

The chapter also identifies entry points for the relatively new area of *private military and security companies* (PMSC), stating that incorporating gender concerns could enhance the effectiveness of these companies. By integrating gender concerns, public trust in PMSCs can be endorsed and human rights violations reduced. In order to fully benefit from these positive effects, regulatory regimes for PMSC can be set up, which mandate the integration of gender issues, the direct accountability of PMSC personnel for violations of international humanitarian law and national laws.

When it comes to *parliamentary oversight*, it has to be acknowledged that parliaments play an important role by approving budgets and formulating legislation for gender sensitivity: Parliaments can formulate and oversee the implementation of gender-responsive laws and policies. The latter can include the support of public debate and consultation on gender issues as well as the revision of existing legislation with regard to their gender sensitivity. Furthermore, attention must be given to making sure that women are well represented within parliamentary

oversight mechanisms. Recent experiences in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have demonstrated the particular importance of that. Despite the enormous financial support DRC received in the course of the electoral process in 2006, the number of women in the National Assembly decreased, compared with the transitional period. Quotas can therefore be an essential instrument for ensuring female participation.

*Civil society oversight mechanisms* of the system can strengthen gender sensitivity and local ownership. In order to enable them to carry out this important control function, civil society organisations (CSOs) can be included in monitoring bodies, for example through independent monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, capacity building can represent another possible entry point in this area. CSOs can benefit significantly from training on gender issues. In addition, support for CSO networks can endorse the credibility of CSOs engaged with security system institutions.

#### d) Facing challenges and overcoming obstacles

Cultural attitudes can be a challenge or even an obstacle to gender-responsive SSR. Social norms largely determine behaviour and social interaction. These norms are highly dependent on the cultural context and might vary considerably among different countries and societies: reforming the security system in a gender-sensitive way implies different challenges in Afghanistan from those it presents in Nicaragua. A sustainable gender-responsive SSR must therefore be based upon a deep understanding of the respective cultural context. However, cultural environments or male-dominated societies that prohibit women from working within security system institutions might represent a major challenge to gender-responsive SSR. Deep-seated stereotypes can make the conduct of SSR almost impossible. The main challenge for actors involved is thus to support the creation of a gender-responsive security system within a society that is still marked by inequalities and stereotypes. However, this sometimes creates a tension between given cultural norms and the transformative and normative SSR agenda. In order to overcome this tension, SSR should best be conducted in the context of a broader reform of governmental policies and tied up with other reforms such as institutional reforms or the reform of the education system. This is sometimes possible in post-conflict situations, where state institutions are often rebuilt or reformed in depth, as for example in Timor-Leste. In such situations, it can be useful to focus on public awareness-raising and to mobilise political will in order to build a broad coalition supporting the inclusion of women.

Aside from the problem of stereotypes, gender issues are often left aside when it comes to setting priorities in programming, being considered as less important than other security-related matters. This obstacle could be encountered through practical gender trainings, relevant briefings, mentoring, monitoring etc.

e) Particular challenges in post-conflict situations

In post-conflict environments, SSR has to deal with particular challenges. It is considered that SSR is crucial to preventing the re-occurrence of conflict and war and to enhancing public safety and security. In most post-conflict situations such as Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone, SSR is therefore considered to be a crucial ingredient in the peacebuilding efforts. Post-conflict SSR can often be characterised by a particular *window of opportunity* which consists in being able to conduct a holistic and deep reform so as to contribute to building new institutions and changing institutional cultures. This is in part the case in Liberia, where most security system institutions were literally rebuilt. This allowed the formulation of benchmarks and quotas regarding gender, which proved to contribute to a relatively positive reform course in Liberia with regard to gender sensitivity (Jacob 2008). Traditional gender roles often experience massive changes in times of conflict. SSR can take up these changed roles or behaviours in the aftermath of a conflict and benefit from them for conducting gender-sensitive SSR. In this context, it is essential also to address human right abuses and violations during the years of conflict.

Thus, when conducting SSR in a post-conflict-situation, there are certain dynamics which have to be taken into account. At the same time, these dynamics can also represent entry points for gender-responsive SSR. These entry points might include:

First, the peace process itself. At an early stage of this process, the initial policy guidance for the conduct of SSR is set up. At this point, it is critical to ensure that women's representatives and civil society groups are heard to make sure that the security and justice needs of all social groups are really met.

Secondly, peace support operations themselves may offer many entry points for a gender-responsive SSR by their presence. Female peacekeepers and all-female contingents, such as for example the so-called "Indian contingent" in Liberia's UN peacekeeping mission UNMIL, can serve as role models and can facilitate female recruitment. Furthermore, gender units within the peacekeeping operations can enhance the gender-responsiveness of the SSR process. However, these gender units need to be well-equipped and have adequate personnel resources in order to be able to carry out their tasks effectively.

Thirdly, transitional justice can also represent a crucial entry point. Mechanisms of transitional justice aim at addressing past human rights violations, for example gender-based violence, and thereby facilitate a process of reconciliation and sustainable peacebuilding at a societal level.

#### **4) Conclusion**

The aim of this contribution is to outline the content of the forthcoming OECD DAC chapter

on SSR and gender, to be added to the 2007 SSR Handbook, as well as to highlight its objectives. The OECD DAC acknowledges the important role gender plays in SSR processes by publishing this very specific chapter.

The chapter on gender and SSR is an important step forward in addressing the interconnection between gender concerns and security matters and also in addressing gender as a relational category. The focus for the months to come must now therefore be on programming and the implementation of these guidelines. Thus what is required is expertise on the ground, resources, as well as prioritisation and training.

## Literature

- Aisha, F. 2005:** Mainstreaming Gender in Peace Support Operations: The United Nations Mission in Liberia. In: Aboagye, F. and Bah, A. M. S. (eds), *A Tortuous Road to Peace. The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*, 147-163. URL: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Chap7.pdf>, 13.01.2009.
- Anderlini, S.N./Conaway, C.P. 2004:** Security Sector Reform. In: *International Alert/Women Waging Peace* (eds), *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace. A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action*, 31-40. URL: [http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/46\\_security\\_sector\\_reform.pdf](http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/46_security_sector_reform.pdf), 04.02.2008.
- Bastick, M. et al 2007:** *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector*, Geneva: DCAF.
- Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008a:** Security Sector Reform in Africa. The Promise and Practice of a New Donor Approach. ACCORD Occasional Paper Series 3/2. URL: [http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/op\\_2008\\_2.pdf](http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/op_2008_2.pdf), 20.02.2009.
- Bendix, D./Stanley, R. 2008b:** Engendering Security Sector Reform – Where to from here? In: *Sicherheit und Frieden* 1, 44-47.
- DCAF/INSTRAW/ODIHR 2008,** Security Sector Reform and Gender, Praticce Note 1. URL: [http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2008/02/29669\\_1030\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2008/02/29669_1030_en.pdf), 10.01.2009.
- DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007a:** Project Outline. Gender and Security Sector Reform - Creating Knowledge and Building Capacities. URL: <http://www.dcaf.ch/gender-security-sectorreform/gssr-project-outline.pdf>, 10.01.2009.
- DCAF/UN INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR 2007b:** Good and Bad Practices in Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel. Summary of a Virtual Discussion. URL: <http://www.uninstraw.org/en/images/stories//gender&ssrtrainingdiscussion-summary.pdf>, 10.01.2009.
- GTZ 2005:** Gender and Citizen Security: Regional Training Module. URL: [http://www.gtzgenero.org.ni/publicacion/1130875019\\_guide.pdf](http://www.gtzgenero.org.ni/publicacion/1130875019_guide.pdf), 10.01.2009.
- Hendricks, C./Hutton, L. 2008:** Defense Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit.* Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UNINSTRAW, 2008.
- Human Rights Watch 2002:** *We'll Kill You If You Cry – Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict.* Vol. 15, No.1, Washington/London/Brussels.

- International Centre for Prison Studies 2008:** Penal Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008.
- Jacob, M. 2009:** Engendering Security Sector Reform. Liberia and Sierra Leone Compared. In: Jacob, M. et al (eds), Engendering Security Sector Reform. A Workshop Report, pp.39-66.
- Mazurana, D./Carlson, K. 2004:** From Combat to Community: Women and Girls from Sierra Leone. Washington: Women Waging Policy Commission, Hunt Alternatives Fund.
- Nesiah, V. 2006:** Gender Justice Series, Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies and Procedures, New York: International Centre for Transitional Justice. URL: <http://www.ictj.org/static/Gender/GendHandbook.eng.pdf>, 10.01.2009.
- Oelke, S. 2007:** Security Sector Reform and Gender. Concept and Points of Entry for Development Cooperation. Eschborn: GTZ.
- OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2009:** OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform – Integrating Gender Awareness and Equality. Paris: OECD.
- OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2007:** OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Paris: OECD.
- OECD-Development Assistance Committee 2005:** Security System Reform and Governance. DAC-Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD.
- OECD-Development Assistance Committee 1999:** Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation, DAC-Guidelines. Paris: OECD.
- Popovic, N. 2008:** Security Sector Reform Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008.
- Quast, S. 2008:** Justice Reform and Gender. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.
- Tõnisson Kleppe., T. 2008:** Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel – Good Practices and Lessons Learned. In: Bastick, M./Valasek, K. (eds), Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.
- UNAMSIL/DPKO 2006:** Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming Work and Impact of United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): Final Report prepared for DPKO. By Eugenia Date-Bah. URL: [http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/DPKO/UNAMSIL\\_evaluation.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/DPKO/UNAMSIL_evaluation.pdf), 21.09.2008.

**UN-INSTRAW 2008:** Planning for Action: Good Practices on Implementing UNSCR 1325 on a National Level. URL: <http://www.un-instraw.org/images/files/Backgroundpaper1325.pdf>, 10.01.2009.

**UN INSTRAW 2004:** Gender and SSR Framework. URL: <http://www.uninstraw.org/en/index.php?option=content&task=blogcategory&id=152&Itemid=211>, 10.01.2009.

**UNDP 1994:** Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**UN DPKO Best Practice Unit 2004:** Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations. URL: <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/library/GRP%20Full%20Version.pdf>, 10.01.2009.

**UNIFEM 2007:** Policy Briefing Paper: Gender Sensitive Police Reform in Post Conflict Societies. URL: [http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender\\_Sensitive\\_Police\\_Reform\\_Policy\\_Briefing\\_2007.pdf](http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/Gender_Sensitive_Police_Reform_Policy_Briefing_2007.pdf), 10.01.2009.

**UNIFEM 2004:** Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. URL: [http://www.iknowpolitics.org/files/Getting\\_it\\_Right\\_Doing\\_it\\_Right.pdf](http://www.iknowpolitics.org/files/Getting_it_Right_Doing_it_Right.pdf)

**UNMIL/Office of the Gender Advisor 2003:** Gender Mainstreaming. URL: [http://unmil.org/documents/Gender\\_Background\\_and\\_mainstreaming.pdf](http://unmil.org/documents/Gender_Background_and_mainstreaming.pdf), 10.10.2008.

**UN Security Council 2000:** Resolution 1325. URL: [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf), 06.01.2009.

**UN Security Council 2008,** Resolution 1820. URL: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement>, 10.01.2009.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Daniel Bendix** is a PhD candidate at the *Institute for Development Policy and Management* of the *University of Manchester*. In his research he explores how far contemporary development policies are shaped by mechanisms of power that reflect a colonial legacy. In 2007-8 he carried out research on Security Sector Reform in a project funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research and directed by Ruth Stanley at the Free University of Berlin.

**Margarete Jacob** works as a Carlo-Schmid Fellow with the OECD DAC's *International Network on Conflict and Fragility*. Over the past months, she has accompanied the publication process of the OECD DAC chapter on gender and security system reform that will be added to the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform at a later stage. She previously worked in the German Bundestag on issues related to security sector reform. Margarete holds a master's degree in 'International Security' from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris and a diploma in political sciences from the Free University Berlin.

**Henri Myrntinen** is a freelance researcher based in Berlin and has worked extensively on issues of gender and conflict in post-disaster and post-conflict societies. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, South Africa, completing his thesis on masculinities and violence in Timor Leste. He has also written a report on Gender and SSR in Timor Leste for DCAF Geneva which will be published in 2009.

**Sandra Oelke** works for the sector programme "Peace and Security" of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Over the past years, she worked extensively on issues of security sector reform in a development context. She is now based in Nairobi, where she works with GTZ as a consultant to the Eastern African Standby Brigade Mechanism.

**Ruth Stanley** teaches international relations, peace and conflict research and political science at the Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science, Free University Berlin. She is a graduate of the University of Oxford and the Free University of Berlin, where she gained her Ph.D in political science. In 2007-8 she directed a research project on Security Sector Reform funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research, and is currently co-directing a research project on the governance of public security in Buenos Aires and Mexico City with the Research Centre 'Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood' (DFG SFB 700).

**Kristin Valasek** is DCAF's Gender and Security Sector Reform Project Officer working with the Women in an Insecure World Programme. Prior to joining DCAF, Kristin coordinated gender, peace and security policy, research and training at UN INSTRAW. She has also worked with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs focusing on gender mainstreaming. Kristin holds a Masters in Conflict Resolution from the University of Bradford.